I would like to put a possible exit strategy for Iraq on the table for discussion. I have had the Dean position on Iraq from the outset–stupid decision, but now that we’re there we must make the best decision for all given the new, albeit unwelcome, reality on the ground. We broke it and we need to be responsible enough to help fix it, not to mention that leaving it broken could seriously hurt us.
The details below. . .
Here’s the basic plan:
- Change the military mission. Transition Coalition action from trying to establish internal Iraqi peace and security to essentially robust border patrol–preventing foreign forces entering or leaving Iraq. The fledgling Iraqi police force will have to sink or swim or ask the UN for peacekeeping assistance. The Coalition will change their mission to creating the space for Iraqis to work out amongst themselves what kind of nation they wish to be without fear of overt pressure from Turkey, Iran, Syria, Jordan or (and this is key) the US. Logistics support for this changed operation will need to be planned carefully because it is critical that the US be seen to be moving to the edges and to be leaving the middle of Iraq. Strong diplomatic efforts with the border countries may yield some assistance with this new mission. Rhetorically and physically we need to change from occupation to protection of Iraq. This means that there will be no more Coalition security protection for reconstruction efforts or for Coalition private contractors. This mission change wouldn’t necessarily preclude covert special ops inside Iraq to deal with a specific high-level terrorist operation, but the public profile of the Coalition mission must change. Over time, US forces can be replaced by other Coalition troops and ultimately by Iraqis as the Iraqi government gets its feet.
- Change the reconstruction mission. Tight border control should also encourage the rebuilding of Iraqi industrial capacity (particularly if investment funds are offered) so that less must be imported. Increasing the number of available jobs for young Iraqi men is an essential part of the strategy. Coalition and other international aid MUST flow to Iraqis in ways that keep the money in Iraq cycling through its economy. The UN or other international agencies might try applying community-based micro-lending extensively as a means of stimulating local economies and enhancing efforts at community self-reliance. International aid might also target the building of appropriate technology industry (solar power comes to mind) that can provide electricity without the transmission lines. I see microloans to purchase solar cells and storage capacity in support of small businesses. Rebuilding Iraq from the bottom-up, instead of the top-down, is the single most important step to actually encourage the lofty “freedom” that Bush evangelizes.
- Change the attitude toward the Iraqi insurgency. Increase diplomatic outreach to Iraqi insurgents challenge them to govern as well as oppose. Challenge them to remove those factions that don’t want to build, but simply destroy. Use PR to denounce the suicide bomb activity as anti-Iraqi and therefore, anti-Islamic. The idea here is to refocus the attention of the insurgency on building something positive for Iraq instead of merely opposing the occupying force.
- Include all stakeholders in the constitutional negotiation process, whether or not they’ve met some US notions of legitimacy–including representatives of Baathist loyalists. This might even include representatives of Iraq’s immediate neighbors or the Arab League as non-voting observers. It may be necessary to overtly exclude US and British parties or surrogates to boost the legitimacy of the process.
- Change the guards. UN peacekeeping forces should take over protection of vital assets (oil fields, airports, interior operational military bases and Green Zone). Green zone should be maintained as a “neutral safe zone” for negotiations between factions, but under UN control. The idea is to keep key resources neutral with respect to actual and potential warring factions. Contracting for the oil fields must be in the control of the recognized Iraqi government but overseen by UN for fraud and abuse.
For the first few years, Iraq probably needs to have strongly federalized government, whereby most power is devolved to the provinces or other-defined regions and the central government limited to overseeing the oil revenues and disbursing them fairly to the provinces so that they can build up security and infrastructure and independent industries. This would allow the development of strong regional representation from which a more legitimate national government can be built. It also risks hardening the internal divisions in the country along tribal and religious lines, making it easier to visualize civil war or even ethnic cleansing. The presence of UN peacekeepers and the close proximity of Coalition troops and robust efforts at promoting constitutional government will lessen these risks as a practical matter, I think, in the short term.
Bush, of course, can’t really accomplish this plan unless he’s willing to completely abandon his real reasons for going there in the first place: control of oil, reconstruction contracts for Halliburton, new permanent U.S. military bases, or installation of compliant, puppet regime. Even if he’s willing, his neocon backers won’t let him sell them down the Tigris.
Dems, OTOH, can certainly promote these ideas “changing course away from failure and towards success in Iraq”. The plan 1) shows a path to the possibility of a democratic Iraq, 2) promotes more robustly and convincingly the freedom of self-determination, 3) minimizing the risk of regionalizing the conflict, 4) focuses the military objective on a measurable and doable goal (keeping the foreigners out of Iraq’s nation-building process), and 5) creates a more reasonable scenario whereby US forces can be replaced over time by other forces. WRT this last item: It seems more likely that the Coalition can be broadened more easily to support guarding the borders than to support policing the cities, since it is a task vastly better suited to military approaches (not to mention safer) than is rooting out entrenched urban insurgents.
I’ll stop now. Could this fly, either as an actual policy (instituted by a different US govt, of course) or as a political winner with the public?
