There was an historic breakthrough yesterday in the North Korean nuclear standoff. Apparently the North Koreans gave up some of there demands and agreed to halt its nuclear program in exchange for a civilian reactor. This was of course seen as a major diplomatic victory in the war on nuclear proliferation but North Korea was sure to put a quick halt to that:
The US should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK’s dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs (light-water reactors), a physical guarantee for confidence-building
This should come as no surprise to anyone who is informed about the position of the North for the past 2.5 years. The problem has always seemed to be who will do what when (sequencing). Diplomats were obviously led to believe that the Koreans would dismantle, sign the NPT and the safeguards prior to receiving any rewards; if this was the agreement yesterday the Koreans seemed to have unilaterally changed that agreement:
As clarified in the joint statement, we will return to the NPT and sign the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and comply with it immediately upon the US provision of LWRs, a basis of confidence-building, to us
…
As already clarified more than once, we will feel no need to keep even a single nuclear weapon if the DPRK-US relations are normalized, bilateral confidence is built and we are not exposed to the US nuclear threat any longer.What is most essential is, therefore, for the US to provide LWRs to the DPRK as early as possible as evidence proving the former’s substantial recognition of the latter’s nuclear activity for a peaceful purpose.
As I pointed out yesterday I was skeptical on an agreement that was based on promises and my skepticism was obviously warranted. The signed agreements between foreign ministers and diplomats are not to be celebrated until ratified by all parties (leaders of each nation). There was similar confusion in the Iranian negotiations prior to their suspension of their enrichment programs. These latest developments does not necessarily mean that yesterday’s progress wasn’t real progress (if nothing more it shows that the Koreans are not completely opposed to dismantling of all their nuclear weapons) but it demonstrates the medias ignorance and their desire to break stories rather than explain them. Don’t sound the celebratory trumpets just yet.
A Promise Is A Comfort To A Fool
Were prescient yesterday. Good call.
So let’s say we give them the LWR’s.
There’s still this vagueness ahead of us:
we will feel no need to keep even a single nuclear weapon if the DPRK-US relations are normalized, bilateral confidence is built and we are not exposed to the US nuclear threat any longer.
That looks like a series of loopholes big enough to drive a nuclear reactor through. All they will have to do is say, “Gee, thanks for the LWR, but you know our relations just don’t feel ‘normal’ to us. We just don’t have enough of that ol’ bilateral confidence spirit. And we still feel exposed to a nuclear threat from the US.”
And then what would we do. . .repossess the LWR’s?
This deal looks like a way to get the US to pay for hugely expensive stuff while the NK’s continue on their merry way doing anything they want to do.
Thanks for keeping us informed about this stuff, wiseprince. (Your link doesn’t go where you want it to go.)
You obviously raise a good point. I think the best way to look at this is not to look at them dismantling their nuclear weapons immediately but to get them to sign onto NPT and the safeguards. With Bush’s policy vise-a-vie North Korea the world took a major step backwards because they pulled out of treaties and got rid of inspections. We need to get back to that point. We can’t expect to jump from the situation we find ourselves in now straight to a non-nuclear North Korea (After all they were labeled apart of the Axis of Evil along with Iraq and Iran)
Someday maybe someone will do a book detailing all the ways in which the world had to struggle just to try to get back to the point where we were at the moment that Bush took office. They could call it, Undoing the Damage.
I wish I could agree with you about the benefits of signing on to the NPT.
Given the fact that the US first and foremost has now routinely and with impunity violated almost every tenent of the NPT, and in doing so has lessened it’s benefits to non-nuclear countries as a result, there is now less incentive for nations to support the NPT protocols now than ever before.
With the US doing R&D on tactical nukes, and with them giving nuke technology and support to non-signatory India, why would any country wary of “first world”, nuclear armed aggression choose to deny themselves the one seemingly effective deterrent against such aggression?
Mind you, I’m not advocating such rationale, but clearly such defensive thinking has resonance in the increasingly violent world the Bush regime is propagating. By undermining the practical incentives for nations to want to remain nuke free, BushCo has done incalculable damage that will take decades to repair.
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The Bush administration has finally changed its tactics on Iran and N. Korea. The problem is that during four years of stalemate, both countries moved on with their programs.Both Iran and North Korea are aggressively using this progress on the ground as leverage in talks. Tehran, especially, is barreling ahead with new found confidence, converting raw uranium at a great rate and seeking to isolate Washington and its three European allies diplomatically from other nations. Russia and the other 30 members of the IAEA’s Board of Governors.
Since re-activating its nuclear program in August, in defiance of the wishes of the “European Union-3” — Britain, Germany and France– , Iran has converted more than seven tons of raw uranium or “yellowcake” at its Isfahan facility into uranium hexafluoride gas, or UF6, officials with the IAEA tell Newsweek. UF6 is the basic feeder stock for enriching uranium into bomb-grade material and reactor fuel. Added to more than two tons already on hand, “that’s enough for two nuclear bombs,” says David Albright, a nuclear expert with the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington.
¶ A Foreboding?
CIA/America Refused Arrest in 1975 & 1985
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Whenever a gang of megalomaniacal warmongers, (Cheney, et. al.) seeks to gain support of the people in order to expand their aggressive use of force, they set about to create more enemies and find more ways to sustain the threat from them. They do not allow diplomatic efforts that might eliminate those perceived threats to succeed.
Cheney and the neocons will never allow a real deal for N. Korea to dismantle it’s nukes to go forward. Like they do with bin Laden, (conspicuously still at large), they need to use Kim Jong Il as a boogeyman in order to advance their warmaking agenda, and in the particular case of N. Korea, to go forward with the ridiuculously expensive and non-functional “missile defense” boondoggle, a huge operation whose primary function is to loot the treasury and turn over the proceeds to defense industry contractors.
sbj said it right.
Short version: A nation would have to be stupid to sign on to the NPT in good faith. Perhaps the North Koreans are crazy, but most surely they are not stupid.
However, the real obstacle to the NPT is the US, which remains in blatant violation of its own treaty. While this is very bad news for the multi-cellular part of the biosphere, the fact is that right now the NPT is just completely dead.
When, within a couple of decades, American industrial society is completely destroyed, and the possibility of making and maintainging these weapons no longer exists, then the issues of nuclear disarmament will be revisited, successfully.
But not yet.
You guys are wrong. As far as the U.S is concerned it may be dead only because the IAEA refuses to call America on its blatant disregard for the NPT. That being said it is not dead for nations who respect international law and who have something to gain/lose by abiding by the NPT. As long as the IAEA has the ability to take concerns to the security counsel the NPT is a good deterent. Moreover, in its application it serves as a way to monitor nuclear activities. When Nuclear inspectors were in North Korea the world knew its capabilities (granted they were in breach). At the very least the world had a very good understanding of the program. At present no one outside of the North Koreans have any idea what they have which makes the situation that much more dangerous.
If inspectors were not thrown out of Iraq in 1998 the world would not be lead to believe that Saddam had WMD and thus could have averted a war, saved tens of thousands of Iraqi lives and at least 2000 coalition lives. It is not perfect but it is not “dead”. Without much thought one can see where the NPT & safeguards have helped and in the case of North Korea how much faster nuclear programs would be without safeguards.
But the IAEA could not force the US into compliance, they could only make a declaration that the US is out of compliance. As useful as that would be, I don’t think, at this time, it would change the strategic situation.
The US has embarked on force alone, and that creates the world’s strategic reality. The US no longer has any qualms at all about being an outlaw nation.
Or indeed, about anything.
The IAEA has the right, the power and the obligation to refer the United States to the U.N security counsel but in practice what would that really accomplish. They could recommend sanctions be placed on the United States but in this global economy where many nations are reliant on Americans as consumers how well do you think that would go over? Also, the United States has veto power so the conflict of interest should be self-evident.
I wrote a diary previewing the world summit in which I pointed out some of the 750 change the United States wanted ammended to previously ironed out reform compromises. The change request should show where the United States truly stands in this world. It is quite shameful to be completely honest. The U.N needs to be able to deal with all member states including the economically wealthy and the politically powerful. Unfortunately in its current form I don’t think that is realistic (and on that point you are correct).