Judge Asks Key Question On 9/11 Foreknowledge

Judge: Key issue is whether 3,000 victims could have been saved
WASHINGTON (AP) -- The fact that the U.S. government overlooked numerous warning signs in the run-up to the September 11 attacks is an old story that is being used in a new way in the Zacarias Moussaoui case. It could save his life.

With the admitted al Qaeda conspirator facing a death penalty trial early next year, the judge framed a key question in a recent closed-door hearing: Even if Moussaoui had told the FBI everything that he knew, would that have enabled the government to avert the 2001 terrorist strikes?
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"We need to know almost frozen in time what was known by the government before the planes hit the World Trade Center," MacMahon told the judge.
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The upcoming penalty phase has Moussaoui's lawyers poring through material from past investigations for evidence of what the government knew before September 11.

The last paragraph is crucial to what might develop with the investigations of SP Fitzgerald. This came about, in part, as a result of Moussaoui finally entering a guilty plea after trying several times to have his case heard.

The following details were taken from a Timeline of the Franklin/Plame events.


April 13, 2004: Bush Continues to Insist That 9/11 Could Not Have Been Prevented
           In a press conference, President Bush states, "We knew he [Osama bin Laden] had designs on us, we knew he hated us. But there was nobody in our government, and I don't think [in] the prior government, that could envision flying airplanes into buildings on such a massive scale." [Guardian, 4/15/04] He also says, "Had I any inkling whatsoever that the people were going to fly airplanes into buildings, we would have moved heaven and earth to save the country." [White House, 4/13/04; New York Times, 4/18/04 (C)] Two days earlier, he said, "Had I known there was going to be an attack on America I would have moved mountains to stop the attack." [New York Times, 4/18/04] In July 2004, he will claim even more generally, "Had we had any inkling whatsoever that terrorists were about to attack our country, we would have moved heaven and earth to protect America." [New Jersey Star-Ledger, 7/22/04]
People and organizations involved: George W. Bush, Osama bin Laden

April 22, 2004: Death Penalty Allowed by Appeals Court
           In spite of multiple rulings beginning in 2002 that Zacarias Moussaoui must be allowed to question witnesses, including Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, the government has continued to refuse any access to high-level al-Qaeda prisoners. Because of this, Judge Brinkema sanctions the government by ruling in October 2003 that the prosecution could not seek the death penalty. [Time, 10/19/03] Prosecutors have appealed the decision and, on this day, a federal appeals panel restores the government's right to seek the death penalty. However, the same ruling hands a partial victory to Moussaoui, ordering prosecutors to work out a method that would permit Moussaoui to question three high-level prisoners. CBS News reports that the judge ruled, "Moussaoui could have access to information from three al-Qaeda prisoners [Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, and Mustafa al-Hawsawi] who may be able to exonerate him." [CBS News, 4/23/04] As a result of the appeals decision, the government will file a motion in July 2004, seeking to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of Moussaoui. The motion explains that the evaluation would only be used to counter any defense strategy to spare Moussaoui the death penalty by citing his mental condition. The motion states, "Like most capital cases, the mental condition of the defendant is likely to play a significant rule during the penalty phase." [CBS News, 4/23/04; Guardian, 7/7/04]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Zacarias Moussaoui, Leonie Brinkema

July 2004: Report on FBI's 9/11 Failures Is Completed, But Remains Unreleased Until After Presidential Election
           In November 2002, as the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry was finishing its investigation, it had formally asked for a report by the Justice Department (which oversees the FBI) to determine "whether and to what extent personnel at all levels should be held accountable" for the failure to stop the 9/11 attacks. An identical request was made to the CIA (see June-November 2004). [New York Times, 9/14/04] The Justice Department report, titled "A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks," is completed this month. [Washington Post, 4/30/05] It centers on three FBI failures before 9/11: the failure to follow up on the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui in August 2001 (see August 15, 2001), the failure to follow up on FBI agent Ken Williams' memo (see July 10, 2001) warning about Islamic militants training in US flight schools, and the FBI's failure to follow up on many leads to hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar. The report provides some new details about miscommunications, inaction, and other problems. [New York Times, 9/14/04] The report remains classified. Senior Senate Judiciary Committee members Patrick Leahy (D) and Charles Grassley (R) call for its release. The senators state, "While the needs of national security must be weighed seriously, we fear the designation of information as classified, in some cases, serves to protect the executive branch against embarrassing revelations and full accountability. We hope that is not the case here." [New York Times, 9/14/04; Washington Times, 7/12/04] One problem complicating the issuing of even a declassified version is the possibility that the material would taint the criminal proceedings against Zacarias Moussaoui. In early 2005, the Justice Department inspector general's office will ask the judge presiding over Moussaoui's case for permission to release a declassified version of the report. But the judge will turn down the request in April 2005, even after Moussaoui pleads guilty (see April 30, 2005). The report will finally be released in June 2005 without the section on Moussaoui (see June 9, 2005). [New York Times, 2/13/05]
People and organizations involved: US Department of Justice, Charles Grassley, Patrick Leahy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Zacarias Moussaoui, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ken Williams, Khalid Almihdhar

April 22, 2005: Moussaoui Pleads Guilty to All Charges Against Him, But Denies Role in 9/11 Plot

Zacarias Moussaoui.
In an unexpected move, Zacarias Moussaoui pleads guilty to all six terrorism conspiracy charges against him. Moussaoui had been arrested weeks before 9/11, and was formally charged in December 2001 for his role in the 9/11 plot. He says it is "absolutely correct" that he is guilty of the charges: conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries; to commit aircraft piracy; to destroy aircraft; to use weapons of mass destruction; to murder US government employees; and to destroy US government property. However, he says, "I was not part of 9/11," but rather claims he was part of a "broader conspiracy" aimed at post-9/11 attacks. He says he was personally directed by bin Laden to pilot a 747 and "strike the White House" with it, but as part of a "different conspiracy than 9/11." His plea means there will be no trial to determine guilt, but there will still be a trial to determine his sentencing, which could be as severe as the death penalty. He promises to fight in the sentencing phase, stating he doesn't deserve death because he was not directly connected to the 9/11 plot. [CNN, 4/23/05; Washington Post, 4/23/05] A CNN legal analyst notes that Moussaoui's guilty plea "makes little sense." Moussaoui may have actually had a chance to be proven not guilty because of the many thorny legal issues his case raises (two suspected members of the al-Qaeda Hamburg cell have been found not guilty in German courts because they have not been allowed access to testimony from al-Qaeda prisoners who might exonerate them, and Moussaoui so far has been denied access to those same prisoners (see March 22, 2005)). It is pointed out that Moussaoui gave a guilty plea without "any promise of leniency in exchange for his plea," and that he is unlikely to gain any sympathetic advantage from it in the death penalty trial. CNN's analyst notes that the statements in his plea "suggest that Moussaoui [mistakenly] thought he had tricked the prosecution." Doubts still remain whether Moussaoui is fully mentally sound and capable of legally defending himself. [CNN, 4/28/05] A terrorism expert for RAND Corporation says of Moussaoui's rather confusing statements, "If we thought by the end of the day we would find the holy grail as to exactly what the genesis of 9/11 was and what Moussaoui's role in it was, we have been sorely disappointed. This contradiction in his behavior raises more questions than it answers." The Washington Post notes that, "It remains uncertain" whether the death penalty trial "will divulge much new information about the plot." [Washington Post, 4/23/05 (B)]
People and organizations involved: Zacarias Moussaoui, Osama bin Laden

The FBI report was finally released in June of 2005, almost a year after it’s completion. It concluded the cause of failure was widespread deficencies in the system. Able Danger was then part of the discussion soon after and it could be drawn from the circumstances that it may have been a part of what was being covered up. An interesting bit of speculation might assume that Fitzgerald had the FBI report in his possession and before the grand jury as a cause for the dely in it’s public release.

With the interwoven connections of the Franklin and Plame investigations with events that stretch backward beyond 9/11, one of many constant common elements is seen…Patrick Fitzgerald.