[Promoted from the diaries by Steven D]
“I like guys who’ve never been there that criticize us who’ve been there. I like that. I like guys who got five deferments and never been there and send people to war, and then don’t like to hear suggestions about what needs to be done.”
–Congressman John Murtha on Dick Cheney
Congressman John Murtha’s stunning remarks Thursday may have finally broken the logjam of posturing, triangulating, and hemming and hawing that has plagued certain Democrats ever since the Dubyanocchio Administration let it be publicly known that the United States was going into Iraq 41 months ago. That is, if those Dems can keep from being cowed by anti-American pissants like this one. For smacking down such creatures, all they need follow is Murtha’s superb roundhouse kick to the head of chickenhawk Cheney.
Not that we’ll necessarily see a complete withdrawal from Iraq in six months or even a year. George Walker Bush still has 1158 days to serve. But Murtha, the decorated Marine, has left other far more liberal Democrats with no further excuse for continuing to shy away from discussing the inevitable: America will leave Iraq before that country is democratized, rebuilt or even stabilized because efforts to do so have failed. Even if the Administration was to yield in its obstinacy and change course along the lines suggested by, say, General Wesley Clark, it’s too late to turn the situation around.
When the Administration and its allies were crafting their plans for invading Iraq four years ago, one thing on their minds was the definitive shattering of the “Vietnam Syndrome.” That disorder was a conservative caricature. It depicted progressives and media and “back-stabbing” politicians as having not only caused the U.S. to lose the war in Southeast Asia but also of making the American public unwilling to support military force anywhere for almost any reason.
That was a phony accusation, but it resonated with ideologues eager to prove that Democrats were “weak on defense,” just as they supposedly were weak when they “lost China” a generation prior. Some went so far as to claim that Ronald Reagan was influenced by Vietnam Syndrome when he brought the Marines home after the 1983 barracks bombing in Beirut.
George H.W. Bush more or less claimed that the syndrome had been terminated after the Gulf War in 1991, saying “the ghosts of Vietnam had been laid to rest beneath the sands of the Arabian desert.” In the view of the neoconservatives, however, the opportunity to drive a stake into the heart of the syndrome was surrendered because the U.S. stopped well short of Baghdad. They had argued ever since in favor of finishing the job. And, in January 2001, they had set the Administration’s wheels in motion to do just that, more than eight months before Osama’s kamikazes gave them the twisted excuse they needed.
I’m sure the last thing they anticipated was creating an Iraq Syndrome. But that’s where their foreign policy has been taking us since January 2001. As we all have seen, that policy has weakened the economy, trashed military readiness and recruiting, given our real enemies oodles of experience in fighting a hyperpower on the ground and undermined the fight on terror (or whatever we’re calling it now).
Enlightened Democratic leaders can shape this still inchoate syndrome to America’s and the world’s advantage. But not if they draw the wrong lessons from it, the way conservatives drew the wrong lessons from Vietnam, using their stab-in-the-back smears to underpin the current foreign policy that is ideologically as bad if not worse than the one which produced the Southeast Asian slaughterfest.
I think almost all elected Democrats, even those who haven’t yet signed on to Congressman Murtha’s proposal, have learned the first important lesson of the Iraq Syndrome: don’t stick with what doesn’t work.
For the record, along with about 30% of Americans, I opposed this war long before shock and awe got CNN’s stamp of approval. As I’ve written before, it wasn’t a mistake, it was a calculated scheme by men and women who thought – like prideful hegemonists throughout history – to remake the world in their self-interested image or, at least, force it to kowtow in their direction.
My prewar opposition aside, I have to face facts. If the occupation of Iraq had gone as well as the weeks leading up to “Mission Accomplished,” if Bush and his cronies had been competent, if they had sent more troops, if they had stuck with international law regarding treatment of prisoners, if they hadn’t diverted resources from Afghanistan as part of the invasion, if they’d stopped the looting, if they hadn’t disbanded the Iraqi army, if they’d secured the arsenals, if they’d not allowed their pals to suck up no-bid contracts, if they’d supplied the troops with decent equipment, if they’d listened to somebody besides Ahmad Chalabi, if they’d read any history, if, if, if … then we probably wouldn’t be having this little talk. (Competence wouldn’t have excused the fact they lied and exaggerated and invented a rationale to start an unnecessary war, of course. But that is another discussion.)
With the possible exception of Joe Lieberman and a handful of others, Democrats generally agree that the war has been outrageously mishandled, and I’ll hazard a guess that the vast majority also believe the opposite of what Cheney this week shrieked to be the case. The war was a put-up job. Beyond this, however, the party is split, most importantly, split over what to do next.
Which brings me back to the headline of this piece.
The two generals I have in mind are General Wesley Clark and General William Odom.
Let me say at the outset, I have no grudge against General Clark. Had he won the nomination last year, I would have raised money for him, walked precincts for him, voted for him and tried my best to persuade others to do likewise, just as I did for John Kerry after my first choice, Howard Dean, bit the dust. There was, indeed, a time when I thought many of his proposals for what to do in Iraq made eminent good sense. They would still make sense if a Democrat were president so we could begin changing course tomorrow. But a Democrat is not president and one won’t be for years, and meanwhile, the Iraq situation and all its fallout – diplomatic, military, economic – worsens.
While General Clark has long recognized that Administration policy in Iraq is wrongheaded, reckless and dangerous, over the past 18 months he has been unwilling to budge from his view that now is not the time to argue in favor of a pull-out.
Now was not the time in April or June or October of 2004. Now was not the time in late August 2005 when he wrote his well-distributed Washington Post Op-Ed column. Now was not the time when he spoke to the Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus in late September. Now was not the time when he gave his radio address in late October at the time of the constitutional referendum.
I hate to be trite, but if not now, when?
Clark’s August column nicely described Administration policy. And, though I disagree with aspects of it, he offered some excellent prescriptions for improving the situation. Vast improvements if, again, a Democrat were president. But Bush is president and will be for 38 more months, four more than we’ve already been failing in Iraq.
In the last line of his column, Clark writes:
If the Administration won’t adopt a winning strategy, then the American people will be justified in demanding that the Administration bring our troops home.
Bush won’t and can’t adopt a winning strategy. If there was such a time, it was three years ago, two years ago, perhaps one year ago. But now, given that 13% of the Iraqi people support continued occupation and given every other FUBAR we’re all too familiar with – with a new one announced practically every week – it’s clear there is no winning strategy. (As an opponent from the get-go, I never thought there was a winning strategy, but that, too, is another discussion.)
General Clark and many other Democrats, including some of my favorite commentators in wwwLand, continue to argue against benchmarks and dates certain for withdrawal using the same old claims: We broke it, we have to fix it. If we leave, the situation will worsen, not just in Iraq but beyond. Bush Inc. got us into this mess, we have to get out of it in “the right way.” Nobody wants photographs of helicopters taking off from embassy roofs with Iraqi officials hanging from the struts.
Clark concedes to a narrowing window of opportunity: He says something must be done before it’s too late. But he’s been saying that for a long time. And now, today, as Congressman Murtha has reluctantly, sadly, concluded, it is too late.
Meanwhile, Clark, using the same words as George Bush, argues that withdrawal will “embolden the terrorists.” In his radio speech just a month ago, he said:
“But America cannot allow itself to be so blinded by anger over this Administration’s mishandling of events since the removal of Saddam Hussein from power that we are unable to see the danger of pushing for a premature withdrawal of U.S. forces. Those who would use terror as a tactic in Iraq would be rewarded and emboldened if we pull out prematurely. We cannot do that …”
I am no particular fan of William Odom or the pro-Republican Hudson Institute, where he is a senior fellow. Although I’ve heard his take on improving U.S. intelligence is well worthwhile, the only one of his books I’ve read is America’s Inadvertent Empire, a choppy and occasionally incoherent look at U.S. power in the 21st century whose very title gives away its bias.
On the other hand, unswayed by the neoconservatives’ arguments, he was opposed to the Iraq invasion before it happened. On target then, on target now. His most recent demolition of the rationale for why the U.S. must not leave Iraq “precipitately” was published at the same time as Clark’s August Op-Ed.
If I were a journalist, I would list all the arguments that you hear against pulling U.S. troops out of Iraq, the horrible things that people say would happen, and then ask: Aren’t they happening already? Would a pullout really make things worse? Maybe it would make things better.
Here are some of the arguments against pulling out:
1. We would leave behind a civil war.
- We would lose credibility on the world stage.
- It would embolden the insurgency and cripple the move toward democracy.
- Iraq would become a haven for terrorists.
- Iranian influence in Iraq would increase.
- Unrest might spread in the region and/or draw in Iraq’s neighbors.
- Shiite-Sunni clashes would worsen.
- We haven’t fully trained the Iraqi military and police forces yet.
- Talk of deadlines would undercut the morale of our troops.
But consider this:
1) On civil war. Iraqis are already fighting Iraqis. Insurgents have killed far more Iraqis than Americans. That’s civil war. We created the civil war when we invaded; we can’t prevent a civil war by staying.
For those who really worry about destabilizing the region, the sensible policy is not to stay the course in Iraq. It is rapid withdrawal, re-establishing strong relations with our allies in Europe, showing confidence in the UN Security Council, and trying to knit together a large coalition including the major states of Europe, Japan, South Korea, China, and India to back a strategy for stabilizing the area from the eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Until the United States withdraws from Iraq and admits its strategic error, no such coalition can be formed.
Odom goes on to deconstruct the other eight reasons as well. I urge everyone to follow the link. For those who won’t, here’s what he says about No. 4:
4) On terrorists. Iraq is already a training ground for terrorists. In fact, the CIA has pointed out to the administration and congress that Iraq is spawning so many terrorists that they are returning home to many other countries to further practice their skills there. The quicker a new dictator wins the political power in Iraq and imposes order, the sooner the country will stop producing well-experienced terrorists.
Why not ask: “Mr. President, since you and the vice president insisted that Saddam’s Iraq supported al Qaeda – which we now know it did not – isn’t your policy in Iraq today strengthening al Qaeda’s position in that country?”
And No. 8:
8) On training the Iraq military and police. The insurgents are fighting very effectively without US or European military advisors to train them. Why don’t the soldiers and police in the present Iraqi regime’s service do their duty as well? Because they are uncertain about committing their lives to this regime. They are being asked to take a political stand, just as the insurgents are. Political consolidation, not military-technical consolidation, is the issue.
The issue is not military training; it is institutional loyalty. We trained the Vietnamese military effectively. Its generals took power and proved to be lousy politicians and poor fighters in the final showdown. In many battles over a decade or more, South Vietnamese military units fought very well, defeating VC and NVA units. But South Vietnam’s political leaders lost the war.
Even if we were able to successfully train an Iraqi military and police force, the likely result, after all that, would be another military dictatorship. Experience around the world teaches us that military dictatorships arise when the military’s institutional modernization gets ahead of political consolidation.
In the December Atlantic Monthly, James Fallows views No. 8 somewhat differently in his look into Why Iraq Has No Army [subscription only]. In great detail, Fallows blames Administration policy for this failure, quotes depressing assessments by soldiers and civilians on the ground, and finally notes:
But listening to these soldiers and advisers is also deeply discouraging — in part because so much of what they report is discouraging in itself, but even more because the conversations head to a predictable dead end. Sooner or later the question is What do we do now? or What is the way out? And the answer is that there is no good answer.
Three months ago, Hendrik Hertzberg wrote similarly in The New Yorker:
The chilling truth is that no one really knows what to do. No one knows whether the consequences of withdrawal, quick or slow, would be worse or better – for Iraq and for the “war on terror” of which, willy-nilly, it has become a part of – than the consequences of “staying the course.” It is a matter of judgment, and the judgment that will count, more chilling still, is that of George W. Bush.
In August, General Odom wrote:
So why is almost nobody advocating a pullout? I can only speculate. We face a strange situation today where few if any voices among Democrats in Congress will mention early withdrawal from Iraq, and even the one or two who do will not make a comprehensive case for withdrawal now. Why are the Democrats failing the public on this issue today? The biggest reason is because they weren’t willing to raise that issue during the campaign. Howard Dean alone took a clear and consistent stand on Iraq, and the rest of the Democratic party trashed him for it. Most of those in Congress voted for the war and let that vote shackle them later on. Now they are scared to death that the White House will smear them with lack of patriotism if they suggest pulling out.
That wasn’t quite true when Odom wrote it. The Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus was formed in July and Russ Feingold has, of course, been calling for withdrawal by Christmas 2006 for quite some time. The liberal hawks at the Center for American Progress have written a comprehensive “redeployment” plan. Though the withdrawal they propose is molasses-like, they include kernels of good ideas for a broader foreign policy. Having already been smeared, John Kerry has found his voice on the subject of withdrawal. Murtha, nationally obscure, but arguably the most militarily credentialed elected Democrat to speak up so far, has given his fellow Democrats a rallying point.
Like Kerry, I want 20,000 home for Christmas. I want everybody home by, say, next Easter. But I know better. Too many obstacles. However, with the holidays just around the corner, activist-constituents around the country should prepare to push a couple of hundred home district-visiting Democratic Representatives and Senators into Murtha’s camp to fight to make next year the last for our troops in Iraq.
With an ever-larger percentage of Americans disenchanted with “stay the course,” maybe just enough Republicans can be pried from the Administration to back a much speeded-up version of the CAP plan, along with political and financial support for a U.N. sealing of the borders while the new Iraqi government learns to deal with the insurgency, an insurgency which will undoubtedly but unpredictably change with a U.S. withdrawal.
As many have said, there is no good answer. Whenever we withdraw, we’re surely going to see many things happen in Iraq that we’re not going to like. I fervently wish we were in different circumstances. If I thought that staying would make a difference, would improve matters for Iraq, would deter terrorism, would make America really stronger, more respected, better able to deal with the regional instability, I’d go along with Wesley Clark’s suggestions. If only it were three years ago. But we don’t have a time machine. We can’t start over, regain Iraqi trust and make up for the tactical, strategic and moral mistakes already made. Out now is the only solution. And now is now.
It can’t just be out now. America does have a responsibility to try to clean up the mess George Bush and his pals have created. Withdrawal should not mean abandon. We do owe the Iraqi people assistance, tens of billions in economic aid and whatever other help may be appropriate given unfolding developments. But it is ever more apparent that progress can’t be made so long as the U.S. occupies Iraq and creates a rationale for the jihadist wing of the insurgents who unhesitatingly blow up babies.
Getting the troops out, of course, is only one piece of what fresh, Democratic-inspired foreign and defense policies must entail. Those policies must be multilateral. And they must be based on acknowledgment that military power is scarcely the sole component of national security. We need a new energy policy, a new human rights policy, a new trade policy as well.
I’m not a pacifist, isolationist or ostrich. Nor am I a Pollyanna about what constitutes real and lethal threats to both America and the rest of the world. Sometimes, we must use force, and not only when there is a direct threat to our “interests” within our borders. However, the Bush Administration’s policies – in many places, but especially in Iraq – have made the task of building genuine national security so much more difficult. Every time right-wingers throw up that “weak on defense” canard, they should be reminded of just who recklessly put us between this rock and that hard place.
[Cross-posted from The Next Hurrah.]
