by Larry C. Johnson (bio below)
Had dinner last night with an old CIA buddy who has just returned from Iraq with some discouraging news. Although our troops and intelligence operatives are killing scores of insurgents (my friend estimated the kill rate at 160 enemy per each friendly) the insurgents keep coming. As Sy Hersh predicted in last month’s New Yorker, the military commanders decided to shift from ground confrontations to high altitude airstrikes. According to press reports on Wednesday, for example, the United States carried out 53 strikes inside Iraq. One of these, the mistaken bombing of a civilian home north of Baghdad, was condemend by Iraqi officials.
There should be no doubt our tactics have changed. The United States is relying more on aerial bombing, most of it high altitude or stand off, rather than close air support for troops on the ground engaged in a fight. Despite the promise of “precision” bombing, aerial strikes are anything but precise. They are very lethal and very powerful. On that front, a lot of insurgents, mostly Iraqis, are dying. But a bombing campaign, short of nuclear strikes that vaporize the whole country, cannot defeat an insurgency. We do not have enough planes or pilots, not to mention bombs. … continued below …
Most U.S. military officers on the ground sincerely believe that we have reached a tipping point where we are killing enough insurgents that their will to fight is being sapped. But the death toll from insurgent strikes during the last two days calls into question that confidence. It is worth recalling that in Vietnam we killed close to 1 million North Vietnamese while we suffered 57,000 fatalities. That was a kill ratio of roughly 200 20 to 1. Unfortunately, we do not know where this magical tipping point is.
The alternative argument is that imprecision of the U.S. strikes is likely to generate more insurgents than are killed. Within the ethos of the tribal culture in Iraq, seeking revenge on those who have wronged you or your family is a mission that can span centuries. The folks we are fighting have a much longer attention span than we do.
The coming months creates additional challenges and contraints for the United States military that are likely to work in favor of the insurgents. As the Shia led government assumes control in February the U.S. ability to conduct unilateral counterinsurgency missions will be curtailed because we will first have to seek permission to carry out such operations. At present U.S. forces can act without seeking Iraqi permission. That gives us an element of surprise. Once the Iraqi Government becomes the gate keeper our troops will face a greater risk of having the secrecy of any operation compromised.
This will likely lead to a reduction in U.S. counter insurgency operations over the coming months. As our operations decline the various Iraqi insurgent groups will have a chance to regroup, resupply, recruit, and become more lethal. Since we also are starting to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Iraq our actual ability to conduct operations will be further constrained.
The outlook for the next 10 months is not pretty. We will see a continued upsurge in violence, most of it sectarian in nature, with Iraqis dying at a far greater rate than Americans. U.S. military casualties will decline if the United States opts for a garrison strategy (keeping its forces on secure bases and devoted almost exclusively to training Iraqi forces). However, if the United States feels compelled to send its forces into cities to fight ithe nsurgents the U.S. death rate will go up.
What we can’t answer at this point is whether or not an Iraqi Government dominated by Shia religious extremists will allow the United States to play a constructive role in trying to build a secure, safe Iraq, or if U.S. forces will be used as proxies to kill Sunni opponents of the Government, or if the Shia will tell us to get out. My friend, recently back from Iraq, sees little chance that new Iraqi Government will opt for a non-sectarian solution to the security crisis. That leaves us two bad options–killing Sunnis or getting out. Either choice does not strengthen our policy in the Middle East.
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Larry C. Johnson is CEO and co-founder of BERG Associates, LLC, an international business-consulting firm that helps corporations and governments manage threats posed by terrorism and money laundering. Mr. Johnson, who worked previously with the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. State Department’s Office of Counter Terrorism (as a Deputy Director), is a recognized expert in the fields of terrorism, aviation security, crisis and risk management. Mr. Johnson has analyzed terrorist incidents for a variety of media including the Jim Lehrer News Hour, National Public Radio, ABC’s Nightline, NBC’s Today Show, the New York Times, CNN, Fox News, and the BBC. Mr. Johnson has authored several articles for publications, including Security Management Magazine, the New York Times, and The Los Angeles Times. He has lectured on terrorism and aviation security around the world. Further bio details.
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Bombing, eh? Wonder how that will work?
Yeah,
where have we seen this before? Even at a kill ratio of 200 to 1 we are still losing this because their will will outlast ours and every single combat death is magnified here. You cannot defeat such a force especially when the very tactics you use are themselves the biggest regeneration tool for their cause. It’s mindboggling and disturbing that we find ourselves here again, thirty years on from learning our lesson.
Of course, when you can count any man woman or child as an insurgent you can come up with a pretty high number.
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Poor math … leads to my new diary ::
It is worth recalling that in Vietnam we killed close to 1 million North Vietnamese while we suffered 57,000 fatalities. That was a kill ratio of roughly 200 to 1. Unfortunately, we do not know where this magical tipping point is.
Although our troops and intelligence operatives are killing scores of insurgents (my friend CIA buddy – estimated the kill rate at 160 enemy per each friendly) the insurgents keep coming.
From memory of Vietnam era, the code for kill ratio was a standard 10:1 on the battlefield. Lose one of our own in the jungle, there would be 10 of them! This was a standard multiplication during Vietnam era for U.S. Command or DoD press release.
What is the implication of the erroneous kill ratio as discussed in Larry Johnson’s diary, read on …
“Treason doth never prosper: what’s the reason?
For if it prosper, none dare call it treason.”
▼▼▼ READ MY DIARY ▼
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I would have left it to a comment, but the article and arguments are left dangling once the correction is made.
The kill ratio is a basic in warfare, it’s not my profession, but as soon as I read the kill ratio 160:1 and 200:1 I knew it was not a reality for Vietnam and unlikely for Iraq.
Iraqi Death Toll Above 100,000
The kill ratio of 20:1 is very realistic, that would put the death toll above 100,000 for the combination of insurgents and civilians killed in almost 3 year of Iraq War and occupation. This would be in line with the number of deaths as reported by The Lancet. That’s is the most important conclusion of the numbers, Larry Johnson and his CIA buddy as technocrats show no concern for the lives destroyed by this war of choice. A bloody shame and very troublesome for persons in any form of leadership in this nation.
Many innocent persons have died, the Iraqi civilians we don’t count! Our own forces don’t get the protection they deserve, thus losers on all sides.
“Treason doth never prosper: what’s the reason?
For if it prosper, none dare call it treason.”
▼▼▼ READ MY DIARY
It’s becoming clear that only this administration knows the answers to properly see this through to completion. It is imperative, for the sake of our national security, for them to magnify their influence by taking up offices in Baghdad and directing affairs from there.
Then they can come back after they win the war.
..the insurgents keep coming. With a potential reservoir of one billion people, there is an inexhaustible supply.
There’s something in the Geneva Convention that states an occupying power must protect civilians. Dropping bombs on built up areas does not exactly provide much protection to those living nearby.
That aside dropping bombs at all is counter productive. People will see it as unnannounced death from above that can come at any time. It basically terrorises civilians. It can only increase the hatred for an occupying force, and also it makes the occupiers look like cowards. They wont come and fight.
It is probably little surprise that it seems every ordinary Iraqi actually in Iraq who gets asked a question on TV about some facet of daily life seems to start with the precursor: ‘as well as having to suffer the occupation, we …….’
When Al Qaeda ask George Bush to admit he has lost in Iraq, they are just asking him to admit the truth. Somebody somewhere in Washington should be asking how have we gotten to the position where Al Qaeda can taunt us like this with the truth? Unlike after Vietnam I hope that this time we can learn from our disastrous follies before we end up repeating them yet again.
Show me someone who frames the conflict in terms of “won/lost” and I’ll show you a certifiable idiot. Ah. That would be this administration.
Agree about Al qaeda not being popular in Iraq, but they still get to deride the US that was my point. Most of the insurgents/resistance/whatever you want to call them are Iraqis.
The US is still the major occupying power and as such should provide protection to civilians. Aerial bombardment does not whether it be beacause of bad targetting or as some claim because of collective punishment.
In virtually case of a major power occupying a country and facing a resistance the resistance loses every face to face encounter. In most cases the resistance wins the war. We above all should remember this from Vietnam. However, we still have to learn the lessons from 30 years ago.
The US is still the major occupying power. . .
My point is simply that the multinational force serves at the pleasure of the Iraqi government. If the new Congress votes to expel that force tomorrow, irrespective of the wishes of the administration, they must leave. By any definition that is not an occupying power.
That said, under the provisions of the UNSC Resolutions, the MNF is indeed responsible for “security” of the population – subject to civilian (political) control – until the Iraqi government can provide internal security.
We agree on concepts, but not on descriptors/definitions. I’m trying my damndest (and have for months) to accurately characterize the “Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait” (UNSCR titles). Bandying terms thrown by the administration and slopped up by lazy reporters of all stripes gives those terms validity if repeated endlessly.
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As far as I’m concerned no one “wins” a war. This administration, through ineptness, corruption, lack of leadership and oversight, and sheer stupidity destroyed Iraq to save it.
And our people, and Iraqi civilians pay the price every day.
You sure are right about the ordinary people not winning wars.
Thanks Larry. This intensified air war ought to be all over the front pages. The Defense Department isn’t even hiding it any longer. All of their published releases contain a paragraph on “today’s air war.” Yet the media, with a few exceptions like a recent piece in The Washington Post, continue to ignore it even as it takes more and more innocent Iraqi lives.
This is a valuable and important piece.
Well… while the news media have covered every twist n turn in the negotiations over constitution, it has mainly unnoticed the significant development in Iraq since Jan. 2005 election – “the emergence of a sectarian civil war btw Sunni and Shia”.
the beginning of Shia violence next to Sunnis by Shia militias, wid unspoken govt. approval, raises new issues of central meaning 2 US policy.
I think if you scrutinized history than you’ll find the biggest problem with Vietnam was the lack of will on the part of the South Vietnamese to do anything for them. Whoever gave them a bowl of rice was fine; they didn’t care about the source. They are too lazy 2 do anything 4 themselves, n were perfectly okay with living in grime n coercion.
This is the same problem with the Iraqis. They are too “sluggish” to stand on two feet n take care of themselves. ny civilized society wouldn’t tolerate thugs running around killing randomly 4 no reason other than the fact that they get their thrills by watching blood spill on the streets.
The only question we have 2 answer is wt to do now to give US the best chance of winning (or, at least, not losing) Iraq. As Larry says 1 option is that pulling out the troops will give US the best chance of winning. I disagree, n not just becoz it sounds like a stupid idea. If the people of Iraq would work together, this war would be ended.
The So. Vietnamese didn’t not care… they didn’t see anything worth fighting and dying for in the cause of the corrupt, amoral regime. Why bother, when having the other side win would at least bring peace?
<chortle> You mean like D.C., or L.A. or Atlanta or…
The Iraqis at least have a reason–though it’s gone wild. They want foreign occupiers out.
And the top US military minds have already spoken–it’s not a question of the US winning or losing. We’ve lost already. That’s a done deal; all that’s in question is the details of how we lose… Mission Accomplished.
for Right in this.
Either:
1) Our troops are being more effective than they were in Vietnam… with a kill rate of ~200 to 1, that would mean that over 400,000 Iraqis (most of them Iraqis) who are “enemy” have been killed. And how many collateral deaths among the civilians? And didn’t Bush say 30,000?
or
2) Our troops are being slightly less effective at ~160 to 1… for 350,000 “enemy” deaths (Same questions apply).
or
3) Our troops have actually only (“only”) killed 30,000 and in that case are only getting a ratio of about 13.6 to 1. Despite better quality equipment (when they can get it…) and training, and being all volunteer (though that unfairly describes those stop lossed as volunteers…).
What’s that about? Which is true?
Would the old-line media (or freeperville) like to address this? Have we really killed a third to a half a million people in Iraq… only to see the level of violence going up?
There are various stategies for fighting a war. In the First World War all sides chose the strategy of attrition: Just keep shelling or shooting at the other side until they are exhausted and give up. This is a very expensive strategy, but it often works.
Another strategy is manoeuver. The idea is not to kill the opposing forces en mass, but to disrupt those points which are key to the enemy’s combat cohesion. In manoeuver war, captures are a stronger sign of success than enemy KIA, because they show the opponent is falling apart. The famous example is the German Wahrmacht in World War Two. The Germans defeated the French easily, despite being outnumbered and having tanks with less armor and smaller guns. The key to the Germans’ success was understanding how to use their tanks effectively–having a good organization with the ability to move flexibly, that despite overall weakeness could concentrate overwhelming force at the critical points.
Since the Civil War, the US has always chosen a strategy of attrition. For the US (somewhat less so for the British) WWII was pure logistics. The Vietnam War was also fought as a war of attrition, but when that began to fail, the US fell back to another strategy:
Genocide.
In genocide, you don’t really attempt to engage the enemy at all, except as chance allows. Your real (as opposed to ostensible) targets are the civilian population. The idea is that the enemy depends on its civilian population for all manner of practical support, and if that population is exterminated, then the enemy will not have the means to continue the fight.
In Vietnam, this was called, “when you can’t remove the fish from the sea, remove the sea from the fish.”
The strategy of genocide has succeeded at least once in US history–in the wars against the native peoples. It failed spectacularly in Vietnam. But it is the strategy the US moves to when attrition fails.
The move to remote bombing is the clue of the shift, which has been hinted at for some time. For bombing by its nature cannot destinguish easily between civilian and military targets, and in a guerrilla war it cannot distinguish at all. Most of the “insurgents” killed by bombing–not a mere majority but almost all of them–are perforce civilians. This is for two reasons, which compound each other: Civilians are of course most of the population, and guerrilla fighters are more likely to survive attacks by virtue of experience and training.
Right now the US poses a great danger to the world, for the US will use genocide against anybody, when its ideas run out and its patience wears thin. If the Iraq War were actually just a matter of Iraq, the strategy–though cruel–might succeed.
But as the Iraq War begins to set in motion events throughout the world, the failure of genocide as a strategy is guarranteed.
Yes, it violates the Geneva Conventions.
A great article as always Larry, and I, for one, appreciate the perspective you bring to this site. But, I have to point out a spelling error that seems to be common among Americans. I know it’s silly to be pedantic over spelling, but this one really gets me: “insurgent” is not an accepted spelling (in most of the world, at least) for “civilians defending their homes and families against an illegal occupying aggressor”.
I don’t understand why your friend is so discouraged – the US military must have eliminated some 10% of the Iraqi Sunni Arab population in the 15-59 age range according to this estimate – and it probably means that the US military is capable of wiping out the entire male component of the Sunni Arabs in about 20-30 years with the loss of only another 15-20,000 troops.
The reality is that your CIA friend is suggesting that in 31 months, the US military have killed some 300,00 plus opponents, on top of the very high civilian casualties that are being caused by the violence, at a rate of about 2-2,500 per week ( that’s 3-400 per day, every day ). This is pure bullshit, and either he is conning you, or he hasn’t really got a clue what he’s talking about and has fallen into the Vietnam era body count trap of guesstimating bodies that no one ever actually sees.
I also think you may have misinterpreted the 53 airstrikes information: I suspect that this may in fact be the number of “missions” flown – which would also include surveillance, convoy security, routine patrolling and some bombing missions. If there were 50-odd airstrikes per day we’d hear rather more from the various Arabic news outlets that have a presence in the region regarding indiscriminate US air operations.