Bremer claims he was used as Iraq ‘fall guy’ (Financial Times)
Paul Bremer, former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, says that senior US military officials tried to make him a scapegoat for postwar setbacks, including the decision to disband the Iraqi army following the US invasion in 2003.
In a memoir published yesterday that broke a more than year-long silence, Mr Bremer portrays himself in a constant struggle with Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, and military leaders who were determined to reduce the US troop presence as quickly as possible in 2004 despite the escalating insurgency.
Among the tidbits selected by the article (go read it, there is more, notably on the infighting between Rumsfeld and Rice, and the decision to disband the Iraqi Army):
A Pentagon spokesman yesterday confirmed that Mr Bremer had sent Mr Rumsfeld a memo based on a report by the Rand Corporation consultancy that recommended 500,000 US troops would be needed to pacify Iraq – far more than were sent. But Mr Bremer’s advice was rejected by military leaders and Mr Rumsfeld.
The interesting twist here is that this may give some cover to Bush and Rumsfeld who said that they never got requests from the military to have more troops. But is it just Bremer trying to shift the blame, or did the military brass know and keep quiet?
Mr Bremer’s account of his 13 months as Iraq’s governor is at times vituperative – scathing of the Iraqi exiles who formed the initial Iraqi Governing Council, resentful of Democrats in Congress who sniped at his efforts, the press for focusing on the negative and feeding on leaks, and bureaucrats in Washington who obfuscated when he was trying to rebuild an entire country.
I suppose that’s the rule in such books: it’s everybody’s fault but the author’s. But…
What emerges clearly from the diary is that there was no detailed postwar reconstruction plan, that the US lacked decent intelligence to deal with an insurgency it failed to predict, and the naivety of Americans who were shocked at the dismal state of Iraq’s economy and infrastructure after years of sanctions.
In a book where he is supposed to defend his work, that this should come through is significant – although not so surprising given the reality on the ground.
In one particularly bleak moment in October 2003, Mr Bremer pleaded with the president to back him in this internal struggle. “I’m concerned that a lot of the Pentagon’s frenetic push on the political stuff is meant to set me up as a fall guy,” he told Mr Bush at the White House. When the president looked puzzled, he added: “In effect the DoD position would be that they’d recommended a quick end to ‘occupation’, but I had resisted so any problems from here on out were my fault.”
Mr Bremer lauds the president for backing him in most of these battles.
Puzzled, or clueless?
The book sounds as if Bremer does not want to cut himself off from the Bushistas, but a lot of actionable truth comes out.
I believe he’s been a tool and an opportunist.
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His book “My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope“ a year as governor of Iraq, Paul Bremer disavows Minister of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. “We had important differences of opinion.”
WASHINGTON (NRC Handelsblad) 9 January 2006 —
You work 18-20 hours a day in your first months as civilian administrator in a complete chaos. Rumsfeld makes a visit and tells you: “I think you don’t realize how urgent your task is”.
“I was indeed bewildered – although I kept my anger in check. He didn’t realize how hard we had to work. I think he was frustrated. The moment of his visit was shortly after the second suicide attack. We felt the pressure, everyone did, because we could not bring security to Iraq.”
Busk asks you: can Rumsfeld delegate?
“He is tough, and he intimidates people in his surroundings such, that it’s difficult to get people at the ministry to make decisions. Only Rumsfeld decides. In his case it works.”
Why dit the president put forward the question?
“There were stories in the press – he was such a difficult boss.”
You describe how Rumsfeld doesn’t take the reports of looting after the fall of Baghdad seriously. What was the impact?
“Later we made a calculation the cost of looting was $12bn. One of my biggest mistakes. I didn’t urge a firm position to stop looting. I was criticized for the suggestion a shoot to kill policy for looters – I still believe that would have been the right approach. I should have made a stronger case for this policy. The true problem was, of course, we gave the impression we lacked the ability to invoke order and authority.”
At the time, education came to a standstill, when 10,000 teachers who lost their jobs through deba’athification. You consider that decision wise today?
“We wanted regime change, and this meant the Ba’ath party had to be removed from power:’deba’athification’. I still believe it to be the right choice. Often it’s forgotten, with our policy we wanted to eliminate the top 1% of Ba’ath-members in high position of government. I wanted the Iraqis to decide: Americans could not distinguish between an ideological Ba’ath-supporter and a teacher who was a Ba’ath member for the sole reason to hold a teaching job.
The mistake was I delegated the implementation to the CPA. It then became part of the muddy domestic-political relationships. We discovered a much larger number then the intended top 1% was removed from office.”
What was the result?
“The biggest problem were the 10,000 teachers who had lost their job. And of course the impression by the Iraqis that deba’athification meant for all Ba’ath party members. This fact led to serious ramnifications in the process for reconciliation with the Sunni.”
Did this provoke the uprising of insurgency?
“I don’t think so. although, I don’t know the answer. I believe the insurgency was to happen anyway. We found a secret document that mentioned Saddam had plans ready. But it is difficult. Our intelligence did not see the uprising coming. Equally they had no knowledge of the poor state of Iraq’s economy.”
Why did you not let the Iraqis administer a larger part of the government?
“I handed the Iraqis as much authority as they could handle. They were just not ready for it. They couldn’t even set up an organization. They didn’t have managers. They were in no position to manage – simply put – a budget.”
Is it a fact the Pentagon was so angry you didn’t want to transfer sovereignty, they developed a plan to hold you responsible for the post-war failure in Iraq?
“That’s what Andy Card told me, chief of staff in the White House.”
Nice city Washington.
“Well, you know how matters are solved here. I understood the danger.”
Iraq's former US administrator, Paul Bremer, shakes hands with the country's interim president, Ghazi al-Yawar, during the handover ceremony as Bremer's deputy, David Richmond, applauds. The GuardianWhen the insurgency is on the increase, you told Bush and Cheney at the end of 2003, the Pentagon has no strategy for victory. Was the White House vigilant?
“We didn’t make gains on the ground in military terms. We entered a city, had a firefight, problems seemed solved, and our forces moved out. The same problems started all over. That’s what I explained was going on.”
Half a year later, you told Condoleezza Rice that “the worst” happened: the United States was an “incompetent occupation force”.
“We were unable to secure the country. We had all the disadvantages that belong to, what is labeled, an occupier. When this becomes a fact, at least you have to provide security to the citizens.”
The journalist Packer in his book The Assassins’ Gate portrays you as an isolated man in the secure zone of Baghdad – a long distance from the demoralized population.
“To a certain extent, that is true. Because of safety precautions I wasn’t free to walk the streets of Baghdad. It was frustrating. You are a diplomat and want to observe the country. The other side of this, I did travel throughout all of the country. I met thousands of Iraqis. But my freedom to move about was limited.”
Is terrorism fostered by the war?
“It is clear they entered Iraq – in part likely, because we closed down Afghanistan. Otherwise they would still be there, I think. But ok – what else? Should we not have liberated Iraq? I don’t understand the consequences of such an analysis. Should we have left Saddam in power?
The question illustrates that Europe still have difficulty understanding new terrorism. The Unites States were confronted with muslim extremists, who want to kill us by the thousands. That is totally different terror we experienced in the seventies and eighties. The conclusion is the U.S. cannot sit and wait. We have to preempt before we are attacked.
But Europe didn’t move, and the U.S. refuses to be passive. I wouldn’t call Europe an museum, like Thomas Friedman, that sounds too similar to ‘Old Europe’ of Rumsfeld. But Europe has problems, no doubt about that. When you are threatened and you don’t see this, then you are floating without any goal in sight.”
NRC Handelsblad – January 9, 2006. Translation Oui.
● My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope
Paul Bremer III
“Treason doth never prosper: what’s the reason?
For if it prosper, none dare call it treason.”
▼ ▼ ▼ MY DIARY
That is so rich! So many ghastly quotes in there. This one jumped off the page at me:
Rumsfeld prefers killing to diplomacy, planning, or even having sufficient troops.
It’s hard to find hope sometimes.
State of War, The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration presents great views on this as he relates comments by a number of anonymous insiders.
The main point I got out of Risen’s book was that our government is run by Cheney and Rumsfield. Not that I had much doubt before, but this has more than confirmed it.
I recommend the book for insights on how all this happened, and is likely to keep happening.
I regret to say it might be a while before I can pick up a copy. Is there any more insight you can lend from that source? What or how does he view the effect of the baby neocons who were put in positions of power there without any experience? M Ledeen’s daughter for instance?
but Simon & Schuster offers a good description and a link to an excerpt. That’s probably as far as I’ll get in the near future.
I was out of town today, so I’m just reviewing the comments now. But I do have several pages dog earred. This diary most likely will grow old before I can develop much response. I’ll make a note to drop some info in somewhere “rumi” appears again. Better yet maybe I’ll find the time to do a book review diary.
From the CRS Report The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities, Updated 6 Jun ’05:
The initial chain of command established control over all reconstruction and post-conflict actitives within the DoD. (Tommy Franks job under the laws of war and occupation). Confusion reigned:
No one was on “first”. What had been a nearly-unreported internal battle for control of post-war Iraq between State and Defense, resulted in two discrete – and uncommunicative – chains of command. Placing overall decision-making directly inside the White House. Which explains why the CPA was culturally, politically, and organizationally unqualified to to perform the tasks assigned:
Bremer chose to go – as Fallows wrote about the period – “blindly into Baghdad”. Too late to claim he can see clearly now. Hindsight has always been 20/20.
[Note: more CRS reports on Iraq here]
Tuesday, January 10
Morning Report 1/10/05
Bremer: Out to Launch
Ex-pasha starts book tour by blaming everyone else for the Iraq debacle
Mission unaccomplished: Bremer on his way home on June 28, 2004
Actually, there was a plan.
From Blueprint for a Mess by David Rieff in the NYTimes magazine of Nov 2, 2003 (archive).
Bremer is a cracker. All these pigs who ate at the trough of Iraq are now claiming it was the other guy.
If they had kept the army together the result would have been that the army would have divided and split into an insurgency. The result would have been very close to the same.
It doesn’t matter who did what. Anything they did after the invasion and occupation could and can and is only a mistake.
They are all to blame and should go to trial before any judgement of Sadaam is rendered.
They are all criminals
I knew reconstruction was really, truly doomed when Bremer caused Moqtada Sadr’s call for an uprising by shutting down the preacher’s newspaper.
Dumb move, alienating the Shi’a, of all our likely allies. It’s not like they were a oppressed minority. No. The Shi’a were an oppressed majority. Bremer showed them that could continue without the Baath Party.