The US Military Academy’s Center for combatting terrorism http://ctc.usma.edu/ issued a report that examines what the administration’s policy should be in fighting the Iraqi jihadist movement.
Bottom line. It ain’t rocket science. But too complicated for an administration that hasn’t the desire to read it.
The United States government reached a significant stage in the fight against jihadi‐inspired terrorism this past year when it decided to place a greater emphasis on fighting its ideological roots. Yet despite this appropriate course adjustment,the U.S. Government and its Western allies generally do not know the main producers of this ideology and the significant issues that unite and divide the movement — information that is key to defeating it.
(more below the flip)
Now, knowing this administration, that is not surprising. And as it is par for the course, the information is already out there, if the people in charge were competent. As the report so tactfully states:
Jihadi leaders are surprisingly frank when discussing the vulnerabilities of their movement and their strategies for toppling local regimes and undermining the United States. Their candor is, in large part, a consequence of struggles for leadership within the movement; thus, a leader of one group will publish his strategic vision in order to gain more recruits and achieve a reputation as a serious scholar worthy of respect. It is also a consequence of the United States’ success in destroying jihadi training camps and denying safe havens–jihadi leaders have had to put their writings online so as to provide continuing guidance to a very decentralized following.
In a sense, members of the johadi movement have put their team’s playbook online. By mining these texts for their tactical and strategic insights, the United States will be able to craft effective techniques and procedures to defeat followers of the movement.
The odd thing is, according to the report, is that as we are (or should be) doing this to the jihadis, they are doing the same thing to us.
Although we would like to claim credit for the approach described in the introductory paragraphs, it is modeled after a similar approach used by Aby Bakr Naji, a rising star in the jihadi movement…Naji urges fellow jihadis to study Western works on management, military principles, political theory, and sociology in order to borrow strategies that have worked for Western Governments and to discern their weaknesses.
Based on his reading, and the soviet experience in Afghanistan, Naji argues the best thing that could happen would be for the USA to invade the middle east. The reason being is several fold;
- The USA and Soviet Union often did their fighting through proxies during the cold war, and middle eastern alliances were made based on the strategic and economic value of aligning with one or the other superpower.
- The invasion by one of the superpowers would a) inflame the middle eastern population,as happened when soviets invaded Agfhanistan (the USA helped a little in that regard); b) inflicting damage on the superpower military erodes the myth of the invincibility and further enboldens the insurgency. (as an aside, when the USA first invaded, rumors abounded that the dark sunglasses worn by troops gave them X-Ray vision).
The plan describes three stages. First, jihadis bomb sensitive economic targets, diverting security to those areas. Second, exploit that diversion to create chaos in the softer targets, allowing pro-inurgent administrators to come in. Third, these administrators will then start to coordinate with each other towards a caliphate.
This point three is where the underpants gnome theory kicks in. By focusing on soft targets (targeting iraqis) they undermine their support amongst the civilian population. Also, in their recruiting, there is the concern of recruits not following orders, branching off and doing their own thing, spies, and powerful clerics who disagree with them and siphon off support and recruits.
This was explained in the letter from Zawahiri to Zarqawi, cautioning him against targeting civilians.
This is not out of ideological or theological reasons, but from a purely pragmatic, strategic calculus: The masses must view jihadis as liberators, not oppressors. They must be seen as fighting a just war and walking the moral high ground.
Wow, change jihadis to American troops and the psychological battle is clear. Except we (the USA) have the disadvantage of being occupiers of the country, thereby losing the high ground at the beginning.
There is much here I didn’t cover. Luckily the report (pdf) is only 25 pages, but for those that won’t click through to the link, below are the conclusions:
1 – Direct engagement with the United States has been good for the jihadi movement…
2 – The Jihadi movement has become decentralized and training camps like those in afghanistan four years ago are no longer necessary for the military or doctrinal preparation of new recruits…
3 – Although jihadi ideologues recognize the utility of the long term, eternal struggle, they are absolutely serious about establishing Islamic states in the near term… They are less interested in overthrowing a ruler…. than they are in establishing small enclaves around the globe in regions that are not well-policed…
4 – Positive public opinion is necessary for attracting people to join or support the movement; thus, effective propaganda is crucial for the success of the jihadi movement [Rubble’s note: cartoons anyone]. Conversely, the movement declines in popularity when it is perceived to be attacking fellow muslims, causing public disorder, damaging critical national industries, or engaging in sectarianism…
5 – Religious leaders play a critical role in attracting youth to the movement, providing religious justification for violence, and determining its overall strategic direction. But this cuts both ways, as non-jihadi religious leaders are able to siphon off support from the movement and challenge its legitimacy…
6 – Jihadi ideologues closely follow Western thought and U.S. strategic planning for insights that can be used against the United States and its allies…
The full report (pdf – 25 pages) can be found at:
http://ctc.usma.edu/Stealing%20Al-Qai%27da%27s%20Playbook%20–%20CTC.pdf
