If you’ve been following the Phillipe Sands story from the UK press to the US, you’ll remember that the Commander In Chief was determined that the date for invasion was MARCH 10, 2003.  What was the holdup?

Lord Peter Goldsmith, Attorney General UK, was called into Washington that day to recant his opinion that the war would be in violation of UN 1442.  They worked him over…. and it was the professional torture team that did it…. Cheney, Addington, Bybee, Hynes, Yoo and Gonzales as well as TENET…. gave him what the Brits call “a proper woodshedding”  For three years Goldsmith, when he talks at all, says “They didn’t lean on me.”

By the 17th Goldsmith had reversed his opinion….. following Gonzales’ lead in making the illegal legal.  He learned his lessons well.

How to legitimise a war in 10 days
May 2, 2005
Pretoria News

D-Day for Tony Blair
9 May 2005
By Linda Heard
Counterpunch Magazine

The new picture we’re looking at is that the go-signal for the illegal invasion rested with the opinion of just one man….. Peter Goldsmith.  Had Lord Goldsmith stuck to his original March 7th opinion and allied himself with the late Robin Cook, Clare Short, and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, all of whom resigned on the eve of the illegal invasion, March 17th, 2003…. the US would not have secured its ally the UK, and the unfolding of evidence for the illegal war plans would have surfaced that much earlier.

These are the infamous emails between Falconer, Morgan and Goldsmith….. when he recovered from his Washington experience, Falconer and Morgan rewrote his legal opinions for him….. providing George and Tony the paper they needed to launch their illegal invasion….. but seven days too late for George’s edict…. WE INVADE ON THE TENTH OF MARCH.

More blasts from the past:

Key No 10 aides were split over war

Times On Line UK; July 31, 2005

Robert Winnett, Whitehall Correspondent

The disclosures have been made by Blair’s biographer Anthony Seldon, who has benefited from insider accounts that the government is now seeking to suppress

Seldon is understood to have had access to the private unpublished papers of key officials. Sir Christopher Meyer, the former British ambassador in Washington; Lance Price, former deputy to Campbell at Downing Street; and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain’s ambassador to the United Nations and then special envoy to Iraq, are all understood to have kept detailed records and were all interviewed by Seldon

Blair/Whitehall Attempt To Supress The Facts About Going To War on Iraq

The most sensitive sections of Seldon’s biography detail the run-up to the war in Iraq during 2002 and 2003, Blair’s relationship with the White House, and attempts to persuade the United Nations to back action.

Decisions were made largely by a tight group of Downing Street advisers, diplomats and intelligence chiefs working with the prime minister. However, Seldon discovered that even within this group there was unease about Blair’s actions. “Even No 10 was divided, with Jonathan Powell (Blair’s chief of staff) strongly advocating closeness to the (American) administration, and Sally (Baroness) Morgan in particular pressing for the need to go down the UN route, ” writes Seldon.

“Many senior diplomats in the Foreign Office were deeply concerned but failed to speak out . . . Within his closest team in No 10, Campbell and Morgan had private reservations while (David) Manning (Blair’s foreign policy adviser) was often uneasy . . . The intelligence chiefs (Sir John Scarlett, Sir Stephen Lander and Sir Richard Dearlove) were not counselling caution.”

The noose tightens:


Figures released by the Ministry of Defence have shown the reasons given by Britain and America for stepping up bombing raids in Iraq in the run-up to war were a sham, writes Michael Smith.

Geoff Hoon, who was then defence secretary, and Donald Rumsfeld, his American counterpart, both claimed that the rise in air attacks was in response to Iraqi attempts to shoot down allied aircraft

Blair Was Told He Could Have Stopped The War

Seldon writes that during the autumn of 2002 British diplomats and politicians were involved in tense negotiations at the UN, but it seemed that Blair was being bounced into war. Dick Cheney, the vice-president, was hostile to Blair and the British and sat in meetings “like a lump”, according to one official present.

However, Blair was told by diplomats, thought to be Meyer and Greenstock, that he could have stopped America invading Iraq had he been prepared to use his influence.

“Advice Blair received from diplomats that autumn (in 2002) was that Britain could be the swing vote on whether or not the US would go to war.”

The Intelligence Has Come Unfixed: The Numbers Don’t Add Up

Ministers have since insisted that the stepped-up attacks, which began in May 2002, were as a result of increased Iraqi activity and were not an attempt to provoke a response that would give the allies an excuse for war.

The figures do not support those claims. In the first seven months of 2001 the allies recorded a total of 370 “provocations” by the Iraqis against allied aircraft. But in the seven months between October 2001 and May 2002 there were just 32.

Sir Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrat foreign affairs spokesman, who obtained the MoD data in a Commons written answer, said it reinforced the need for an inquiry into ministers’ conduct in the run-up to war.

For the memo hounds, here’s a good one for you…. From the Brits to the US via Washington…. a familiar circuitous route:

Bush preps historic Third Term – memo
It’s war. It’s a ‘Continuity Presidency’
By Thomas C Greene in Washington
Published Saturday 1st April 2006 10:33 GMT

0 0 votes
Article Rating