Any impartial observer would wonder what on Earth we think we are accomplishing in Iraq. The GAO isn’t exactly impartial, but they do not see a strategy (excerpts of their report are below the fold). And they are not alone. Robin Wright wonders about the loss of American influence in the region. The Boston Globe editorializes about Iran holding all the cards and warns Israel about falling for their trap. Time Magazine has a cover article about the end of cowboy diplomacy. Stephen Lynch is trying to get the Bush administration to think outside the box. There’s an excellent book review of Peter Galbraith’s book The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End.
It’s not just a lack of resolve. It’s getting pretty hard to ignore the high level of carnage going on in Iraq. Khalilzad keeps trying, but his rhetoric is ringing pretty hollow.
The U.S. ambassador to Iraq expressed concern Tuesday about growing sectarian violence in the region but said withdrawing U.S. troops precipitously almost certainly would make it worse.
Zalmay Khalilzad, speaking at a Washington think tank, stopped short of calling current strife in Iraq a civil war, arguing that state institutions are holding up, and state leaders say they want to stay in government.
“It’s a matter of definition,” Khalilzad said at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “There is significant sectarian violence, no doubt about it.”
But he added: “Because of the desire of the leaders to work together and the state institutions to hold together, I do not believe the conditions I described are a civil war.”
I don’t know what else to call it. I agree with Khalilzad that a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. troops will almost certainly make the civil war sectarian strife worse. The question is whether we can do anything positive to save lives in Iraq, or whether we will merely bankrupt ourselves, lose what little is left of our credibility, and further endanger our national security?
The GAO report states pretty unequivocably that we have no plan for success and that we are unlikely to be successful. It states that we are failing in curbing the influence of militias, that we are failing to create effective minitries of government, that we are failing to revitalize the Iraqi economy, and that we have no answer to who is going to pay for ongoing operations and where that money is going to come from. They recommend that the National Security Council get their shit together, come up with a real plan, give clear responsibilities for enacting the plan, etc. It’s a kind way of pointing out that there is no plan, and that the Iraq War is a failure.
Here are Feingold’s comments:
“The report released by the Government Accountability Office criticizing the President’s Iraq strategy is another red flag that we need to change course in Iraq. Suggesting that the Administration’s strategy for Iraq isn’t really a strategy at all, the GAO report says that the Administration has not been straightforward with Congress regarding the costs of the Iraq war and that it has failed to identify the resources for, or costs of, our indefinite military presence in Iraq. The report clearly calls for measurable benchmarks for success in Iraq and accountability for U.S. taxpayer dollars being used there. Unfortunately, the Administration continues to ignore mounting calls to change its Iraq policy, which has been both a distraction from the larger global fight against terrorist networks and a drain on our nation’s resources.”
What GAO Found (.pdf)
July 11, 2006
REBUILDING IRAQIn November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President’s strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The U.S. goal is to establish a peaceful, stable, and secure Iraq. In addition, in June 2006, the administration issued a fact sheet at Camp David discussing current progress and goals in Iraq.
This testimony (1) discusses the extent to which the NSVI and its supporting documents address the six characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) assesses how security, political, and economic factors will affect achieving the U.S. strategy for Iraq. In this testimony, the NSVI and supporting documents are collectively referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq.
What GAO Recommends
A GAO report issued today recommends that NSC, along with the Departments of Defense and State, complete the strategy by addressing all six characteristics of an effective national strategy in a single document. State commented that the NSVI’s purpose is to provide a broad overview of the U.S. strategy in Iraq, not all details. GAO’s analysis was not based exclusively on the NSVI but included all key supporting documents.
Consequently, GAO retained the recommendation for a more complete and integrated strategy.
The NSVI is an improvement over previous U.S. planning efforts for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. However, the NSVI and supporting documents are incomplete as they do not fully address all the characteristics of an effective national strategy. Among its positive attributes, the strategy’s purpose and scope is clear; it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a “vital national interest and the central front in the war on terror.” Also, the strategy generally addresses the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and provides a comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. However, the discussion of outcome-related performance measures to assess progress in achieving these goals and objectives is limited. Moreover, the strategy falls short in at least three areas.First, it only partially identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy.
Second, it does not fully address how the U.S. will integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community, and it does not detail Iraq’s anticipated contribution to its future needs.
Third, it only partially identifies the current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the June 2006 Camp David fact sheet provides additional detail but does not address these key shortfalls.
Security, political, and economic factors will hamper U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and achieve key U.S. goals. First, the U.S. and Iraq are trying to stabilize Iraq by training and equipping additional Iraqi security forces and securing Baghdad and other strategic cities. However, increases in attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners and the growing influence of militias will adversely affect U.S. and Iraqi efforts. Second, the U.S. and Iraq are trying to improve Iraq’s capacity to govern by reconciling sectarian groups and building the capacity of national and provincial governments to provide security and services. However, sectarian conflicts, the lack of capacity in the ministries, and corruption serve to hinder these efforts. Third, the U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq’s economy and restore the oil, electricity, and other key sectors. However, these efforts have been impeded by security, corruption, fiscal, and other challenges.
The formation of a permanent Iraqi government gives the U.S. an opportunity to re-examine its strategy for Iraq and align its efforts with Iraq and the international community. As a first step, NSC should complete the strategy by defining and disseminating performance metrics, articulating clear roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In addition, the United States, Iraq, and the international community should (1) enhance support capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, (2) improve the capabilities of the national and provincial governments, and (3) develop a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy.
