WOW! WOW! and Wow! Message to Karl Rove and Dick Cheney–read it and weep baby. Cheney’s newly appointed biographer, Stephen Hayes, is blown out ofthe water. Bottomline, Saddam rebuffed cooperation with Bin Laden, tried to capture Zarqawi, and did NOT repeat NOT train foreign terrrorists at Salman Pak. The Senate Intelligence committee today released Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments and The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress as part of its long awaited and long promised Phase II report about the accuracy of the intelligence and it is ugly for the Bushies.
I will do more detailed analysis in the coming days. Here’s the down and
dirty on the questions about Iraq’s links to terrorism:
1. Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qa’ida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al-Aq’ida to provide material or operational support.
2. Postwar findings have identified only one meeting between
representatives of al-Qa’ida and saddam Hussein’s regime reported in prewar
intelligence assessments. Postwar findings have identified two occasions, not reported prior to the war, in which Saddam Hussein rebuffed meeting requests from an al-Qa’ida operative.
3. . . .Postwar findings support the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) February 2002 assessment that Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi was likely intentionally misleading his debriefers when he said that Iraq provded two al-Qa’ida associates with chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training in 2000. . . . No postwar information has been found that indicates CBW training occurred and the detainee who provided the key prewar reporting about this training recanted his claims after the war.
4. Postwar findings support the April 2002 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment that there was no credible reporting on al-Qa’ida training at Salman Pak or anywhere else in Iraq.
5. . . . Postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi.
6. Postwar information indicates that the Intelligence Community accurately assessed that al-Qa’ida affiliate group Ansar al-Islam operated in Kurdish-controlled northeastern Ira, an area that Baghdad had not controlled since 1991.
7. Postwar information supports prewar Intelligence Community assessments that there was no credible information that Iraq was complicit in or had foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks or any other al-Qa’ida strike. . .
8. No postwar information indicates that Iraq intended to use al-Qa’ida or any other terrorist group to strike the United States homeland before or during Operation Iraqi Freedom.