Cross posted at the front page of My Left Wing.
I haven’t yet said much about the recent post by LondonYank about ongoing U.S. naval deployments to the Persian Gulf region because I’m not sure what to conclude from it. But I’ve been asked numerous times to share my thoughts about it, so here they are.
Let me say from the outset that I purposely do not keep track of current movement of forces or tactical capabilities, nor do I pulse contacts on the inside for the latest “scuttlebutt.” That protects me from inadvertently publishing something I shouldn’t that might endanger our forces at sea and in the field.
So all I really know about the present naval “buildup” in the Gulf area is what was reported by LondonYank’s primary source, Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya of Global Research. In his October 1 article titled “The March to War: Naval build-up in the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean,” Nazemroaya describes a U.S. naval posture in that part of the world that will soon include two aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious strike group that carries a Marine Expeditionary Unit.
Assuming Nazemroaya’s information is correct (and it certainly sounds plausible), I don’t see too much to get excited about. Not yet anyway. Given the history of naval deployments to Fifth Fleet (Fifth Fleet is the Maritime component commander of all U.S. naval forces in Central Command’s Area of Responsibility) over the last decade or so, two carriers and one amphibious group in theater is not an alarmingly large naval presence.
So that doesn’t mean a strike on Iran is imminent. But that doesn’t mean one isn’t imminent, either.
From the Sea
According international agreements, our warships can operate within striking distance of most significant land based objectives without violating sovereign territory, airspace or territorial waters. (In general, “territorial waters” extend 25 miles from the coastline. An extensive body of maritime law covers sovereign authority over straits, archipelagos, inland seas, enclosed waters, etc.)
I often joke that military “transformation” has turned the U.S. Navy into a coast guard with an army and a air force, and it’s pretty much true. After the Cold War, the Navy re-geared and reorganized itself from a blue ocean superiority force to one that projects air and land power from littoral waters, or as the Navy doctrine white paper put it, “Forward From the Sea…” Two carrier groups with their air wings and cruise missile shooting escorts can deliver a heck of a lot of air power over the beach, and while an Amphibious Group’s Marine Expeditionary Unit isn’t going to invade and occupy a country the size of Iran, it can perform a heck of a lot of mission vital to the support of a joint air and maritime operation.
What’s more, carrier and amphibious groups are deployed overseas 24/7, every week of the month, every month of the year, and are available to respond rapidly to darn near any crisis that may occur. It’s not too much of an exaggeration to say that peacetime and wartime deployment cycles don’t look a whole heck of a lot different.
U.S. naval task groups and forces are self-contained and self-sustaining. Anywhere they may be sent to conduct combat operations, lines of communication and supply are already in place because combat operations happen in the same places as “normal” operations, which is pretty much everywhere.
Once deployed and committed to combat, America’s naval forces can virtually operate indefinitely. Moreover, their agility at deploying rapidly and sustaining operations also makes it relatively easy for them to redeploy (or withdraw) from a theater of operations as the political situation dictates.
For U.S. naval forces to sortie from home port earlier than scheduled, be extended on deployment, or diverted from their original assigned missions to respond to an emerging situation is so common that it’s almost more the rule than the exception. So I’m not overly excited about this naval “buildup” in the Gulf. Yet.
I am concerned, however, that our neo-diplomacy (or pseudo-diplomacy) with Iran isn’t going to work, largely because of its inherent design flaws.
By insisting on a halt of uranium enrichment as a precondition to direct negotiations with Iran, the Bush administration has all but ensured that direct negotiations won’t take place. Iran has consistently asserted that it won’t surrender its “inalienable right” under the UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop peaceful nuclear technology, and I doubt they’ll back down from that position. When the U.S. calls for UN Security Council sanctions, Iran’s energy coalition partners Russia and China are likely to veto them. At that point, the neocons will face a choice between wiping a truckload of Farm Fresh AAAs off their faces or unilaterally pulling the trigger.
Given that the guy who will make that decision is Il Cheney, there’s a good chance the gun will go off, even though neoconservative pundits like Robert Kagan and Charles Krauthammer admit that such a move would produce dire consequences for the United States.
However, two recently turned wild cards may force Cheney to fold.
First among them is North Korea’s recent announcement that it intends to conduct a nuclear weapons test. Even Cheney may see the lunacy in striking Iran, which has no nuclear weapons and says it doesn’t want any, while taking no direct action against North Korea which not only admits it has nuclear weapons but says it wants to light one off to see how big it goes “boom.”
Second is the crash and burn of John Bolton’s bid for confirmation as U.S. Ambassador to the UN. Again, I’m no beltway insider, but I sense a Foley-magnitude bombshell ticking under the covers of that story.
From the Air
If a major air and naval operation against Iraq goes down, it will doubtless involve significant involvement of U.S. Air Force assets. Most likely, in fact, the Air Force will run the air show component of the operation.
And very likely, an air operation against Iran will feature more animosity between the Navy and the Air Force than between the U.S. and Iran. The rivalry between these two air power services goes back a long way, and it’s not likely to end any time soon. Or any time ever.
In the Iranian scenario, as in so many U.S. joint air power adventures of recent history, USAF assets will sortie from relatively protected remote land bases, while USN assets will fly or launch from ships in “harm’s way.” In their long running feud for the bigger slice of the defense budget, our Navy and Air Force have constantly bickered over the virtues of “presence” over “vulnerability.”
If irony were alive and with us today, it would smirk at the knowledge that one of the most vital foreign policy decisions in American history will degenerate into a Military Industrial money grab.
Afterbrow
Pardon the braying, but did I call this or what? Just in from Reuters:
Russia and China agree that using or threatening force against Iran is unacceptable and presenting Tehran with ultimatums is counter-productive, Interfax news agency quoted a Russian Deputy Foreign Minister as saying.
“The positions of our two countries coincides that the use of force or the threat to use force is absolutely unacceptable,” the agency quoted Alexander Alexeyev as saying on Friday when asked about Russian and Chinese policy on Iran.
“Talking to them (Tehran) in the language of ultimatums and attempts to force them into a corner are counter-productive,” Interfax quoted him as saying.
How about them apples, George of the Bungle?
Watch out for that tree, huh?
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Commander Jeff Huber, U.S. Navy (Retired) writes from Virginia Beach, Virginia. Read his commentaries at ePluribus Media and Pen and Sword.
Related articles and stories:
In an Arms Race with Ourselves
“A Bridge Too Near,” from Jeff’s novel BEADWINDOW!
