A battle erupted two days ago (we’re just hearing about this now)
between a tribe in Amara (a city that sits to the southeast of Baghdad)
and the militia loyal to Moqtada al Sadr. According to press reports,
the police rounded up a senior militia figure after a car bomb killed a
member of the policemen’s tribe. Al Sadr’s Mahdi Army responded by
attacking the police station, sacking it, and burning it to the ground.
Since Thursday night 18 people have been killed and almost 100 people
wounded in clashes between police and hundreds of armed fighters from
the Mahdi Army of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
Sadr,
in fact, is the de facto President of the new Shia Iraq and controls
one of the two most effective non-coalition military forces in Iraq
(the Peshmerga is the other). Apparently, we’ve forgotten that al
Sadr is both a deft politician and a pretty good general. He has
used our tactics against us to solidify his own strategy.
Al Sadr came out with a vengeance in April 2004, when his army
bloodied the U.S. forces during a week of fierce fighting. It
started when U.S. Special Operations forces arrested one of his top
deputies on April 3, 2004. This arrest followed on the heels of
the decree by CPA Viceroy, Jerry Bremer, the previous week, which
shuttered al-Sadr’s newspaper, al-Hawza. Moqtada’s followers
ambushed a U.S. patrol from the First Calvary Division late on the
afternoon of April 4th. Pinned down, they called for help.
Two Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) from the same Division responded and
ran into the Mahdi buzzsaw.
The battle spread from Sadr City. Within days al-Sadr was in
control of the cities of Najaf, Kufa, Kut, and Karbala. When the
fighting ended, al-Sadr established himself as the new powerbroker in
Iraq. Today, two and one-half years later, al-Sadr is the power
behind Prime Minister Maliki. He’s the guy Jim Croce sang about
(i.e., “You Don’t Mess Around with Jim”). He used force in Amara
to remind the other Iraqis that he is a bad ass. He also
negotiated a settlement to the fight in Amara to reinforce the message
that if you want to get something done in Shia territory, you must deal
with Moqtada.
So, what’s our strategy? If we want the formal Iraqi
government to have the monopoly on force (which is the ultimate
definition of a true government) then we must employ tactics to disarm
the militias. But Maliki tells us to leave al-Sadr alone.
And the Kurd’s Peshmerga aren’t about to give up their guns
either. This is a strategy that don’t hunt.
At this juncture we must come to grips with the reality that Iraq is
not a nation, but a fractured, tribal society. We should do the
following:
- Identify a Sunni militia that can become a counterweight to the Mahdi Army and ensure it is properly equipped and trained.
- Open negotiations with the Mahdi militia and the Peshmerga to
establish them as the regional security force for their respective
areas. - Secure an armed UN Force to patrol Baghdad and protect the
neighborhoods from sectarian reprisal (we are probably talking at least
a force of 100,000). - Declare an end to armed U.S. patrols, reduce the number of U.S. bases, and institute a policy of attacking only if attacked.
This will help us defuse the spiral of violence currently underway
in Iraq. Once the violence is under control, we can then begin
the painstaking process of trying to promote reconciliation and healing
among the Shia, the Sunnis, and the Kurds. But that will take
years (if not a generation). At this point, the U.S. objectives
should be to re-establish our image as “liberators (rather than
occupiers) and avoid inflicting anymore pain, death, and humiliation on
the Iraqi people. If we continue to be perceived as the agent of
death in Iraq, we are sowing seeds for a generation of terrorism and
revenge that will haunt our grandchildren. That is a strategy
that will guarantee defeat.
[Also at No Quarter]
