Of all the tragedies going on in Iraq, I am most saddened at the plight of the Kurds. They have the most to gain from a stable Iraq and the most to lose when the U.S. pulls out. They are already seeing the writing on the wall.
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani today harshly criticized the [ISG] report, saying it contained some “very dangerous” recommendations that would “undermine the sovereignty of Iraq and the constitution.
Talabani, a Kurd, was particularly critical of the 96-page report’s recommendations for more centralized control of Iraq’s oil wealth, embedding thousands of U.S. troops with Iraq’s security forces to advise and speed up their training and legislation to allow thousands of people from Saddam Hussein’s ousted Baath party to return to their jobs.
“The report has a mentality that we are a colony where they impose their conditions and neglect our independence,” Talabani told reporters in Iraq, according to wire services and CNN reports.
He said Iraq needs to be able to control its own security without requiring U.S. authorization.
Late last week, other Kurd leaders attacked the report of the study group, led by former Republican secretary of state James A. Baker III and former House member Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), particularly because the report suggested giving the Iraqi central government control over all oil revenue. The report also recommended delaying beyond next year a referendum in Kirkuk on whether the oil-rich northern city should join Iraq’s Kurdistan region, a move that would strengthen Kurdish autonomy.
Mahmoud Othman, an influential Kurdish legislator called the report “negative” and said it would interfere with Iraqi sovereignty.
“I never thought such a negative thing would come out from U.S. consensus. Kurds have been friendly for Americans. Why we should be rewarded like that?” he said.
This will be the third serious betrayal of the Kurds in the last thirty-five years.
Following the Ba’ath takeover in 1968, the new regime promised Kurds that their lot would improve. Iraq’s new 1970 constitution recognized “the national rights of the Kurdish People and the legitimate rights of all minorities within the unity of Iraq.” A 1974 “Law for Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistan” promised that Kurdish would be an official language, used in Kurdish schools. These actions marked Iraq’s broadest official recognition of Kurdish identity and rights. (In contrast, neighboring Iran and Turkey, then staunch U.S. allies, have never even formally recognized the Kurds as a distinct nationality, let alone promised them national rights.)
However, during negotiations in 1971 between the Ba’ath regime and Kurdish representatives, it became clear that the key issues of Kurdish control of local security forces, receiving a fair portion of Iraq’s oil income, and sharing national power were not on the table. The Ba’ath also began encouraging Iraqi Arabs to move to Kurdistan and attempted to assassinate Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani. Barzani, who had been in contact with the U.S. and the Shah (and perhaps Israel) since the early 1960s, turned to them once again for help against Baghdad. Barzani even promised the Washington Post that if the U.S. backed the Kurdish struggle, “we are ready to do what goes with American policy in this area if America will protect us from the wolves. If support were strong enough, we could control the Kirkuk field and give it to an American company to operate.”
The Kissinger-Shah plan went into effect in 1972. Iran and the U.S. encouraged the Kurds to rise against Baghdad and provided them millions of dollars in weapons, logistical support, and funds. Over the next 3 years, $16 million in CIA money was given to Iraq’s Kurds and Iran provided the Kurds with some 90 percent of their weapons, including advanced artillery.
The U.S. goal, however, was neither victory nor self-determination for Iraqi Kurds. The CIA feared such a strategy “would have the effect of prolonging the insurgency, thereby encouraging separatist aspirations and possibly providing to the Soviet Union an opportunity to create difficulties” for U.S. allies Turkey and Iran. A Congressional investigation of CIA activities, headed by New York Congressman Otis Pike, concluded that “none of the nations who were aiding [the Kurds] seriously desired that they realize their objective of an autonomous state.” Rather, the U.S. and the Shah sought to weaken Iraq and deplete its energies. According to CIA memos and cables, they viewed the Kurds as “a card to play” against Iraq, and “a uniquely useful tool for weakening [Iraq’s] potential for international adventurism.”
To this end, Iran instituted “draconian controls” on its military assistance and never gave the Kurds more than three days worth of ammunition in order to deny them the freedom of action needed for victory. At one point in 1973, Kissinger personally intervened to halt a planned Kurdish offensive for fear it would succeed and complicate U.S. machinations in the wake of the October Arab-Israeli War. The Pike investigation concluded:
The president, Dr. Kissinger, and the Shah hoped that our clients would not prevail. They preferred instead that the insurgents simply continue a level of hostilities sufficient to sap the resources of our ally’s [Iran’s] neighbouring country. The policy was not imparted to our clients, who were encouraged to continue fighting.
I don’t think they are going to give us a fourth chance.
