The mess in Iraq is reflected by the policy confusion that now reigns in the
United States. The supposed salvation lying within the findings of the
Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study Group has not materialized. In fact, the
Baker/Hamilton study was dead on arrival and really did little to address
the military reality on the ground in Iraq. We really shouldn’t be too hard
on Baker and Hamilton because there is no clear philosophy or strategy
dictating what we should do in Iraq.
I’m currently working at a U.S. military base directly and heavily invovled
in the Iraq operation. I am stunned by the lack of consensus even within
the military about what is going on in Iraq and what we should do. As in
Washington there are folks who believe we need more troops and folks who
believe the time to pull out has come. The only area of consensus is that
things are going poorly in Iraq and we need to do something different.
Looking back at Rummy’s incredible memo of November 6, 2006, we now realize
that even the SecDef, who helped create this mess, had reached a similar
conclusion. Rummy wrote:
The situation in Iraq has been evolving, and U.S. forces have adjusted,
over time, from major combat operations to counterterrorism, to
counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence. In
my view it is time for a major adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are
currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.
Welcome to reality based analysis. So now, what do we do? Two suggestions
by Rummy are quite interesting and have received little attention. Rummy
recommends:
¶Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced
from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and
to 5 bases by July 2007.¶Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those
provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively
cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S.
forces would leave their province.
These suggestions also reveal the fatal flaw in the U.S. strategy.
Regardless of where you stand on the “do we have enough troops” dispute,
this fact is clear–the United States had too many troops tied up defending
and manning 110 bases and not enough in the streets keeping Iraqi safe and
training Iraqi troops. Do you realize that if every base had only 1000
troops that we would have had 110,000 troops tied up defending static bases
that were not critical sites for stabilizing Iraqi society?
If we reduce the number of bases and shift units that were in a “guarding
the bases” mode to a “train the Iraqi soldier/police” or “keep neighborhoods
safe” mode then we can increase the combat effectiveness of our troops
without having to add significant new numbers of troops. It looks like this
is the combat strategy that the commanders persuaded Bush to consider during
today’s VTC (video telephone conference). Of course this is easier said
than done. As Pat Lang has noted in previous posts, the types of units
currently on the ground in Iraq dictate and constrain what the United States
can and cannot do.
In reducing the number of bases it is imperative that the United States
retain a robust QRF (quick reaction force) capability to respond to
Provincial Reconstruction Teams spread throughout Iraq. Unfortunately, from
what I have seen and heard (and read in briefings) there is no consensus
among Army commanders about what should be done. There is a vacuum of
leadership with Rummy headed out the door and President Bush is in listening
mode. Keep your eyes on Abizaid and Chiarelli. They may seize the moment
to try to shift the momentum from the downward death spiral that has seized
Iraq. But, whatever they do, the options are shrinking and none offer a
quick fix to the sectarian civil war raging in and around Baghdad.
