More From Iraq

Go Big:  Plus up US forces in Baghdad in order to target MAS and
JAM.  This simply will not work.  We can not solve COIN with
more counter-guerilla.  According the CF spokesmen, the large “sweep, clear
and hold operations” in Baghdad in 2006 were not successful despite a
significant increase in CF and combined operations (Baghdad is not Tall Afar or
Fallujah).  We failed to sweep and clear the motivation for Iraqis to join
the insurgency and likely made more enemies.

Why are we targeting MAS and JAM? 

• MAS does not support sectarian violence.  He is an advocate against
  it.  He is as nationalist who wants to reach out to Sunni (despite the
  fact they want nothing to do with him).
• MAS is an influential player because the Coalition made him important in
  2004 by talking about him.  We gave him “street credit.”  We and the
  press boost his reputation (and ego) every time we call him the “fire brand
  anti-American cleric.” 
• Most JAM who attack CF are doing so against MAS’s orders, they are
  rogue.  They consider MAS too soft on CF and too political.
• Most JAM members are gang members who simply want security and
  money.  JAM has become a very bureaucratic organization (they publish
  orders/FRAGOs, have pay roll rosters, etc).

Our time to target MAS and JAM is passed.  For almost 2 years (Fall 04 –
Spring 06) JAM was not targeted, and the organization grew significantly not in
numbers, but in organization and capabilities.  The organization is too
entrenched and too diffuse to make viable targets.

Expected results of increased offensive operations to target JAM in Baghdad
and MAS:

• Increase in countrywide violence.  This goes without saying, we saw
  it in 2004 on a couple of occasions. 
• MAS will become even more popular simply due to the fact that he is wanted
  by the occupation forces.  Killing or capturing him will make him a
  martyr like his dad, which is probably not far from what he wants. 
• Further alienate the population of Baghdad who already feel threatened by
  sectarian violence and fear what the security forces will do to them as
  well.

The “Sadr City” problem:  We are afraid to go into Sadr City, and the
people of Iraq know it.  MAS and JAM have been claiming since early 2006
that CF were planning on going into Sadr City, despite the fact that we had no
intent or desire to do so.  This was a very smart move on MAS’s part. 

He made CF look weak, timid and scared.  The people of Sadr City believe
that we will not go into the city for fear of high casualties, therefore they
live with JAM as a reality of life.  The problem is that we really
shouldn’t go into Sadr City because no matter how many forces we throw at it, we
will never truly be able to “separate the fish from the water.”  JAM will
initially fight back (or not), and they will then fade away and disappear into
the city until we leave (which is inevitable).  Just like in 2004, JAM will
take casualties, many innocent Iraqis will be turned into anti-occupation
insurgents, and we will leave.  As a result, is it a Catch 22.  If we
go in, we will create more insurgents than we destroy, if we don’t go in, our
credibility as an effective force is at risk. 

Alternate
COA:  Marginalize MAS and Co-op JAM.

In my opinion, we have a classic chicken or the egg argument, which comes
first, security (stability) or economy. Do you need stability and security to
establish a good economy, or do you need a good economy to have stability? When
left to military leaders, the correct answer is always SECURITY! It is, after
all, a principle of patrolling. I argue that if you focus small, but effective
security on key points of infrastructure, economy and key AQ targets such as
Shia markets, holy sites (not trying to secure the entire country at once), that
as the economy improves, the reason why Iraqis become insurgents will go away.
That is our ultimate goal and that is the only way we will win.   

MAS is what we make him.  JAM is a very well organized gang-like
security force to protect Shia areas from Sunni extremists and provide
employment (even if it is illegal).  I will use DIME to organize my
thoughts:

Diplomatic:

• Let Iraq deal with their neighbors, we have nothing to offer Iran or Syria
  as carrots. Plus, Iran will NEVER back down, so it is wasted effort. The only
  thing we can take away from Iran is Iraq’s permission for Iranian pilgrims to
  visit Iraq.  Saddam never allowed it because he knew that the pilgrims
  would be heavily infiltrated with IRGC and MOIS, which is exactly what is
  happening to Iraq now.
• We should have more open diplomacy with moderate Sunni insurgents. 
  What do they really want?  Do we know?
• Take away MAS’s street credit by getting him back into the political
  arena.  He has often refused to meet with any Americans because he knows
  it will destroy his credibility with the more extreme members of his
  following.  Therefore we should make every effort to call MAS a “good
  guy” and meet with him openly.  It will increase his political standing
  (in his own mind, most politicians want nothing to do with him), but it will
  actually alienate much of his supporters.  MAS will feel important, but
  his importance will be lessened and he will fade away as a failed
  politician.  What would be the harm to policy and CF reputation in Iraq
  if we try to reach out to him ,and MAS “stands us up?”  The Iraqi
  government could put a spin on his refusal to meet as being an obstructionist,
  stubborn and not helping the Iraqi people.
• This will leave only the extremists (such as AQ and rogue JAM) who
  represent only a fraction of the insurgents. Isolate the extremists.  We
  must get back to that, and that is done through diplomacy and control of
  information at many levels.

Information:

• We are getting our butts kicked in information. I don’t even know where to
  start on this one except to say that COIN is won with ideas. Information is
  the poor man’s nuclear bomb. Everyone plays lip service to it, but we do very
  little about it.  All of the things listed below happen at some small
  scale, but there needs to be a dedicated effort to drastically improve the way
  we handle Information Operations throughout the military.
• For example: A classic example of how information operations can be more
  effective than kinetic operations.  By saying that CF are coming into
  Sadr city, MAS increases the desire for protection (which JAM provides). 
  When the CF don’t come, he uses the inaction to bolster his own credibility
  for providing protection.  Well done.  What could we have done?
• Information Operations (IO) needs to be thought of as more than a
  supporting effort, it is the Main effort.  Everything else that we do
  either supports our IO campaign or our enemies’.  This is contrary to
  what is taught in doctrine and in the war college and is very hard for senior
  leaders to accept.
• IO messages are very top driven and are very unresponsive
  (reactive).  The creation of IO messages need to be delegated down to
  battalion commanders based on a set of approved themes.
• The IO plan needs to be briefed in every order at every level.  No
  raid should ever occur without a preplanned message for the local
  population.  No patrol should be allowed to leave the gate without either
  specific talking points with a specific target audience, or a list of IO
  information requirements to confirm or deny the delivery, comprehension, and
  reaction to previous IO messages.  The patrols’ feedback must be
  streamlined to reach decision makers to update IO messages. 
  (standardized reporting)
• Intelligence collectors (includes patrols) need to actively collect the
  threats’ IO messages.  These messages need to be analyzed and countered
  immediately.
• Part of IPB needs to include:  MLECOA and MDECOA for IO messages, how
  they will be delivered, what they will say and who will say them.   

Military:

• Counterguerilla is the name of the game, but it is only a subset of COIN,
  yet we spend probably 90% of our time talking about it.
• I think we tried to do too much too fast, we tried to setup up IA Brigades
  and Divisions in a year using adhoc CF conventional army units (MiTTs). 
  It was way too fast. I think we should dissolve all Iraqi Army, National
  Police above the Company level and start over. Instead of a small military
  transition team with an Iraqi Battalion HQ, place an Iraqi company under the
  command of American Battalion. Let the American and Iraqi company commanders
  work together on every mission. Once each American company has an Iraqi
  counterpart working for it, start building Bn staffs with the American Bn
  Staff.   Hand pick the Bn leadership and staff members from the
  companies.
• JAM are working as a security force.  We should attempt to use
  them.  Co-op JAM in Sadr City and make them an official National Police
  Brigade and confine them to Sadr City.  Force them to hand over all of
  their records (for payroll reasons) and we will learn all about their
  structure and manpower.  Hold them accountable for their actions by using
  the paychecks as a carrot.  (JAM wants this, they want to be an
  Army)  This will anger many Sunni, but that is where the Diplomacy comes
  back into the picture, it all must be interconnected.
• Checkpoints work!  (Caveat, when manned by disciplined and competent
  soldiers).  In the fall of 2006, PM Maliki was pressured to ask GEN Casey
  to take down the checkpoints around Sadr City.  We did, and within a
  short time, VBIEDs starting attacking Sadr City again.  Insurgents,
  especially outsiders, fear checkpoints.  Most munitions in Baghdad have
  to be brought in from outside the city.  Sunni attackers who plan on
  attacking Sadr City must come from outside Sadr City.  When we restrict
  their freedom of maneuver, we hurt them.  When we see insurgents petition
  to have checkpoints removed, or we see checkpoints attacked, we should be
  reaffirmed that the checkpoints are in fact disrupting insurgent operations.
• Focus security efforts.  It is not possible to secure everything at
  once like we are trying to do, so stop trying.  Focus security efforts on
  high pay off areas such as Sadr City, the oil infrastructure and the
  government.   Focus security efforts in support of diplomacy,
  information and economy.  It is all interconnected and must be
  synced. 

Economics: 

• As cynical as this sounds, money is the cure for everything. Why are there
  no Kuwaiti terrorists, no attacks on Americans in Kuwait despite very high
  numbers for over 15 years? Partly because every Kuwaiti citizen gets about
  $60,000 a year for being a Kuwaiti.
  Oil, we must fix the oil problem in
  Iraq. Once we do that, and the country has money, we can pour money into the
  trouble areas.
• Infrastructure is broken.  We can pour $100s of millions into Sadr
  City, but we are putting band aids on the problem.  Sadr City has over 2
  million people, and it was built for about 500,000.  We should use
  oil-generated revenue and build new cities.  There is plenty of land
  north of Sadr City, hire residents to start new construction with heavy
  oversight to ensure building standards are met.  This will employ Iraqis,
  it will give them new places to live (fix the overpopulation problem). 
• Crazy idea:  Build a wall around Baghdad, or even around Iraq. 
  The “Great wall of Iraq” will employ hundreds of thousands and will have
  additional bonus effect of limited points of access into Iraq making external
  influence more difficult.
• In order for a national army to work, or any work projects that take
  Iraqis away from home, there must a reliable Iraqi Banking system. Iraqis who
  only get paid hard currency are forced to travel home every payday to give
  money to their families.  There needs to be a way that money can be wired
  home, or a direct deposit system.  If families could go to a national
  bank and safely draw their husband’s paycheck, the husband can go away from
  home for an extended period of time to work.  A husband who is not at
  home is not becoming an insurgent. 

Additional thought:

It is hard to assess progress because we don’t have any metrics.  It is
very hard to map our progress because we don’t have a standardized system for
reporting operational data to generate metrics.  In Iraq, PowerPoint is the
method of choice for operational reporting, however, PPT does not populate
databases and does not reach national analysts.  There is a very
standardized reporting system for intelligence information (Intelligence
Information Reports, TD’s, etc), however there is no standardized system for
reporting operational results.

For example, an analyst in DIA is studying insurgent Abu X.  He reads
every HUMINT and SIGINT report about Abu X.  What he doesn’t know is that
Abu X was captured two weeks ago.  He doesn’t know this because he didn’t
get on that unit’s OPSUM distro and didn’t see the PPT slide.  He also
doesn’t know what was found at Abu X’s house.  Hopefully, if all goes well,
the analyst later figures it out when he finds interrogation reports about Abu X
and reads DOCEX reports. 

I had DIA analysts who worked at Camp Victory tell me in Spring of 2006 that
no one patrols Sadr City anymore, that CF haven’t been there for months. 
Of course, that was completely wrong, we had several patrols a day in the city
(these patrols were published in newspapers).  The analyst is making
assessments based on partial information because there is no system for putting
operational information (patrol debriefs) into a database that the analyst can
search. 

We tried putting patrol debriefs (including raid results) into IIR formats
using the American Soldier as the source.  G2X shot us down because the
reporting was circular because it was already on a PPT slide.  This is
silly because the IIR can state that this information is also stated in a named
PPT file.