February 11, 2007
Computer scientists are unanimous in their disagreement. Wireless communications, especially those protected with the WEP encryption (used in nearly all DREs) can be broken in a few minutes. Further, an attacker can perform an attack from a significant distance from the polling place (at least 1/4 mile), using an inexpensive antenna (less than $5 in parts). At best, wireless is a marginal reduction in security; at worst, wireless is a tremendous reduction in security. In corporate America, wireless communications of the sort used today and advocated by VEBA are considered a major security risk. We cannot conceive of any way in which wireless communication can be considered an “added security level”.
Of the 32 jurisdictions four of the largest, Fairfax County, City of Richmond, Henrico and Arlington counties, are included. Disabling the wireless component of this voting system will:
Render our current voting system incapable of tallying votes by location (precinct). Pollworkers will be forced to tally the machines individually. Then, using a calculator, manually add the individual machine totals. Issue: Adding a manual process to any procedure substantially increases the error rate of results.
We agree that there is a small additional level of effort and potential for error. However, the totals generated in this fashion are unofficial, and the official totals can use the same method used for totaling results across multiple precincts.
Have a negative impact on pollworkers. Pollworkers normally arrive at the polling place at 5:00 a.m. At 7:00 p.m., more than 14 hours after arriving, they will be required to perform a critical manual tally process. Then complete the required lengthy and tedious paperwork, including hand tallying the write-in votes, call-in the results, close-down the precinct and finally return the materials. Issue: Expect a decline in the number of individuals willing to serve as pollworkers due to an increase in time and responsibility requirements (although more pollworkers will be needed due to the increased processes and responsibilities.)
We are sympathetic to the efforts of the overworked pollworkers. However, the time required to perform the hand totals should be no more than a few minutes. A typical Virginia election has no more than a dozen races; even with five machines per precinct, that is a total of 60 addition operations, which can be completed in under ten minutes using a calculator. VEBA is exaggerating the impact.
Impact the time election returns are made available to the public. It will take a much greater amount of time to manually tally the voting machines and compare and record write-in votes. Issues: Expect significant delays in election returns. Final unofficial returns may not be available until the following morning. Expect a public perception of “something wrong” with the election process as a result of the delays.
The impact should be no more than the few minutes required to perform the totaling. Voters will gladly wait a few minutes more for unofficial results rather than having the risk of elections tampered with as a result of unsafe use of wireless communications.
Increase the number of Elections staff and resources to re-train pollworkers using new procedures. Issue: Expect an increase in budget needs to local jurisdictions due to increased staff and resource requirements.
We believe that most poll workers are familiar with the use of a calculator, so the additional training should be minimal.
Increase the number of Election night staff and resources required to manually process the “called-in” returns. Issues: Another manual process will be required, once more increasing the risk of errors. Expect an increase in budget needs to local jurisdictions due to increased staff and resource requirements.
If the totals are done at the precinct level (as VEBA suggests in their earlier questions), there should be no increase in election night staff.
Increase the amount of days and resources it takes the local Electoral board to canvass the election returns, resulting in a significant delay in the certification of the returns. Issues: Yet another manual process will be required during the canvass increasing the potential for errors. Expect an increase in budget needs to local jurisdictions due to increased staff and resource requirements.
If the existing voting machines fail to “synchronize” (as frequently happens), this process is already required. So no new processes are required. The additional effort should be minimal.
Significantly impact local Electoral boards and the Virginia State Board of Elections in their abilities to be compliant with election laws, i.e. post explanation of changes made to election night returns. Issues: Local Electoral Boards and the Virginia State Board of Elections will be required by Virginia Election Laws, /Chapter 6 §24.2-671. Electoral board to meet and ascertain results; conclusiveness of results, as amended just last year in 2006 (HB 1175,) “Certification of results: State Board of Elections to post on internet changes made to results”.
If corrections are required, the explanation of incorrect additions is far more desirable than unexplained modifications due to attacks via wireless communications.
In summary, the Verifiable Voting Coalition of Virginia believes that the hardworking pollworkers of Virginia can be trusted to accurately total election results, and thereby largely eliminate a major source of risk to our elections.
