Cross-posted from Diatribune.
As more states move their primary dates up, presumably to attract more attention from the candidates and to have more of a say in the nomination, the effect of such leapfrogging on individual candidate’s chances at becoming the Democratic nominee is unknown, as Devilstower diaried a couple of days ago in “Who Wins At Leapfrog?” But a discussion we seem not to be having is just what result, what goal, is to be achieved by any change in the calendar or the process. That is, while the objections to the calendar seem to be defined, the goals of such changes seem rather ill-defined.
Of course there is always a discussion of the relative power of the individual states in the nominating process, and whether Iowa should retain its traditional first in the nation status (if you mean by “tradition” since 1972 when the Democratic Party adopted McGovern-Fraser Commission‘s recommendations for reforming the delegate selection process), whether Iowa and New Hampshire are representative enough of the nation, etc. Then there is the discussion surrounding the influence of money and the problem of nominating a candidate who is beholden to this or that (or many) corporate interests.
In order to achieve goals, the goals must be set. That seems self-evident. It would seem that any changes that are advocated in the nominating calendar or process ought to be evaluated in terms of achieving the goals of the Democratic Party at the national level. So let’s see what the goals of the Democratic Party, and the party’s nominating process are.
I would propose that the goals are something like the following: “To nominate a presidential ticket that will win the general election, serve the following four-year term, and govern in a manner that reflects as nearly as possible the views and in accordance with the values held by the party.”
A little bit general on the far end, the governing part, but the part about winning the general election and holding office for four years seems to be at the heart of it. Of course there are a bunch of caveats that could be thrown in, and a laundry list of special statements about empowerment, civil rights, etc. But what I am looking for here is consideration of the process itself without completely losing sight of the fact that there are goals to be accomplished after winning.
Let’s look at the history of the process as it has been, more or less, since 1972.
1972 – McGovern ran as the anti-war candidate. Nixon won a landlside for various reasons including the “southern strategy” and by painting McGovern as just this side of a communist.
I’m not so sure there was a candidate who could have beat Nixon, but that is open to discussion. Edmund Muskie won the Iowa Caucuses while McGovern came in second. It was also a trial run for the new process. Perhaps Muskie could have run a better campaign, had he held his campaign for the nomination together
1976 – Carter ran as a fiscally conservative southern Christian who was at least tolerant of liberal social views. He used the Iowa Caucuses (where he finished second to (“uncommitted”) to get the momentum for a national run. He won the presidency, but he was not an extremely strong candidate and the vote was very close. but the Watergate scandal had lowered public respect for government and politicians. The Republicans right took advantage of that to gain strength for the next election.
1980 – Carter (after a challenge from the left, led by Ted Kennedy) was tagged with the “malaise” speech and was attacked as ineffectual. (Carter did not actually say “malaise” in the speech but it was so well identified with the word that many people mistakenly remember him saying it). The Iranian hostage crisis did nothing to help him, either, especially when the military botched a rescue mission.
Would Kennedy have been a better nominee? If so, how would the process have had to change to deny the nomination to the incumbent President? Had the delegate selection calendar been front-loaded in 1980, would we have had a better chance in the general election?
1984 – Mondale led another electoral disaster against an incumbent Republican. Who could have beat Reagan? I don’t think any one could.
1988 – Dukakis blows a chance at the open seat. George H. W. Bush was not that popular with the right wing, but he held their interest in the face of Dukakis, who was framed as an effete east-coast liberal.
Dukakis was a horrible candidate. I will stand up for Iowa here: he came in third in the caucuses behind Gephardt and Simon. 1988 was Gephardt’s chance win, but the rest of the country decided to nominate Dukakis. Whatever change in the process would prevent that sort of thing from happening again deserves a look. But Iowa certainly did not dictate that nomination – and that was a bad thing in that instance.
1992 – Clinton is nominated as a “centrist” with help from Harkin (whose candidacy made Iowa irrelevant), and the “Super Tuesday” primaries across the old south. Clinton, with help in the general election from H. Ross Perot as a spoiler, won the presidency. It would seem, then that the process worked to nominate another southern governor to go on to win the general election. The argument could be made that it worked because of Harkin and in spite of Iowa’s position on the nominating calendar.
1996 – Clinton was renominated without opposition. Again the process worked.
2000 – Vice President Gore staved off a challenge from Bill Bradley to gain the nomination. Gore won the popular vote and there is little doubt that had the votes been counted honestly in each state, he would have won in the Electoral College as well. Instead, five right-wingers on the Supreme Court effectively nullified the election and appointed George W. Bush. But, again, the process seems to have worked in nominating a popular candidate who actually won the election.
2004 – Kerry gains the nomination after perhaps surprisingly coming in first in Iowa. Kerry could have run a better campaign against W. But, in all honesty, who would have been a better candidate in 2004? Gephardt was past his prime and the media set about to destroy Howard Dean. Perhaps Edwards would have connected more with those average voters had he been on the top of the ticket. If so, how could the process have been different to achieve the result that we may see as having been preferable?
Of course, in all instances, it could be speculated that there might have been other potential nominees who did not even attempt to negotiate the nomination process. And perhaps that other candidate could have been nominated and could have turned out to be the best president ever. Fill me in in the comments section if you think that might be the case.
If a different calendar or process would not have given us a better ticket, then there would not seem to be a reason to change.
Now, all of this is getting a bit long, but the nut of it is this: any change in the process and the calendar should be made for the purpose of ensuring the selection of a presidential ticket that will win the general election, serve the following four-year term, and govern in a manner that reflects as nearly as possible the views and in accordance with the values held by the party.
So with all the proposals to leapfrog primaries and caucuses, front-load the nomination process, increase or decrease the influence of certain states in that process, etc., this question needs to be asked:
How is that going to help?
