How does this bode for today’s situation?
Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, September 18, 1971, folder: Vietnam Elections, box 872, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, NSCF, NPMP.
We recognized from the beginning the uncertainty that the South Vietnamese could be sufficiently strengthened to stand on their own within the time span that domestic opposition to American involvement would allow. It has always been recognized that a delicate point would be reached where our withdrawals would coincide with maximum domestic uncertainty to jeopardize the whole structure at the final hour.
Therefore a negotiated settlement had always been far preferable. Rather than run the risk of South Vietnam crumbing around our remaining forces, a peace settlement would end the war with an act of policy and leave the future of South Vietnam to the historical process. There would be a clear terminal date rather than a gradual winding down. We could heal the wounds in this country as our men left peace behind on the battlefield and a healthy interval for South Vietnam’s fate to unfold. In short, Vietnamization may be our ultimate recourse; it cannot be our preferred choice. . . .
