You might think my title is a reference to John McCain’s claim that we should stay in Iraq for 100 years. That would, after all be a reasonable assumption. But no, the idea that we must stay in Iraq for the indefinite future at a cost of thousands of lives and billions (trillions?) of tax dollars is not solely limited to Republicans, right wing crazies and Bush/Cheney dead enders. It’s also the rallying cry of prominent news reporters and self described Middle Eastern experts like Michael R. Gordon of the New York Times, who today in a column/report castigates Democrats for daring to talk about pulling our military forces out of Iraq:
I have rolled north to Baquba with a Stryker brigade that cleared the city of insurgents and stayed with a cavalry squadron that found common cause with Sunni sheiks in Hawr Rajab. And from Iowa to Washington, I have talked with the leading candidates who were willing to be interviewed on the war (four, so far) and tracked the ones who were not.
Those were parallel universes, in which the discussion of the taxing road ahead and potential fall-back options were often so divergent that the generals and the politicians seemed not to be talking about the same war.
The American officers I met were hardly of one mind on how to proceed in Iraq, but they were grappling with decisions on how to try to stabilize a traumatized country with a hard-headed sense that although there have been significant gains, a long and difficult job still lies ahead — a core assumption that has frequently been missing on the campaign trail.
Yes, because only American officers with whom Mr. Gordon was allowed (or chose) to speak have any idea what America’s policy in Iraq should be. Well, only them and other war hawks like Anthony Cordesman and Andrew Krepinevich, who –surprise, surprise — feels exactly the same way that Mr. Gordon does about Iraq: namely that we need to be there for however long it takes to accomplish our “mission” (however that may be defined).
(cont.)
Anthony Cordesman, a military specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who regularly visits Iraq, put it this way: . . . “The Democrats talk about this as if the only problem is to withdraw and the difference is over how quickly to do it.” […]
“Unless you are suppressing insurgents the way the Romans did — creating a desert and calling it peace — it typically can take the better part of a decade or more,” said Andrew Krepinevich, a military expert at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
“The paradox,” he added, “is that counterinsurgency requires convincing the Iraqis of our staying power. At the same time, the American people view success in terms of how quickly we can pull out.”
Yes, unless you are suppressing insurgents the way the Romans did you better be prepared to be in country for a very long time. Just so you understand what Mr. Krepenevich is talking about when he refers to Roman methods of dealing with insurgents, let me give you a quick refresher course on the Roman occupation of Judea and how they put down the numerous Jewish revolts there during the first and second Centuries of the Common Era:
Roman influence in the near eastern provinces of Judaea and Syria Palaestina first came to major fruition with the conquests of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey the Great). […]
While Pompey was busy in a minor campaign against the Arabic Nabataeans, Aristobulus seized Jerusalem and Rome was forced to do more than mediate. Pompey besieged the ancient city and within 3 months, officially made Hyrcanus the high priest and established Judaea as a client state. […]
Later, Marcus Antonius who was given command of the entire eastern empire in an agreement with Octavian (the future Augustus), bequeathed the province along with other Roman possessions to Cleopatra in Egypt. While Herod remained in a position of authority in this period, he supported Antonius and Cleopatra, understandably so, but with Octavian’s victory in the civil war at Actium in 31 BC, the situation changed irrevocably for the entire Roman world.
Herod went to Rhodes to meet the victorious Octavian, and through his political skill, and likely proven ability to stabilize the province, continued in his confirmation as ruler of Judaea. Herod was a brutal king, but this brutality helped keep an often instable political and religious environment on peaceful terms. Despite his brutality and apparent disinterest in traditional Jewish customs, Herod was careful not to infringe on these traditions for the people. He found it vital to his own survival to seek the approval of the masses, but the overwhelming reason for his success was the administration of force to suppress open opposition. The Jews, however, were limited self-rule as it related to their religious practices. […]
Herod’s reign ended with his death in 4 BC and the now Roman emperor, Augustus, was faced with a difficult challenge. . . . Augustus was forced to place Judaea under the direct control of Roman Prefects, who were in turn responsible to the Governor of Syria. Though no legions were directly assigned to the Praefect in Judaea’s early formation, there were typically 3 nearby legions in Syria ready to respond to the numerous revolts of the small province.
Of the most famous of these Roman Prefects, was Pontius Pilate. . . . [T]he rule of Pilate was one of difficult circumstances with several revolts put down by extreme force. Some of his actions regarding religious tradition alienated him from the Jewish population, and even the Emperor Tiberius was forced to intervene. Threatening Pilate if peaceful administration wasn’t restored, Pilate’s actions in the biblical stories may have been less out of tolerance toward Jesus, than fear of retribution from Rome if new revolts occurred. […]
By 66 AD, all out revolt finally broke out when the Procurator Gessius Florus apparently seized seventeen talents from the Jewish temple treasury. This act, paling in comparison to the religious strife that existed between Pagan Rome and the Jewish faith, was simply the final straw that broke the people’s tolerance and armies were raised throughout the province. The Syrian governor Gallus attempted to invest Jerusalem but was soundly defeated, even losing the standard of XII Legion in the process. Religious zealots took hold of forts throughout the region, and ethnic purging took place all over. By 67 AD, however, the Roman general Vespasian arrived and things began to go well for the Romans. He invaded Palestine from Syria and stamped out resistance in the north with great speed. By the summer of 68 AD, only Jerusalem and the stronghold of Masada remained in opposition. […]
In 71 AD, Jerusalem was finally captured and its great temple destroyed, ending the resistance of the main body of the population. . . . By 74 AD, Lucius Flavius Silva, then the governor of Judaea ordered the legion X Fretensis to besiege the mountain fortress to put an end to the resistance. Building an incredible ramp to allow easy movement for siege engines and infantry, the Romans discovered that their efforts would not require a fight. They found the place abandoned, save for a woman and her children, who informed the Romans that the inhabitants had killed themselves rather than become slaves to the Romans. […]
Hadrian was responsible for stopping Roman expansion and attempting to bring cultural uniformity throughout the empire. While it brought great success in most places, the religious differences in Judaea were too great. He rebuilt Jerusalem, first razed by Titus, as the Roman city of Aelia Capitolina and erected a great temple to Jupiter, rather than the Jewish God. Hadrian also forbade circumcision which the Jews viewed as a direct attack on their customs, and by 132 AD, revolt broke out once again. Under the leadership of Simon ben Kosiba, or Bar Kochba, this 3 year struggle would be the most brutal in the history of Roman rule and would turn into a clash involving ethnicity, faith and culture. Three full legions were needed to suppress this clash and extreme measures were taken to end resistance. By 135 AD, the Romans cornered Kosiba and his followers at Bethar where they starved to death and the war was over.
The Jewish people were severely punished by Hadrian. Prisoners were sold into slavery in massive numbers, and Judaism as a religion was under attack. He forbade the people to teach Mosaic Law or to own scrolls of any sort. Pagan temples and symbols were erected all over the province and even directly over old Jewish religious sites. The province itself was renamed Palestine; and of course, Jerusalem was already called Aelia Capitolina to stamp out any reference even to the Jewish names. The people were even forbidden from entering the temple complex to pray at their own sacred grounds, and the outer wall of the complex eventually came to be known as the ‘wailing wall’.
So, Roman influence and occupation began in 64 B.C.E. and various insurgencies and revolts continued there against Roman rule until 135 C.E. when the Romans effectively killed or ethnically cleansed Judea of the majority of the Jews who lived there, renaming it Palestine, and prohibiting the practice of the Jewish religion in the former Judea, a period of almost 200 years. Estimates of the death toll from the Jewish revolt in 66-74 C.E. range from 600,000 to 1, 300,000 Jews. Hadrian’s war against the Jews in 132-135 C.E. is estimated to have killed another 600,000 Jews, or half the remaining population in Palestine. Surviving Jews were sold into slavery. All but a few were scattered to the winds.
So, the Romans, with their brutal methods of genocide and ethnic cleansing to eliminate insurgencies took over 150 years to completely subjugate a religiously devout community with many different sects, and many different extremists. Of course this included periods when the Romans attempted to exert their influence over the Jews through the use of local surrogate rulers or Roman governors who also employed “harsh methods” to keep the people in line.
The Roman situation in ancient Judea sounds remarkably similar to the situation America faces in Iraq, does it not? Now I have no doubt America, with its far greater military might and firepower could achieve a successful genocide and diaspora ethnic cleansing of the Iraqi people in short order should it wish to adopt the brutal methods of the Roman empire. But the question remains. Is that something the American people would stand for? And in the alternative, do we really wish to keep our military forces in Iraq for the next 10, 20, 30, 40, etc. years in the hopes of eventually stabilizing the political chaos and ethnic strife that we ourselves caused when we invaded Iraq under false pretenses?
Michael Gordon, and his serious Middle Eastern scholars, strategists and experts seem to think so. Look at the concluding paragraphs of his “analysis” and tell me I’m wrong. Naturally enough, he puts his argument in the mouths of anonymous diplomats and generals to whom he has allegedly spoken, but there is little doubt that these are his own views which he is pushing.
The generals and diplomats are taught to stay clear of American politics. Right now, they have their hands full trying to devise a way to thin out the American troop deployments and shift more of the burden to the Iraqis without forfeiting hard-won gains. Their hope, one American civilian official said, is to make enough political and military headway this year that the next president will have time to reassess developments in Iraq and perhaps opt for a course correction rather than wholesale change.
In the meantime, some senior officers seem utterly puzzled by the debate at home. “The one thing that befuddles is I have not heard any candidate describe what their short and long term goals are for Iraq, how it fits into their regional goals for the Middle East and transnational terrorism,” said the American officer. “Is their goal just to withdraw troops as fast as possible?”
Let me ask Michael Gordon this question. Based on the Rome’s experience in occupying a country with with various religious and political factions and insurgencies, an occupation that eventually ended in genocide and mass slaughter of civilians on a scale not yet seen in Iraq, after trying every other approach to “stabilizing” that country do we really want to go down that path? Do we really think our military presence in Iraq will do anything other than fan the flames of hatred against the “foreign invaders” much as it did for the Jewish freedom fighters in 66 C.E. and 132 C.E.? Or do we make the difficult, but necessary strategic decision to withdraw from Iraq now, before we are seduced to follow any further down the ruinous and evil path the Romans took? In short, do we want to be conquerors and murderers like every other authoritarian and imperial regime from Alexander the Great through Nazi Germany, or do we want to remain a Republic and a Democracy which cherishes the vision of self determination for people around the globe and a very limited interference in the affairs of other nations?
Gordon and friends want us to choose the former course, one that would ultimately result in the end of our democracy and the rise of an authoritarian, and possibly fascist state, dedicated to foreign wars and imperial expansion. I pray there is still time to chose the latter course. I fear that if the views of Gordon and those “experts” he cites so freely continue to get influence our policy in Iraq and elsewhere that our nation’s time as a beacon of freedom and liberty for all will be swept onto the dust heap of history.
