. . . apparently he has finally decided to share US intelligence information regarding Iran’s nuclear program with the inspectors for the UN’s nuclear nonproliferation watchdog organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the very first time, something he has previously refused to do during his entire term in office, until now (via The New York Times):
The Bush administration has agreed to turn over to international inspectors intelligence data it has collected that it says proves Iran worked on developing a nuclear weapon until a little more than four years ago, according to American and foreign diplomats.
The decision reverses the United States’ longstanding refusal to share the data, citing the need to protect intelligence sources.
So why now? Why give this information to the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, a person who has been persona non grata with the Bush administration until now (they did, after all, do their damnedest to get him fired from his job)? Well, maybe their new willingness to play nice with Mr. ElBaradei has something to do with this:
The administration acted as the International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled to issue a report as early as next week on Iran’s past nuclear activities. Administration officials hope that the nuclear inspectors can now confront Iran with what the Americans believe is the strongest evidence that the Iranians had a nuclear program.
Not that anyone is promising that ElBaradei and his inspectors will get the full dossier that the CIA and other US intelligence agencies has accumulated on Iran’s nuclear activity. Far from it, in fact:
But it remains unclear how much of the data Dr. ElBaradei will be allowed to disclose to the Iranians. In particular, it is not clear if the information includes diagrams and designs that were secretly taken out of Iran on a laptop computer in 2004 and turned over to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Nonetheless, this clearly looks like a victory for the intelligence weenies analysts at the CIA whose advice Bush has generally ignored unless it supported his preconceived agenda. When the NIE that the CIA had prepared on Iran’s former nuclear weapons program was leaked to the American public, Bush’s hand was forced. He may have had no choice but to agree to turn over some of what the US knows to the IAEA if he wants to have any influence on the ElBaradei’s final report on Iran’s nuclear program to be presented to the IAEA’s “35 member board . . . as early as next week.”
The Bush administration’s decision came two months after the publication of a National Intelligence Estimate that concluded, with what it terms “high confidence,” that Iran was designing a weapon through 2003. But the assessment indicated that Iranian officials ordered the work halted later that year, perhaps because they feared it would ultimately be discovered.
The publication of the new estimate in early December undercut efforts to toughen sanctions that were initially imposed because Iran refused to follow a United Nations Security Council demand that it stop enriching uranium.
Of course, none of this means Mr. Bush (and his little friend Cheney) are happy about any of this. Not with the CIA, not with the IAEA, and not with their failure to gin up another war in the Middles East. Far from it, in fact, as Bush’s remarks made during an interview with Pravda Fox News last Sunday indicate:
cont.
Mr. Bush made it clear that he disagreed with the idea that the intelligence estimate lowered the threat from Iran. “Iran is a threat, and that’s what the N.I.E. said, if you read it carefully,” he said. “It showed they had a weapons — secret military weapons program, but that doesn’t mean they can’t have another secret weapons military program.”
According to American and foreign officials interviewed about the contents of the laptop, the information found there included descriptions of the so-called Green Salt Project. That project, which involved uranium processing, high explosives and a missile warhead design, demonstrated what the agency suspected were links between Iran’s military and its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program. If that evidence were substantiated, it would undercut Iran’s claims that its program is aimed solely at producing electrical power.
Let me be clear. I strongly suspect that Iran did have a low level nuclear weapons program run by its military prior to 2003. However, after the Iraq invasion, I think the Iranian government, which was then controlled by the moderates, decided to suspend that program at the same time they sent out feelers to the Bush administration seeking a “grand deal” with America that would grant Iran security from any regime change by the US government in exchange for Iran’s cooperation against Al Qaida, negotiations regarding limitations on its civilian nuclear program, acceptance of Israel, and an end to Iran’s support for groups such as Hamas and Hezbullah. A possible deal, regrettably, that we now know the Bush administration rejected out of hand, thanks in large part to the influence of Vice President Cheney’s office.
As a direct result of that diplomatic failure by the moderates, they lost favor with the ruling Imams, and the path was paved for the hardline factions, led by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to regain power in the 2005 elections. Since then, Ahmadinejad, with the tacit support of Iran’s Supreme Ruler, has pursued a more confrontational stance vis-a-vis the United States, and has pushed forward the development of Iran’s civilian nuclear program, especially its program to enrich uranium for use as nuclear fuel using gas centrifuges, and a heavy water “breeder reactor” at Arak could eventually become a source of plutonium, another element which can be used to make nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, Bush bungled our best opportunity to achieve a diplomatic settlement with Iran, which would have given him everything he now claims he wants, back in 2003. Iran is still a threat to acquire nuclear arms, though not an imminent threat. However, the Bush administration’s unilateralist approach to foreign policy, and its reliance on the projection of US military power in the region, has actually denuded much of our power, particularly the “soft power” assets of our diplomatic and economic influence, because our allies no longer trust us, and our economy has been weakened by the enormous costs of Bush’s misguided war and occupation of Iraq.
He still desperately wants to convince our allies that they should support US proposals for sanctions and possible military action against Iran, but by his own actions he has alienated our allies, humiliated and disparaged our intelligence agencies, and made any American led diplomatic effort to counter Iran’s influence in the region for all intents and purposes a dead letter. The best we can hope for is that his and Cheney’s dreams of military conquest and regime change in Iran have been stymied (which now appears to be the case). It will be left to the next President to see if anything can be salvaged from the mess he will leave behind regarding our conflict with Iran, and with our allies in Europe and the Middle East.
