It’s an article of faith in many left-leaning circles that the purpose of invading Iraq was to establish permanent military bases there. Part of this theory is premised on what we did once we arrived. By abolishing the Iraqi military and engaging in a de-Ba’athification program, we assured that there could be no short-term domestic substitute for our leadership. In effect, the Iraqis had a choice between U.S. occupation and absolute anarchy.
It’s a fine theory, but it is probably not true. An important piece of evidence that it is not true is detailed in this week’s Time magazine. I’ll quote it at length since the context is important It comes from a new book written by General Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of U.S. Forces in Iraq in 2003-2004.
In 2005, Marine General Peter Pace, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called [Sanchez] to say his career was over and he wouldn’t get the promotion to a full general — four stars — that Sanchez says he was promised. Six months later, at Rumsfeld’s request, he showed up at the Pentagon for a meeting with the defense secretary shortly before retiring. In this exclusive excerpt, Sanchez details what happened next:
First, Rumsfeld offered Sanchez some cushy assignments to offset the sting of not getting his fourth star. Then…
Secretary Rumsfeld then pulled out a two-page memo and handed it to me. “I wrote this after a promotion interview about two weeks ago,” he explained. “The officer told me that one of the biggest mistakes we made after the war was to allow CENTCOM and CFLCC to leave the Iraq theater immediately after the fighting stopped — and that left you and V Corps with the entire mission.”
“Yes, that’s right,” I said.
“Well, how could we have done that?” he said in an agitated, but adamant, tone. “I knew nothing about it. Now, I’d like you to read this memo and give me any corrections.”
In the memo, Rumsfeld stated that one of the biggest strategic mistakes of the war was ordering the major redeployment of forces and allowing the departure of the CENTCOM and CFLCC staffs in May�June 2003.
“This left General Sanchez in charge of operations in Iraq with a staff that had been focused at the operational and tactical level, but was not trained to operate at the strategic/operational level.” He went on to write that neither he nor anyone higher in the Administration knew these orders had been issued, and that he was dumbfounded when he learned that Gen. McKiernan was out of the country and in Kuwait, and that the forces would be drawn down to a level of about 30,000 by September. “I did not know that Sanchez was in charge,” he wrote.
So, orders were given, initially, to draw down troops to 30,000 by September, but no civilian will own up to making that decision or issuing that order.
I stopped reading after I read that last statement, because I knew it was total BS. After a deep breath, I said, “Well, Mr. Secretary, the problem as you’ve stated it is generally accurate, but your memo does not accurately capture the magnitude of the problem. Furthermore, I just can’t believe you didn’t know that Franks’s and McKiernan’s staffs had pulled out and that the orders had been issued to redeploy the forces.”
At that point, Rumsfeld became very excited, jumped out of his seat, and sat down in the chair next to me so that he could look at the memo with me. “Now just what is it in this memorandum that you don’t agree with?” he said, almost shouting.
“Mr. Secretary, when V Corps ramped up for the war, our entire focus was at the tactical level. The staff had neither the experience nor training to operate at the strategic level, much less as a joint/combined headquarters. All of CFLCC’s generals, whom we called the Dream Team, left the country in a mass exodus. The transfer of authority was totally inadequate, because CENTCOM’s focus was only on departing the theater and handing off the mission. There was no focus on postconflict operations. None! In their minds, the war was over and they were leaving. Everybody was executing these orders, and the services knew all about it.”
Rather than focus on the strategic blunder here, I want to focus on what it means for the psychology of the war planners.
Starting to get a little worked up, I paused a moment, and then looked Rumsfeld straight in the eye. “Sir, I cannot believe that you didn’t know I was being left in charge in Iraq.”
“No! No!” he replied. “I was never told that the plan was for V Corps to assume the entire mission. I have to issue orders and approve force deployments into the theater, and they moved all these troops around without any orders or notification from me.”
“Sir, I don’t … “
“Why didn’t you tell anyone about this?” he asked, interrupting me in an angry tone.
“Mr. Secretary, all of the senior leadership in the Pentagon knew what was happening. Franks issued the orders and McKiernan was executing them.”
Sanchez goes on the explain that his interpretation of this meeting was that he was being bribed with job offers in an attempt to get him to agree that Rumsfeld had no knowledge that he was being left in charge of the occupation of Iraq. But, again, while that is interesting, the important point is that it appears that there was no plan to stick around in Iraq. The plan was to get the hell out.
The only thing I can think of that explains this is that the lunatics around Cheney and Rumsfeld seriously believed that they could just install Ahmed Chalabi as a new strongman and that he would be able to maintain order. But once they arrived in Iraq they quickly realized that that would be impossible and that Ayatollah Sistani (who they had probably never heard of before) was the most important man in Iraq. They couldn’t do anything without his approval, and that is when things began to unravel in a hurry.
This theory can explain a lot of things, like why General Franks did so little Phase IV (occupation) planning and why the State Department’s plan was tossed aside, and (potentially) why the decisions were made to disband the military and engage in de-Ba’athification.
But, in any case, it doesn’t look like the plan was initially to have a long-term occupation of Iraq.
