Yesterday, Carlatta Gall of the New York Times did a piece that has all the hallmarks of a Scooter Libby/Judith Miller roll-out. On the eve of Obama announcing his policy for Afghanistan, Ms. Gall reports that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban have shed their differences and united to make this a very bloody summer for our troops stationed in Central Asia. All the details are vague and the sources are suspect. And it has this piece of candy, too:
The Taliban fighters said the Afghan Taliban delegation was led by Mullah Abdullah Zakir, a commander from Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan, whose real name is reported to be Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul.
A front-line commander during the Taliban government, Mullah Zakir was captured in 2001 in northern Afghanistan and was detained at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, until his release in 2007, Afghan Taliban members contacted by telephone said.
Color me skeptical. A former Guantanamo prisoner led the Afghan delegation that convinced the Pakistani Taliban to join in a holy alliance, drop their mission in their own country, and join the jihad in Afghanistan? I am not sure that such propaganda serves the Obama (unlike the Bush) administration’s purposes all that well, but it sure serves the case for an expanded military effort.
There’s a huge contradiction in our policy with Pakistan, and it was spelled out quite clearly in Ms. Gall’s piece. On the one hand she writes this:
…in recent years the Pakistani Taliban have concentrated on battling the Pakistani government, extending a domain that has not only threatened Pakistan but has also provided an essential rear base for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
That’s an objectively true observation. This use of the term ‘Pakistani Taliban’ is new, but ‘extremists’ operating out of the north/northeast of Pakistan have been expanding their influence southward over the last few years. They have attacked the Pakistani government of both Gen. Musharraf and President Asif Ali Zardari. But then Ms. Gall writes this:
At the same time, American officials told The New York Times this week that Pakistan’s military intelligence agency continued to offer money, supplies and guidance to the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan as a proxy to help shape a friendly government there once American forces leave.
Let’s think about this. We’re analyzing this as if there is a big distinction between the Afghan Taliban, who Pakistan is arming and supporting, and the Pakistani Taliban, who Pakistan is fighting against in a brutal civil war. But, the article says these two groups have formed an alliance and that the Pakistani Taliban has agreed to stop operations against the Pakistani government and focus on operations across the Hindu Kush border in Afghanistan. If this is true, it is wonderful news for the Pakistan government. Their biggest threat is now going to pack their rumpsacks and hump it through 16,000 foot mountains into another country to make trouble there. In fact, it’s hard to believe the government in Rawalpindi could be so lucky unless they were the guiding hand behind it.
And let’s go back and consider this part of Ms. Gall’s article:
…Pakistan’s military intelligence agency continued to offer money, supplies and guidance to the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan as a proxy to help shape a friendly government there once American forces leave.
After all this time, nearly eight years, it doesn’t appear that Pakistan has changed their Afghan-policy one iota. They are pursuing the same policy they had prior to 9/11, which is to support the Taliban movement in Afghanistan so that they can control Afghanistan. They are doing this in spite of the blowback this has caused in their own country. They are doing it in spite of all the money we give their military and the liaison work we do with their intelligence services. They are doing it in spite of a change in their government (which is now led by a man who lost his wife in an extremist-planned assassination).
It seems to me like nothing can change Pakistan’s mind about supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. These facts make a mockery of our relationship with Pakistan. Keep this in mind when you read President Obama’s comments today, spelling out the rationale for his new policy in the region.
OBAMA: The terrorists within Pakistan’s borders are not simply enemies of America or Afghanistan – they are a grave and urgent danger to the people of Pakistan. Al Qaeda and other violent extremists have killed several thousand Pakistanis since 9/11. They have killed many Pakistani soldiers and police. They assassinated Benazir Bhutto. They have blown up buildings, derailed foreign investment, and threatened the stability of the state. Make no mistake: al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within.
It is important for the American people to understand that Pakistan needs our help in going after al Qaeda.
On one level, everything President Obama said is true. On another level, it seems like we’re operating in a House of Mirrors.
There is a legitimate case for continuing our efforts in Afghanistan and Obama spells that case out very well. If there is a case for abandoning that effort, it is our inability to solve these conundrums I’ve highlighted here. In spite of all the difficulties, I am still undecided about the right policy. I’m torn between the logic in Obama’s proposals and the seemingly insurmountable illogic of the whole region. To be completely honest, this is one situation where I feel that the ultimate decision must be made after reviewing all the top secret evidence and assessments, and I don’t have access to those sources.
I am skeptical that we can achieve our objectives even though I understand why we have these objectives. Pakistan is probably the hardest challenge from a policy point of view that I’ve ever seen in foreign policy. When you take the threat of terrorism and add the nuclear issue and the threat of war with India, it’s hard to find a more challenging set of considerations.
