Writing about the internal religious politics of Iran puts me at the limit of my knowledge. I have a good and broad knowledge of the history of Shi’a Islam, but not so great of a handle on how the thirty years of Islamic rule in Iran has changed what was traditionally the case. I wrote about the history here and here. I don’t want to rehash all of that this morning. if you are really interested in learning as much as you can about the structure of Shi’a clerical power you can get a somewhat flawed and America-centric idea through this paper (PDF) from the Washington Institute of Near East Policy.
I want to provide a bit of context to the report in this morning’s New York Times, without getting too technical or going beyond what I know.
CAIRO — The most important group of religious leaders in Iran called the disputed presidential election and the new government illegitimate on Saturday, an act of defiance against the country’s supreme leader and the most public sign of a major split in the country’s clerical establishment.
A statement by the group, the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qum, represents a significant, if so far symbolic, setback for the government and especially the authority of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose word is supposed to be final. The government has tried to paint the opposition and its top presidential candidate, Mir Hussein Moussavi, as criminals and traitors, a strategy that now becomes more difficult — if not impossible.
“This crack in the clerical establishment, and the fact they are siding with the people and Moussavi, in my view is the most historic crack in the 30 years of the Islamic republic,” said Abbas Milani, director of the Iranian Studies Program at Stanford University. “Remember, they are going against an election verified and sanctified by Khamenei.”
Iran is led by Ali Hosseini Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini as the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution. In that role he is supposed to be the Supreme Marja and have the final word on all matters of religion and state. But Khamenei does not have the religious education to merit such deference in matters of religion. And the very concept of a supreme political cleric is an innovation of Khomeini’s that has always been controversial in clerical circles. To give one example, the last Supreme Marja before Ayatollah Khomeini led the revolution was a man named Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi. He forbade all clergy from taking any part in politics, which was consistent with tradition. In 1960, Borujerdi violated his own rules by protesting the Shah’s Land Reform Bill because it was inconsistent with shariah law. When Borujerdi died in 1961, there was no clear successor. The leading clerics decided against declaring a new Supreme Marja, and opted to set up a system where there would be several marja, each with his own area of expertise. So, from 1961-1979, the official position of the Shi’a religious community was predisposed against either a supreme leader or an active political role.
But, of course, that is not entirely true. During this same time period, Ayatollah Khomeini was developing his theory of Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Jurists), which embraced a political role for the clergy under a supreme authority. And that theory is the basis of the Iranian government’s legitimacy. What’s significant in the news out of Qom is that the leading clergy there have much more religious legitimacy than Ali Khamenei and they are rejecting his political legitimacy by protesting the election. In doing so, they are rejecting Velayat-e faqih.
This is a true ideological crisis for the Revolution. The government can crack down on dissenters of all stripes, but they can’t very well declare that a government based on the Guardianship of the Clergy can crack down on the most esteemed clergy in the country. They can’t issue some edict that will change the very nature of Shi’a Islam so that the people no longer show deference to their own Grand Ayatollahs.
Yet, the government still maintains all the levers of coercion. The question is: will the rank-and-file members of the armed services, Revolutionary Guard, and Intelligence Services obey the Supreme Leader when he is opposed by a religious establishment that has much greater religious legitimacy?
And, of course, complicating matters is the fact that the government still has some Grand Ayatollahs in their hip pocket.
Nevertheless, the situation in Iran has reached a breaking point. Something has to give.
