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(Haaretz) – America’s best Jewish minds are wracking their brains, trying to find a magic formula that will put the settlements close to the hearts of Israel’s supporters, not to mention its critics. A new guide to the perplexed, disseminated by the leadership of the Israel Project, the organization spearheading Israel’s public relations efforts in the United States, offers a glimpse into its very own internal confusion.
The Israel Project’s leadership recognizes that public opinion, even among Israel supporters, is ambiguous about the settlements. Despairing Israel advocates still embrace the delusional security argument, from which even retired general Moshe Ya’alon has distanced himself: They argue that the settlements are necessary for Israel’s security and suggest telling audiences that the settlements were not created randomly. They were put on mountaintops and in militarily sensitive areas to create a security buffer between Israel and its Arab neighbors (Jordan?).
The roads less traveled
Apropos natural growth, it will be interesting to see how Benjamin Netanyahu will explain to Obama section five of the plan for road improvement, part of the Transportation Ministry’s new budget book: “Upgrading Highway 1 between Mishor Adumim and the Good Samaritan Inn and between the Zeitim Interchange and the Coca Cola Interchange [at the foot of French Hill in East Jerusalem], at a cost of NIS 280 million.”
The Israel Project’s 2009 Global Language Dictionary [see link in article]
European diplomats are wondering what happened to Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief. Throughout his many long years in this post, the Spanish statesman always carefully maintained a low profile with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Here a relaxed meeting with Ariel Sharon at the height of Operation Defensive Shield, there a courtesy visit with Ehud Olmert toward the end of Operation Cast Lead. Even when his legs were in the East, his heart was far away in the West, in the White House and in the U.S. State Department.
During president George W. Bush’s eight years in office, Solana transformed the European Union into a ward of the Americans with regard to anything related to the Mideast conflict. It is unclear what suddenly prompted him to take the initiative and suggest that the UN set a target date for the creation of a Palestinian state, even without Israel’s consent.
The avoid and stall tactic at the bottom of past Israeli peace avoidance has worked for decades, why wouldn’t Netanyahu try it again?
As far as I can tell, it is working for him. Obama is now recommending “self-reflection” as the antidote for Israeli intransigence. Reflection of course takes time, and time is always what the Israelis have used to deflect these initiatives. Give us time.
It is now 2012. Netanyahu won.
I don’t know about winning, unless you’re talking about a Pyrrhic victory. Israel’s encroachments into the West Bank, if not uprooted, permanently undermine any legitimacy Israel might wish to achieve. They will place themselves in a position of perpetual defence, and at that point, time and simple statistics are on the Arab side. Eventually Arab armies will stand on the Mediterranean shore of what used to be Israel.
Unless Netanyahu, like his evangelical backers in the United States, is counting upon the inevitable to be pre-empted by the coming of the Messiah, he’d best start thinking about how to achieve peace.
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(Haaretz) – The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, the principal pro-Israel lobby in Washington, proved that all those who eulogized it after Obama’s election were very much mistaken. AIPAC did not try to defend settlement expansion or to openly back Netanyahu. Instead, the lobby undertook a quiet move, almost without publicity, using its tried and tested means: enlisting Congress to signal the president to lay off Israel.
On the day of Netanyahu’s visit to the White House, Obama received a letter, signed by 73 senators, that was couched in impressive understatement. It did not mention settlements, but rather expressed ardent support for the peace process, gently called for clearing up the disputes with Israel on a basis of proximity and friendship, and contained a list of demands aimed at the Palestinians. The signatories included a majority of the members of the president’s party. It was a repeat of AIPAC’s huge success in 1975, when the lobby was able to scuttle Henry Kissinger’s “reassessment” plan by means of a letter to president Ford signed by 76 senators. One can surmise that on this occasion, too, AIPAC did not make do with the letter but also worked the corridors. A few weeks went by, and the message was internalized by the White House: You can have differences with Israel, but you cannot slap it publicly.
Until the next time.
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."