Joe Lieberman was so busy in 2007-8 shilling for Republican presidential candidate John McSame that he didn’t notice that the three leading Democratic contenders (Clinton, Edwards, and Obama) all had health care white papers that included a public option. Or, so he claims. And, anyway, he’s against having one in this bill. But this level of obliviousness pales in comparison to Blanche Lincoln, whose congressional website still claims that she supports a public option despite the adamant opposition she expressed to one on the Senate floor yesterday afternoon. It appears that Lincoln changed her tune after the August Tea Parties spooked her:

In July, she wrote in the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette: “Individuals should be able to choose from a range of quality health insurance plans. Options should include private plans as well as a quality, affordable public plan or non-profit plan that can accomplish the same goals as those of a public plan.”

By Sept. 1, she had changed her mind. “I would not support a solely government-funded public option,” Lincoln said at an event in Little Rock. “We can’t afford that.”

The Senate version of the public option requires that the program be wholly funded through the collection of premiums, without government subsidies (a level playing field). Lincoln acknowledged that intent in her floor statement yesterday, but then delved into conspiracy theatre.

I’ve already alerted the leader, and I’m promising my colleagues, that I’m prepared to vote against moving to the next stage of consideration as long as a government-run public option is included. The public option as a part of health insurance reform has attracted far more attention than it deserves. While cost projections show that it may reduce costs somewhat, those projections don’t take into account who pays if it fails to live up to expectations. If in fact premiums don’t cover the cost of the public plan, it is taxpayers in this country who are faced with the burden of bailing it out.

Notice her language. With the Wall Street bailout proving politically unpopular, Lincoln attaches that word to the public option. This goes beyond mere forgetfulness and becomes outright shilling for the insurance industry. This isn’t merely providing cover for a naked flip-flop; it’s regurgitating right-wing talking points.

It’s difficult to reconstruct how Lincoln’s position has evolved. It has been clear since January that the Senate Finance Committee would not pass a public option because conservative members like Kent Conrad were strongly opposed. Lincoln appeared to be part of that opposition, even as she made some comments that suggested support for a public option. Rather than get bogged down trying to pass something that didn’t have the Democratic votes to pass, the Finance Committee was charged with passing an alternative that could win the unanimous support of the Democratic Caucus and, ideally, one or two Republican votes.

The Finance bill was really just a feeler. They wanted to keep the process moving, but they also wanted to see if they could build any consensus for reform. Depending on details, it might be preferable to pass something easily and with some Republican support than to ram home a totally partisan bill that could jeopardize some political careers. In any case, there was no harm in keeping that line in the water. That the Finance Bill was always seen as a backup plan could be seen in several ways. The most obvious was that Speaker Pelosi was encouraged to continue to pursue a robust public option in the House. That the White House continued to express a preference for a public option was another indicator. The final proof was that Reid included a public option in the melded HELP/Finance bill that is now on the floor. No doubt, Reid was responding to grassroots pressure (much of it coming from Obama’s Organizing for America outfit), but his action speaks for itself.

My feeling, all along, was that the White House was seeking to keep the public option alive, and strategizing about the best way to assure it is included in the final bill. They knew that they didn’t have 60 votes for it in the Senate, but that didn’t deter them. They obviously felt that they might be able to overcome that obstacle when the time came, but they had to decide when that time should come. Their feeling was that it should come during the Conference Committee. When Reid presented his plan to make that time come earlier, the White House relented but told Reid, “We hope you know what you are doing.”

The question now is whether Reid knows what he is doing. He won 60 votes to begin debate, but in the process he was confronted with four senators who promised not to vote for the bill if it included a public option (which it does). Those four senators are threatening to kill the public option, but they are not threatening to kill health care reform in general. That was a distinction that could have been taken away from them by waiting to include the public option until the Conference Committee. If they had been confronted with a choice between acquiescing on the public option or killing reform at the last moment, they probably would have caved. If not, then there never was any strategy that could have worked. But, now, under this strategy, they can force Reid to cave in to their demands prior to the Conference Committee.

But, it’s actually worse than that. It will take 60 votes to amend the health care bill. There are not twenty Democratic senators willing to kill the public option. But, even if there were, it would require all 40 Republicans to go along with the effort to get sixty votes. All the Republicans have to do is withhold their support for killing the public option, and Reid will be unable to take it out. At that point, he’d have to withdraw the bill and start over. The Republicans threatened to do something similar with the Stupak-Pitts Amendment in the House. Knowing that the amendment needed to pass in order for Pelosi to get the votes she needed to pass the overall bill, the GOP contemplated voting with the pro-choicers. It was only because the Catholic bishops nixed that plan that the Republicans abandoned it. But the Cathollc bishops aren’t going to make the same demands on the public option.

In other words, having put the public option in the base bill, Reid is now at the Republicans’ mercy. This is precisely the kind of jam I wanted him to avoid. To get out of this, Reid is going to have to craft a compromise that can satisfy all 60 Democrats. Bernie Sanders and Roland Burris have to be every bit as onboard with the plan as Ben Nelson and Mary Landrieu. That appears to be his challenge. It won’t be easy,