One failed imperialist gives magnanimous advice (for the most part) to a failing imperialist. What to do about Afghanistan? Mikhail Gorbachev has some suggestions in today’s New York Times.
I have been asked several times in recent months what I would recommend to President Obama, who inherited this mess from his predecessor. My answer has been the same each time: a political solution and troop withdrawal. That requires a strategy of national reconciliation.
Now, at long last, a strategy very similar to the one we offered more than two decades ago and that our partners rebuffed was presented at the London meeting: reconciliation, involving all more or less reasonable elements in reconstruction, and emphasizing a political rather than a military solution.
The United Nations envoy to Afghanistan said in a recent interview that what’s needed is demilitarization of the entire strategy in Afghanistan. What a shame this wasn’t said, and done, long before!
The chances of success — success rather than military “victory” — are at best 50-50. There have been some contacts with certain elements within the Taliban. Still more needs to be done to bring Iran into the process; a lot of hard work remains to be done with the Pakistanis.
Russia could become an important part of the Afghan settlement process. The West should appreciate the position Russia’s leaders are taking on Afghanistan. Far from gloating and letting the West bite the bullet while we wash our hands of the whole thing, Russia is ready to cooperate with the West because it understands that it is in its own best interests to counter the threats coming from Afghanistan.
If you’ve ever read Charlie Wilson’s War you know that the CIA was very much gloating about the pain the mujahideen were imposing on the Soviets. In fact, the entire Soviet-Afghan War was seen inside our military and intelligence community as payback for Vietnam. We should be very appreciative that Russia is offering to break the cycle of revenge and work as a constructive partner. The plan that Gorbachev offers is something the Soviets attempted in the 1980’s, but they failed miserably. The reason that Gorbachev offers a 50% chance of success is because we don’t face a comparable superpower funding the insurgency in Afghanistan. The reason Gorby offers a 50% chance of failure is because he know exactly how hard it is to get Afghans to reconcile with each other.
Back in October, the National Security Archives posted some Soviet era documents about their internal deliberations on the Afghan War. These are summarized here:
In terms that parallel those offered to President Obama by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the Soviet military told their leaders in the mid-1980s that the war was not winnable by purely political means and that the initial analysis on the basis of which the troops were introduced did not take into account the historical and religious context of the country. Most strikingly, the Soviets complained that the top leader they helped to install lacked political legitimacy and probably would need to be replaced.
The Soviet military bemoaned the fact that even though every single piece of land was at some point controlled by the Soviet military, the moment the Soviet troops moved on, the territory was immediately re-taken by the armed resistance. Even after Babrak Karmal was replaced by Najubullah and the policy of national reconciliation was introduced, the internal resistance kept intensifying. In January 1987, for example, Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov reports that “the military situation has deteriorated sharply. The number of shelling of our garrisons has doubled. […] This war cannot be won militarily.” The growing numbers of Soviet casualties are cited in every report and discussion.
The choice between putting in more troops and delaying the withdrawal or withdrawing decisively and on schedule eventually put a rift between Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who argued for a delayed withdrawal and providing more military support for Najibullah. In the end, the Soviets withdrew on February 15, 1989, fully anticipating the fall of Najibulah government. A major factor mentioned repeatedly in the internal Soviet exchanges was the need for comprehensive international mediation with Pakistan and the United States at the center of any such process – a condition that did not exist at the time of the Soviet pullout and would not come to pass.
I do have some caveats about Gorbachev’s advice. It’s not possible to completely demilitarize when people are shooting at you, and that would remain a problem for the Afghan security forces even if the Americans put down their guns and withdrew. I also have my doubts about how constructive the Russians have really been, or intend to be. Finally, Gorbachev’s advice does come with a price-tag, so he isn’t completely altruistic in his advice.
Russia is also right to demand access to economic opportunities in Afghanistan, including the reconstruction of dozens of projects built with our help and then destroyed during the 1990s.
Frankly, given the wanton disrespect for life the Soviet Army displayed during the Afghan War (which so far surpassed anything you could accuse the NATO forces of doing that there is no comparison), they have no right to demand economic opportunities to rebuild the few things they actually produced.
Yet, even with these caveats, if they want to help we should accept that help. And we definitely should listen to well-intentioned and generous advice.
