I agree with the New York Times editorial board and Thomas Ricks. The president should not limit himself to sacking Gen. McChrystal. He should fire Ambassador Eikenberry and Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, too. Eikenberry probably gave the president the correct advice but when that advice became public it pretty much ended his relationship with Karzai. Why he remains our ambassador there is a mystery perhaps best explained by the fact that his advice has proven to be prescient. But, right or wrong, his duty in diplomatic in nature and Karzai obviously cannot trust him.
As for Holbrooke, he seems to get along with no one. I haven’t heard a single positive comment about his performance. He’s had a legendary career but he’s doesn’t appear to be thriving in his current role. Someone should replace him.
Obama should pay Eikenberry a huge bonus for getting it right, and then match it from his own pocket for being so foolish (or weak?) as to ignore the best advice he will ever receive on Afghanistan.
That’s very interesting. So Eikenberry himself leaked his classified cables to the White House giving a straight-up honest assessment of Karzai? Or is the point that Eikenberry cannot deal with Karzai after that incident. Someone certainly wanted Karzai to know that we had him pegged. Or someone wanted to take down Eikenberry. Leaving Eikenberry there as ambassador is not an altogether bad thing. When he an Karzai agree publicly it is news. Karzai can safely distance himself from looking like a US puppet and the US can safely distance itself from Karzai’s corruption.
I haven’t heard a single comment about Holbrooke’s performance, positive or negative. I just know that someone has made the relationship between the US and Pakistan somewhat more collegial and Pakistan is better engaged in carrying out its part of the stated strategy than the actors in Afghanistan are. Hillary Clinton generally get props for that, but I suspect that Holbrooke supplies sufficient continuity of contact to make it happen.
Now that Obama has assigned Petraeus to battlefield command in Afghanistan, I think that it is on the military to keep their commitments to the strategy.
Seeing as how the NYT is calling for exclusively State Department firings, I suspect some old DoD hands have a political agenda there. The big point of criticism of the strategy is that the military is not sufficiently committed to the civilian development activities that are the heart-and-soul of the COIN strategy. That US military training and reactions have not caught up to the requirements of the COIN strategy that they are spouting. That the State Department activities and the development projects are seen as auxiliary instead as the heart of the strategy.
without changing policy is like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. I believe Obama has said the policy remains the same. He has us right on course for the iceberg.
John Cole: “The military is supposed to be a weapon used when diplomatic policies fail, not a political wing of the national security state.”
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
And I was just about to suggest we make Petraues the Secretary of GWOT. Just make it a cabinet-level position.
Juan Cole is wrong. The military is supposed to be weapon used in self defense against an attack, or imminent attack, not a means of coercing other countries to do what the U.S. wants them to do.
According to the president the american military (the finest in history!) is supposed to be used to indefinitely occupy large, ungovernable parts of the planet which are known haunts of small numbers of poorly connected and equipped people who don’t like us one bit, no sir. But in any case, to think for a second that the war machine is not a permanent political wing of the american government is, as someone on the thread said, adorable.
I am talking about what it should be. I know very well what the situation is.
PS The main reason those people don’t like you, by the way, is that you use military violence to impose your will on others when “diplomatic” means fail. But i suspect you know that.
PPS Juan Cole is a former military brat, and tends on the whole to have a pro-military bias I have noticed.
John Cole and Juan Cole are not the same person
Oh, my bad! I know they are different people, and that’s what I get for posting comments on blogs while trying to multitask at work.
Every nation does this. Clausewitz didn’t invent the idea, he just formalized it.
Many countries do it, but by no means does every country do it. More to the point, please name another country (besides Israel) that does it as much, as aggressively, as violently, and with as much arrogance as does the United States. And name another country (besides Israel) that uses military violence by default as often and as self-righteously as the United States. And don’t forget to count all the secret and semi-secret military operations, assassinations, etc. that the U.S. is engaged in at any given time.
Well, the Germans were so aggressively violent that they actually got the French and English (who had been fighting each other on-and-off for 900 years) to ally together against them – twice. There was much of Europe colonizing Africa and Asia at the point of a gun, and it goes back throughout history to the Ottomans, Rome, Greece, Persia, Babylon, and Assyria in antiquity. Oh, and there was that Genghis Khan guy.
But your overall point is valid – people on the business end of imperial power are rarely happy about it, but at the end of the day the interaction of nations is little different from the interaction of animals in the wild – you can curse the food chain or you can try to position yourself so that you’re not the one to get eaten, but those at the top of the food chain are going to eat something. And yes, if they slip up and get injured or exhausted then they can find themselves being eaten by several lesser predators (e.g. Rome c. 450) or peers (e.g. Germany c. 1945).
The difference is, of course, that those animals at the top of the food chain have to eat in order to survive. On the other hand, there is very good evidence that countries that do not insist upon eating up the rest of the world tend to be better off overall than those who do. I submit Europe as an example.
Post-WWII Europe is better off, sure, but that is in large part because we were feeding them, so to speak. Let’s see how they fare once the American empire finishes imploding over the next 30 years or so – I can assure you that Europe will start feeding itself, or someone will start feeding off of them…
My point was that things in Europe have improved greatly overall since they stopped trying to eat each other, and since those who had empires stopped trying to eat the rest of the world.
The writer of the line was John Cole, not Juan Cole.
I don’t know who gets to say what the “military is supposed to be”.
But it seems that every country uses their military for carrying out politics “through other means” or threatening to carry out politics through other means. That amounts to coercing domestic opposition or other countries to do what the regime wants them to do.
How the a country uses its military depends on the foreign policy of the country, and the foreign policy depends on the domestic politics of the country. Right now the domestic politics of the US is strongly shaped by 9/11 and the actions of the Bush administration. The unfortunate situation is that after the Cold War, a lot of the public went looking for another enemy for the military to fight. And when you go looking for an enemy, generally you can find one, can’t you Poppy Bush.
The issues at question internationally are what does the US want the coerced countries to do and is it a reasonable use of coercion. The US is the mean kid on the block because it has the most expensive resources and is willing to use its resources to protect its military. Regardless of its national interests or intentions, it will be portrayed as the mean kid on the block. Americans have become so use to that response that they see it as a feature not a bug.
But the US is not alone in coercing other countries through the use of its military. Both India and Pakistan have used their military to coerce a preferred settlement of the status of Kashmir. Argentina and the UK have used their military to coerce a preferred settlement of the ownership of the the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.
So make a list of the countries that the US is currently coercing to do what the US wants done. What does that say about where arriving at a political solution is difficult? And what makes a political solution difficult? And what is the domestic politics that is driving that particular national interest.
John Cole has stated part of the domestic political issue – diplomacy is taking second fiddle to military action because a significant number of Americans don’t understand diplomacy or think that it’s “weak”. A lot of American men seem to have a manhood crisis that is expressed through gun ownership and overbroad and vicarious reliance on military combat.
The first part of Cole’s quote merely restates Clausewitz.
“I don’t know who gets to say what the “military is supposed to be”.“
The job of the military is to use massive violence to kill people and break things. Violence should not be used, people should not be killed, and things should not be broken unless it is absolutely necessary to do so for defense. The use of violence, including military violence to get one’s way when persuasion does not work is unconscionable.
I cannot be as dispassionate as you seem to be about killing people and destroying cities and countries and lives. Maybe it’s just too real to me to treat it like a theoretical matter.
I’m more resigned than dispassionate. I’ve lived too long. Of course, the using of the military to get one’s way when persuasion does not work is unconscionable. I’m not saying it isn’t. I’m just saying that regardless of the size of the country, in certain circumstances the military will inevitably be used that way. Just as when one is militarily weaker, one will resort to asymmetrical tactics to get one’s way.
It’s not a theoretical matter, it is a political one. More folks than you know realize this and are trying to change the domestic politics around this issue — and have been doing so for decades. I think in an earlier comment I explained why we have not yet been successful. Moving the opinion in a nation of 150 million voters is not an easy task even with a few million people trying.
And it is particularly difficult in places like North Carolina which have large numbers of families of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and large numbers of military veterans. And 9/11 did its job; it made a large number of Americans fearful to the point that they make crazy decisions. And it is going to take a while to unwind that mentality, which is driving domestic politics and constrains leaders from doing the right thing even if they would want to.
What a lot of us learned during the opposition to the war in Vietnam is that moral outrage is finally useless as a means of changing national security decisions. Or domestic security decisions.
Age may have brought you resignation, but I find that the older I get the less tolerant I am of abuse of power and the compulsion some powerful parties have to impose their will on others by violence or any other means. And I am most intolerant of those who manufacture problems, threats, and crises in order to justify their bullying and violence – you know, like Iraq’s non-existent WMD’s, and now Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.
I can’t help it, it’s just how I am. Maybe I have seen too much of how these behaviours affect the rest of the world. Maybe after you’ve seen one too many little girls with half their face blown away, or little boys with their limbs blown off, or entire generations deprived of any semblance of a normal life ever you just can’t deal with it anymore. And you know there is absolutely nothing you can do to change it. Maybe your reaction is resignation. Mine is greater and greater outrage. I can’t help it.
As for 9/11, I am tempted to point out that 9/11 was a mere tongue-tip taste of what the United States put Iraq through, not just since 2003, but for nearly twenty years, and of course what its mini-me, Israel, has put Palestinians and Golan Syrians, and Lebanese through for decades. My compassion for the direct victims of 9/11 is great, my sympathy for the Americans in general is limited.
I am resigned, not because I am cold-hearted, but because I found during the Vietnam era that guilt-tripping Americans does not produce a change in policy.
And my point about 9/11 was not that it was more important than any other suffering, but that it created the fear that politicians used to justify invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, torture, and continued and increasing support of the very US policies you find objectionable. I don’t like it either, but it is what it is. And there are still a bunch of folks, some who post on this blog, who are trying to change that policy.
Resigned does not necessarily mean apathetic or inactive.
And you mistake the relationship between the US and Israel. Israel is not the US mini-me, it is the tail that is wagging the dog. It involves domestic US politics and is more complicated that American Jewish support for Israel. There are divisions in the American Jewish community over Israel’s behavior. But there is strong support for Israel’s government that goes beyond the Jewish community and is motivated by a variety of reasons — from fundamentalist Christian theology to business relationships.
Just as the American Cuban community is the tail that is wagging the dog on US policy with respect to Cuba.
I have never suggested guilt-tripping Americans as a tactic. I have merely expressed my views and my feelings.
On the tail wagging the dog thing, there is some truth to that, but the U.S. is also Israel’s main enabler, so it cuts both ways. If the U.S. ever cut Israel loose, Israel would be forced to change its path – and its tune – very abruptly.
Actually, an utterly untethered Israel would have absolutely no restraints – the us-vs-the-world narrative would rule the day in Israel and the Palestinians would rue the day…
“What a lot of us learned during the opposition to the war in Vietnam is that moral outrage is finally useless as a means of changing national security decisions. Or domestic security decisions.”
Setting aside the “security state” terminology, what do you think is useful for changing things? I’m just amusing myself mostly so I have no thought of changing anything at all. As an aside, to me it seems like one reason why these foreign engagements become endless is that the war machine apparatus simply cannot compute its own failure.
Change “cannot” to “refuses to”, and I agree.
Moral outrage is useless because it does not persuade people who fail to have the same moral outrage, and moral arguments fail to win the day. Pragmatic, reasoned arguments are the next fallback, but they work only to the extent that folks are in a reasonable mood. What is holding political support for endless war is that each failure of the war machine creates additional fear among the population, which is exploited by apologists for the war machine. And the fact that the war machine means 3 million jobs in government positions in the military and civilian national security organizations, not to mention all of the jobs performed by contractors. And then there are the thousands of jobs in lobbying to keep the war machine in place. And job-scared people are not interested in voting away the jobs they currently have.
It is fear that has frozen American policy into endless war, and each blowback from previous wars and CIA operations and military actions restarts the fear and gooses military spending. And each recession increases the fear further.
There is still enough people power left in the direction of US institutions that massive realignment of the parties could possibly reverse the trends, but that requires convincing a majority of 150 million voters in a way that is geographically spread out enough to change the alignment of Congress – and to have a President who is tolerant of the change in policy, if not sympathetic to it.
That is now a massive undertaking given the 24/7, geographically wall-to-wall propaganda put out by FoxNews and conservative radio talk show hosts.
You’re right that there is an entrenched minority controlling the game here, if that is what you’re saying. We have to keep in mind that the public at large is questionably committed to this engagement or persuaded of a significant danger from some central asian badasses who don’t like us (wherever they may be!).
I agree that the political power of the war machine is extremely durable and widespread throughout our political institutions. Your analysis of the polemical difficulties of “changing the conversation” is also true, however I think the important thing is not so much to argue in a pragmatic way as to act (and so communicate) in a pragmatic way, which is why I respect the supporters of real community organization, even if I’m not sure their strategy is sufficient.
There have been a few intriguing reports out of the military hierarchy recently: the leaked(?) report about how Israel is a geo-strategic liability, the analysis of how climate change greatly affects America’s long-term security. I do have some optimism that there is a strain of realism and even progressivism in the military. This is partly why I tried to be generous to MacChrystal. If perhaps Obama could empower this element of the command structure while simultaneously transitioning to a sustainable energy infrastructure (for the war-machine feeds on oil), we could see reflexive militarism fade from American power.
My fear is that things are too desperate and moderate pragmatism is too little too late. The recent actions in the gulf and Afghanistan have not reassured me.
The other thing is that a military that refuses to recognize it’s own failure never has the clarifying reality of loss before it. A good commander knows when a position is lost. This is why I loathe this rote genuflecting before the invincibility of american arms.
My second big question for the president is, what in the last 8 years of our excellent central asian adventure gives us reason to think that the next 12 or 18 or 36 months, indeed the next 10 years, will not be exactly like the preceding 30 or 40? All the shiny bars on Petraues? Some new theories being passed around in central command? Some tough-guy talk from the rose garden?
“it seems that every country uses their military for carrying out politics “through other means” or threatening to carry out politics through other means.“
That is not an accurate statement, and even if it were it would not excuse or justify the practice.
W/e country is “in power” will do that, and has done that, throughout the history of the world. It’s just reality. It doesn’t make it right, but it’s not strictly the US.
Right now it is the U.S., and my original point was that this is the reason the U.S. is so roundly hated and resented by so much of the world. Maybe in a few decades it will be China or India, and everyone will hate them, but right now the U.S. not only uses massive and horrific military violence to impose its will on others, more and more this is becoming the default choice.
This would create a false equivalence. If McChrystal, EIkenberry, and Holbrooke are all fired, it presents the disputes among them as matters over which all are equally at fault. One can disagree with how Eikenberry and Holbrooke on the substance, or with Eikenberry’s fault for the leak, but McChrystal was insubordinate, which is an entirely other thing. If either of the other two are to be dismissed, it should not be for another couple of months. This way it will not be equated to the McChrystal firing, which would be trivialized by the comparison.
That’s a really bad idea. It would worsen both the actual chaos and the appearance of chaos afflicting our efforts there. At this point, I think that would only prolong our stay and the attendant disaster.
What about replacing Eikenberry with Ryan Crocker? He works well with Petraeus.
Eikenberry had a policy disagreement with McChrystal that got framed as a personal conflict. The policy issues have to do with the balance between the short-term military security objectives of a counter-intelligence strategy and the institutional in infrastructure development objectives. The idea is that the military is to secure so that development can occur. It is very easy for the military objectives to dominate and undercut the development objectives. Eikenberry’s job is to ensure that the development objectives are not sacrificed, because in a counter-insurgency strategy, that is what finally stabilizes the situation.
Not giving strong enough emphasis to the development objectives causes a descent into a “destroying the village in order to save it” mode of military operation. You can see what drives this in the complaints of the troops quoted in the Rolling Stone article about the rules of engagement.
Replacing Eikenberry will not change that institutional tension between the embassy and the military.