I like to read articles like Mort Zuckerman’s America’s Fading Exceptionalism because I am always trying to find some kind of definition for this ‘exceptionalism.’ The thing is, I never seem to find a definition, just a jumble of ideas and feelings.
My definition of American Exceptionalism is that we found ourselves in a unique position at the end of World War Two. It fell on us to build institutions that could both put the developed world back on its feet and prevent a third World War, which in a newly nuclear era, could mean extinction for all higher life forms on the planet. It was a weighty responsibility, and it was made more weighty and difficult by the rise of the Soviet Union and China, and their antagonism for the kind of free societies we were trying to create. In short, we were exceptional because we found ourselves in an exceptional situation, and we took on responsibilities that no other nations could shoulder.
The key, though, is that part of our job, starting in 1945, was to move towards a future where we are not exceptional. Why build up Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea into democratic, tolerant, peace-loving, economically innovative societies if not to have them eventually share our burdens and responsibilities? Why build the United Nations unless it can eventually keep the peace without relying disproportionately on our resources and sacrifices?
This is why I get curious when I see people decrying the lessening of American Exceptionalism. If we’re doing our jobs right, this is what we ought to see.
The problem is that most people who talk about American Exceptionalism mean something different than what I am talking about. When the Soviet Union fell apart, Paul Wolfowitz penned a document for the Pentagon that said our policy should be oriented around preventing any new superpower from emerging as a rival. Here’s how the New York Times reported on it:
What is most important, [the document] says, is “the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S.” and “the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated” or in a crisis that demands quick response.
Bush Administration officials have been saying publicly for some time that they were willing to work within the framework of the United Nations, but that they reserve the option to act unilaterally or through selective coalitions, if necessary, to protect vital American interests.
But this publicly stated strategy did not rule out an eventual leveling of American power as world security stabilizes and as other nations place greater emphasis on collective international action through the United Nations.
In contrast, the new draft sketches a world in which there is one dominant military power whose leaders “must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”
This policy document was rejected at the time, but it became our official policy in 2001, when the neo-conservatives came to power with George W. Bush. And it seems to me that this is the kind of exceptionalism Mort Zuckerman is referring to when he says this:
Our response to the upheaval in the Arab world was muddled, so that now there is the prospect that Egypt might well be dominated by radical Islamists hostile to our ideals and our interests while our longtime ally Saudi Arabia is deeply alienated from the United States. We may yet see what has happened in the Middle East as one of the great strategic defeats in the history of U.S. foreign policy, comparable to the conversion of China to communism.
Obviously, the security of Israel is an important concern for Mr. Zuckerman, and I can certainly understand his angst, but if we leave Israel’s interests out of the equation for a moment, we ought to see the upheaval in the Arab world in a similar light to the upheaval in Eastern Europe in the late-1980’s and early 1990’s. A collection of nations long oppressed under a tyrannical and totalitarian system is finally throwing off their oppressors and trying to find a way to succeed at self-government. At the end of the Cold War, these nations were casting aside their Soviet sponsors. In the Arab world today, they are casting aside all sponsors, whether they be American, French, Iranian, Russian, or some combination of the above.
What we’re losing is a degree of control. But we’re also gaining. In Egypt, for example, we have been acting as an implement of tyranny, which should be directly contrary to what makes our country exceptional. And this is where I am always seeking clarity in the definition of ‘exceptionalism.’ Because, I’d like to think our sponsorship of the values of self-determination, human rights, and freedom of conscience is what set us apart from the Soviets and the Chinese and gave us the moral leadership to build up and lead a post-war world worth living in. Wherever we’ve fallen short on supporting those values, we’ve failed to be exceptional.
I hear a lot of conservatives talk in more economic terms. For them, we’re exceptional because we’re not like Western Europe in that we don’t have a large social safety net. Somehow, this lack of security for our citizens is seen as what truly sets us aside an uniquely virtuous, because it creates more economic freedom and a better environment for doing business. Other conservatives find our exceptionalism in our religiosity, which they contrast with an increasingly secular Europe.
But the main fault line seems to be over our relative power.
Some people, like me, accept that we’ve been an exceptional nation and power, and that this has justified our country doing some things differently from other nations, and even having a different standard applied to us in international affairs. But we think this should be a temporary state of affairs, and that the goal is a world that can keep the peace and create political freedom without the U.S. taking such a large part of the responsibility. In other words, we should be working to pass off responsibilities and downsize our role as we gain confidence that the world has basically embraced our vision of commerce, human rights, and collective security. When you look at Europe, at the Far East, and even Latin America, you can see that we’ve come a long way towards that goal.
But other people see the goal as sustained American hegemony, where what makes us exceptional is that we have so much control that we can dictate political outcomes and we can make war when and for whatever reason we want.
It’s only in this latter worldview that it makes sense to see the Arab Uprising as a potential defeat to rival the loss of China to the communist side.
Power is nice. But if that’s all we care about, then we aren’t really exceptional at all, are we?
