The main problem with responding to the September 11 attacks by proclaiming a “War on Terror” is that terrorism is a tactic. Bush had a better approach before his national security team got together and decided to conquer the Middle East and Central Asia. Remember the bullhorn moment at Ground Zero?
Rescue Worker: I can’t hear you!
President Bush: I can hear you! I can hear you! The rest of the world hears you! And the people — and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon!
The key was that he said “the people who knocked these buildings down.” He didn’t say Saddam Hussein. He didn’t say anyone who ever commits an act of terrorism. He certainly didn’t say Afghan farmers or random Pakistani hill people. He wanted justice. He wanted to track down the still-living criminals who plotted and financed the 9/11 operation.
The good thing about keeping your reaction focused and limited it that you have some hope of success. It also costs hundreds of billions less to track down a few dozen murderous radicals than it does to invade, conquer, occupy, and rebuild two large nations on the other side of the world.
We could never win a ‘War on Terror’ but we could conceivably kill or capture everyone who had any foreknowledge or responsibility for 9/11.
According to our new Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, we’re getting pretty close to finishing that job.
Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, who arrived in Kabul on Saturday, said that the United States was “within reach of strategically defeating Al Qaeda” and that the American focus had narrowed to capturing or killing 10 to 20 crucial leaders of the terrorist group in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.
I notice that none of them are in Afghanistan. I guess we can mop up these last 20 guys, declare victory, and come the hell home. Right?
Mission Accomplished. Right?
Mission Accomplished. Right?
The mission of routing al Qaeda out of their government-protected safe havens in Afghanistan, and of toppling the government that was working in partnership with them, was accomplished in 2001/2002 (albeit imperfectly, such as at Tora Bora, thanks Shrub). We’re still there ten years later because George Bush had another mission in mind – the establishment of a client state with a permanent American military presence that would allow us to project power in the South/Central Asia region. Because that’s how neoconservatives roll – they see the world as a Risk board, and you get closer to “winning” by having more countries with your color armies in them.
But now, we are coming the hell home. It’s just a matter of how and how fast.
Withdrawing from an ongoing war is not like flipping off a light switch. It’s an undertaking that has to be executed properly, or it can end up causing all sorts of problems. So the timeline and actions steps between the adoption of a “Come the hell home” policy and the completion are subject to more considerations than the yes/no question “Should we leave?”
Here is the DoD argument. There are still al Quaeda leaders still in Pakistan (rumor still is that they are in the area of North Waziristan). In order to attack them you have to base troops somewhere or have a drone base somewhere. Those bases are in Afghanistan.
Now in order to prevent these bases from being overrun, you need X number of troops. And in order to seal the AfPak border you need X number of troops. And in order to protect those troops from the Afghan Taliban in the area, you need X number of troops. Somalia and Yemen are being handled to a great extent from the sea and nearby air bases in the Gulf. But the naval and marine resources required uses the same logic.
Mopping up these last 20 guys is not going to be easy. If Panetta and Petraeus can get DIA and CIA to work together and to work smart, things can happen more rapidly.
Yes mission accomplished. Expect some acceleration of troops coming home. Especially if the debt ceiling bill turns out to be real screwy. Or if it fails.
It seems obvious that there are no “last 20 guys” to eliminate and thereby win a “war on terror”. Nor is there a particular acreage that, once sterilized, will end a “war on terror”.
As long as there are angry/crazy believers with resources, there will be terror attacks, and technology will make it easier and easier to accomplish. The current wars were obvious distractions from that hard reality. A quick end to them will do more to mitigate terrorism than their prosecution ever did.
and thereby win a “war on terror”.
But, of course, we are no longer fighting a “war on terror,” and haven’t been since January 2009. Rather, we are fighting a war against al Qaeda.
Of course you can’t win a “war on terror,” the formulation of the Bush administration produced, for the reasons you describe. The cynical among us would say that they deliberately defined our response to 9/11 in such vague, broad terms specifically because they wanted it to be 1) endless and 2) applicable to any other military missions they wanted to engage in. (Axis of Evil)
But you can win a war against al Qaeda, as long as your definition of “victory” isn’t “the complete elimination of any threat posed by anyone using the name ‘al Qaeda.'”
Once upon a time, it was a very common, important argument from the left that a “war on terror” and a “war against al Qaeda” were two different things, and we should be doing the latter instead of the former. As far as I can tell, this point ceased to be important to or even recognized among a certain segment of the population the moment Barack Obama shifted our conception of the problem in accordance with that observation.
But winning against al Quaeda is not the same (W notwithstanding) to winning a war on terror.
In one respect, the police in every city have the responsibility for winning the war on terrorist actions — making citizens secure enough to go about their daily business (and thereby lowering the likelihood of a terrorist act).
Al Quaeda is a different matter. The Arab Awakening for the moment has sucked the wind out of the al Quaeda message to the Muslim street. That was what bin Laden was complaining about in his email correspondence with al Zawahiri. That is likely accurate and not US disinformation; these guys are not politically dumb. Zawahiri embarked in 2003 or so on the idea of franchising the al Quaeda organization, keeping loose ties, to extend its reach into Iraq, the Arab Peninsula, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and likely Nigeria. It was a strategy of metastasis. No doubt 10 or so of those 10-20 are the symbolic leaders of those franchises. (It is a little like multi-level marketing – the AmWay deVos family knows how it works.)
In Iraq, US commitment to leave and the Iraqi governments not allowing us to extend our presence is working against the Iraqi franchise In Somalia, the al Quaeda organization is coming under heavy attack from African Union troops and the Sufi miiitia. In North Africa, King Mohammed’s changes to the constitution have undercut pressure for violent overthrow. And the only safe haven al Quaeda in the Maghreb seems to have is southern Algeria. An Algerian revolution or democratization would deal it a blow there as well. And in Yemen the situation is still confused but it seems that the opposition is not sheltering al Quaeda and the Saleh military has it under pressure in the south. A strange alignment of interests.
So where else is there terrorism? Well all over, but none threatening US interests. Indonesia and the Phillipines are dealing with their terrorist movements. Palestinians are in one of those periods in which they think they have more to gain through ordinary politics and unity. Colombia is in a period of reduced terrorism and possible raprochement.
The world has changed, and it had little to do with the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And then there is Pakistan, which will likely benefit in stability from US withdrawal from Afghanistan when it comes. And the finding of bin Laden in Abbotabad is still sending shock waves through Pakistani politics. There is going to be a serious review soon of Pakistan’s military and ISI connection to terrorist groups. Because Pakistan is experiencing blowback from these groups. But that does not require the US do anything but keep India calm.
Here’s a link to the story that generated this post:
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2011/07/09/pentagon_chief_panetta_on_first_afghanista
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Asked how he defines a “strategic defeat” for al-Qaida, Petraeus said it means that “they can’t carry out strategically important attacks.”
Which is the same thing as John Kerry’s: ”We have to get back to the place we were, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives, but they’re a nuisance.”
An organization that can blow up a plane once a year is not a strategic threat to our national security, which warrants going to war against. As of 9/11, however, al Qaeda had a great deal more capacity than that. Owing to the support they received from the Afghan government, indirectly from the Pakistani government, and from very well-connected people in the Saudi government, they actually rose to the level of a strategic threat, in a way that, say, November 17 or the Red Brigades never did.
What Patraeus, Kerry, and Panetta are saying is that the military war against al Qaeda will end, and our counter-terror efforts will revert to being merely a top law enforcement/intelligence priority, when we’ve knocked them back into the category of an ordinary terrorist organization, and hard enough that the ordinary law enforcement/intelligence approach outlined in John Kerry’s book can keep them there.
And, apparently, they’re feeling pretty confident that we’re close, which is a reason to celebrate, for all sorts of reasons.
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accomplished. It will be a strategic retreat, nothing more and nothing less. History will judge harshly. Bush abandoned Afghanistan and Iran has been emboldened in Iraq. Saudi Arabia has empowered the Sunni muslim communities throughout the Middle East. A clash of Sunni and Shia muslims can be seen as a result. Pakistan and India will battle for the fruits of Afghanistan. Thus Pakistan will continue its support for all terror groups in the region. Remember who created the Taliban? Leaving Kabul won’t be as dramatic as the escape from Saigon or the defeat of the Soviet army by the Afghan forces in 1989.
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."There’s a hell of lot less clash between Sunnis and Shiites since we started withdrawing from Iraq than there was before.
Iran is no more “emboldened” in Iraq today than they were the day we flew in their asset, Ahmed Chalabi, and tried to install him in power – but they are a lot more emboldened there then before we invaded.
Saudi Arabia has been emboldening Sunni communities for decades.
Pakistan and India will battle for the fruits of Afghanistan.
Will, or may? The existence of a threat doesn’t mean it will come to pass. We’ll still have three and a half years to work this problem.
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Not referring just to Iraq. Watch the conflicts in Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, Gaza and Lebanon. Think Hariri assassination …
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."Sure, sure, but what does that have to do with our “retreat?”
Absolutely, we handed the “Shiite bloc” a gift when we invaded Iraq and overthrew the biggest check on Iran, but it’s not as if the consequences of that move waited until our withdrawal to come into play. Crowds in Baghdad were greeting Ahmedinejad with flowers and candy while we still had 150,000 troops in the country.