Zbigniew Brezinski’s new book Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power seeks to address these four questions:
- What are the implications of the changing distribution of global power from the West to the East, and how is it being affected by the new reality of a politically awakened humanity?
- Why is America’s global appeal waning, what are the symptoms of America’s domestic and international decline, and how did America waste the unique global opportunity offered by the peaceful end of the Cold War? Conversely, what are America’s recuperative strengths and what geopolitical reorientation is necessary to revitalize America’s world role?
- What would be the likely geopolitical consequence if America declined from its globally pre-eminent position, who would be the almost immediate political victims of such a decline, what effects would it have on the global-scale problems of the twenty-first century, and could China assume America’s central role in world affairs by 2025?
- Looking beyond 2025, how should a resurgent America define its long-term geopolitical goals, and how could America, with its traditional European allies, seek to engage Turkey and Russia in order to construct an even larger and more vigorous West? Simultaneously, how could America achieve balance in the East between the need for close cooperation with China and the fact that a constructive American role in Asia should be neither exclusively China-centric nor involve dangerous entanglements in Asian conflicts?
You might detect an optimistic note in the way that Brezinski has asked the questions, but reading between the lines what is apparent is that Zbigniew Brezinski is granting that the US imperial adventure launched in the idea of the American Century is over. The US empire with its veneer of the US being first among equals is giving way to a transitional period that is highly risky. And Brezinski is not sure that the US has the domestic politics, economy, or national leadership that can avoid catastrophe. When Brezinski was in the Carter White House, the administration that negotiated the Camp David agreements and brought Deng Xiaoping to Atlanta to finesse the “one China, two systems” cover for China becoming a permanent UN Security Council member–when all this progress happened, it was not supposed to end this way with US power dramatically weakened within a decade.
There are four audiences for Brezinski’s book outlining a strategic vision: general audiences like you and me, intellectual policy elites, US powers-that-be, and foreign ministries. To the first Brezinski offers a short comprehensive strategic view of how he sees the world (likely shared with other members of the intellectual policy elite). To the second he brings an academic argument to which they will respond with alternative strategic visions rooted in their own particular framework of ideas; out of such debates came the Project for a New American Century, to cite a relatively recent example. To the third he brings a wake-up call that the domestic political stalemate and loss of power through two needless wars potential dangers down the road if they continue business as usual. To the fourth, there is a message to be patient with the US while cooler and more realistic heads work through the issues brought about by American overreach.
What scares Brezinski is not the possibility of the rise of the power of China, but the potential conflicts that that might cause with nations on China’s periphery–India, Russia, South Korea, Vietnam, Phillipines, Taiwan, Japan. He is also scared about Russian reassertion of its imperial claims, which could affect Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine. He is scared of the collapse of Afghanistan and instability in Pakistan as the US withdraws from Afghanistan. He is scared of the consequences of a decline of US power in the Middle creating general conflict around Israel.
And then there is Mexico, already beleagered by a US drug war, deportation of immigrants, an increased internal violence from drug gangs–the American “good neighbor” policy replaced by bigoted hectoring. (No, Brezinski does not state it this bluntly). What happens with declining American power and populist resentment in Mexico and areas of the US? The implications taken to reasonable conclusions point to the dangers of significant border conflict.
Finally, there are the implications of the withdrawal of US power, influence, and concern for what Brezinski calls the “global common” — the strategic common (sea and air) and the environment. Both require globalized management to, for example, suppress piracy on the seas. The BRICS countries are playig a greater role in this managment responsibility but the need for consensus among a larger number of countries delays effective responses. Three areas of special concern to Brezinski are the Internet (cyberspace), space, and the Arctic. All three are dominated by American power now but are devolving toward more international management.
Brezinski argues the following in transition:
The argument that America’s decline would generate globay insecurity, endanger some valuable states, produce a more complicated North American neighborhood, and maake cooperative management of the global commons more difficult is not an argument for US global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the twenty-first century–resulting from the rise of a politically self-assertive global population and from hte dispersal of global power–make such supremacy unattainable. But in this increasingly complicated geopolitical environment, an America in pursuit of a new, timely strategic vision is crucial to helping the world avoid a dangerous slide into international turmoil.
By “international turmoil”, Brezinski means turmoil on the order of World War I and World War II. Situations that could suck in alliance of large military forces with seeming inevitability–that would cause even an isolationist America to be drawn into significant war. Like I said, Brezinski is in a quiet panic about US politics and policy although he cannot say this except obliquely.
What he proposes as a strategic vision will be received as bold, even impossible or dangerous. It is none of these; it is a clear attempt at salvaging and restoring American global influence over events. The first part of the vision is to unify Russia and Turkey into the Atlantic alliance to create what he calls a revitalized West. Geographically, it really is the circumpolar North. The second part of the vision is to cooperate with China and Asian nations to ease the tensions that exist between China and each of them on certain issues, the US role being the military shield that allows more regional countries not to have to get into an arms race with China. Importantly, the vision depends on continued good relations with China and general Chinese economic and political stability. In other words, a pretty conventional NATO-like strategic vision that even builds on NATO as an institution. But to do it, the US must get its economic and political house back in order. And that’s where the issue is for Brezinski and no doubt a purpose for the book.
All well and good. Big whoop. Except that Brezinski as a part of the elite is in a quiet panic about what comes after America.
So he plays out one scenario. What are some other scenarios?
When I got back to North Carolina, I relaxed by reading the last volume of John Birmingham’s alternative history of the noughts. The first volume is Without Warning, the second After America, and the third Avenging Angels. This is military science fiction with a high degree of military hardware detail, black ops, and graphic violence. The title of the second volume attracted my attention a couple of years ago, and I read the first two volumes in sequence. The characters were so well drawn, the settings detailed, and the plot involving that I eagerly waited for the third volume.
The plot is this. A force field of unknown origin destroys all of the people in the United States except for a part of Washington and Oregon, Alaska, and Hawaii. The population of this new country comprises overseas military, ex-pats, overseas black operations personnel, and the folks in Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and Hawaii who were lucky enough to miss the force field. When it was started, it was probably the only plot device that Birmingham could use to raise the question of American power. So what happens when on one day American power essentially disappears, leaving Europe, Japan, Australia without their dominant ally and the rest of the world without the dominating presence of US power?
There is another scenario for you. Exactly how does the American government get re-established and how does the American President govern? Who becomes the main geopolitical players and how to they get established?
It’s fictional and unconventional. And extreme.
But both Brezinski and Birmingham raise the critical question: What are the consequences that the American people will be dealing with as a result of the squandering of American power and reputation?
How do you think this unraveling of American empire will play out?
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Takes away all my doubts about the expertise of Zbigniew Brzezinski on the Syrian impasse and the few options available for a resolution. Takes into account the importance of discussion with Russia, China and India to resolve this battle. I miss the depth and understanding of the Syrian issue by both President Obama and Hillary Clinton.
Cross-posted from my diary – Our Hawk Running the State Department with USIP Support.
Just one question, how many special envoys have failed their mission of diplomacy: Frederic Hof, George Mitchell, Richard Holbrooke, Dennis Ross, Marc Grossman and add Susan Rice. Failed missions: Iraq exit, Pakistan alliance, North Korea nukes, Taliban talks, Golan heights, Syria conflict and Palestinian statehood or peace with Israel.
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."
Neither President Obama nor Secretary of State Clinton will clearly state their understanding of the Syrian situation. They are involved, and their words if not carefully crafted could have adverse consequences (and sometimes do anyway). And they have to balance against a public that is whipped up by a chauvinistic opposition party.
As for envoys failing their missions, heads of state send special envoys to accomplish the most difficult tasks. Every US envoy that has had to deal with the Israel-Palestinian issues is hamstrung by the fact that Israel has too much weight in the formulation of US policy on that issue and also can with impunity disregard US appeals for action. Richard Holbrooke did unwind the Serbian disaster in Bosnia. The US has been as inconstant a negotiating partner on North Korea as the reverse.
And to be fair, some of those failures are not failures of diplomacy but failures of military command.
But the perception that the US is a now a flailing and declining empire with unpredictable domestic politics does make an envoy’s job harder. So does the perception that the US is a hubris-saturated sole hegemon.
Richard Holbrooke did unwind the Serbian disaster in Bosnia. The US has been as inconstant a negotiating partner on North Korea as the reverse. http://encuestaspagadasporinternet.org/encuestas-remuneradas-por-internet/
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Published in my diary – America’s Decline Unstoppable
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."
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Poor choice by Obama Foreign Policy team for the Sunni alliance: Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. At the U.N. the US failed to find a compromise with Russia and added rhetoric insult. The US did everything to undermine the mission by Kofi Annan. Result?
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."
Fascinating stuff. For what it’s worth, some of these themes were explored a decade ago by the French historian Emmanuel Todd, in After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order.
So maybe the French are prepared to ease the transition?
Very interesting diary. A couple of points, though. Mexico is beleaguered primarily by the unwillingness of its wealthy (gap between rich and poor among the largest in the world) to ante up in any way – how about paying in for a public education system and a police force? Mexican elites opt for private schools and private security and no taxes. Mexico is a model for the Kochs etc. Mexico problems are exacerbated by usa, but do not originate with us and we cannot solve them either.
other point: I’d argue the more important realignment (as far as global survival goes) is not East West, not first world third world, but world wide corporate, or 1% vs – 99%. not an issue of war per se but the lack of accountability of the .1% re: resources, environment, and economic justice on the part of the 1%. If we in the usa succeed in rebalancing influence of the 99% over the 1% (and it’s actually the .1%). we will have very much influence world wide.
There are one heck of a lot of possible policy changes suggested that ZB doesn’t deal with–tunnel vision on national security is a problem.
I don’t like ZB’s East-West stability model either. Like I said in the diary, one of his audiences is the 1% and transnational corporation officials (the Davos-Bilderberg-Renaissance audience).
Yes, thanx, I didn’t see that piece of it – the hegemonic model nurtures the actual present day division of trans national corporate, unaccountable vs. (for lack of a better phrase) 99%. I talked with a Dutch sociologist in the mid 90’s who pointed out this was/ would be the issue. b/c governance structures are national-based there’s a problem in creating leverage for just practices on the transnational
Does he totally ignore the War with Islam that began its hot phase on 9/11/2001? Syria is still considered a buffer state in an East-West proxy war? Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan are the next battlegrounds of that war.
I do not believe there will be hot war between the US and China, just like there was not hot war between the US-USSR. The stakes are too high for developed nuclear armed states. Cold War and proxy war, yes, but Syria is not a proxy for Us-China tensions. It is a new front in revived Islamic jihad.
Preferring Russia to China strikes me as rather racist.
The draft of the book apparently was written last summer and Syria then was just another Arab Spring protest movement. And feels, I think rightly, that the transformations going on in the Arab world as well as the successful democracy and diplomacy of Turkey is taking the heat out of the Islamic jihad. But fears that US domestic politics and the failure to rein in (although he doesn’t say it directly) Israel will keep the jihadists from disappearing entirely.
He sees the Israel/Palestine issue as fundamentally divisive in the Middle East and worries about that but his quiet panic is that the US is slowly withdrawing for primarily fiscal reasons from pushing the West-Islamic conflict. And Europe is definitely disengaging because it creates more immigrants to Europe. It is primarily troubling to Turkey, which is the hinge state between Europe and the Middle East. (Israel refuses to be a hinge state; Lebanon has become fully Middle Eastern).
He doesn’t fear a hot war between the US and China for a variety of strategic, economic, and cultural reasons. He does fear that miscalculations on the part of India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, or China with respect to each other could endanger the US by forcing US to pick sides like we had to do in World War II. ZB’s traumatizing war was World War II. For most folks in the blogosphere it was the Vietnam War or Bush’s bellicose over-response to 9/11.
He doesn’t prefer Russia to China. He sees argues that a close US, Europe, Russia alliance can moderate the conflicts between Russia and China at the same time that its power deters Chinese overreach. It’s a very debatable point, and we should have that debate. But it is a possible workable policy if done with restraint and without chauvinism.
I have a different world view, but a dialogue and debate is possible, however I think ZB is an exceptionalist, while I see American world dominance as a consequence of the course and ending of WWII, a combination of factors unlikely to be repeated.
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The US and Europe were on speaking terms with the Assad regime of Syria. What changed? The Arab spring, true. However in my view, Syria is a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, along the Sunni-Shia divide. The cause lies in the US invasion and occupation of Iraq which has moved this country into the sphere of influence of its Shia majority and Iran. It’s not by accident another ugly suicide car bombing campaign across seven cities in Iraq killing 65 and wounding nearly 160 citizens (Shia pilgrims). See also the trouble in Bahrain where Sunni leadership tries to govern a Shia majority.
The Obama administration opted for the downfall of the Assad regime for short term political gain: hurt Iran and its influence in the region. An unfortunate choice as Syria is not similar to Lybia and is still a partner of a dominant Russia. Russia wants a conference with the bloc of nations in the region, Iran included. Hillary Clinton refuses and leads the conference “Friends of Syria” in search of a united opposition. As soon as another “friend” shows up Hillary dumps money, arms and provides intelligence on the movements of Syrian armed forces. Where have we seen this before, Iraq-Iran War in the ’80s.
Russia blames the US and Western powers for their support of the so-called Free Syrian Army with arms, munition and funds, thereby undermining the last effort by Kofi Annan to avoid a civil war. The Russians will continue to supply Syria with the same plus attack helicopters because it’s not about demonstrations and protest. Didn’t the US and Saudi Arabia do the same to keep the Bahrain kingdom safe from demonstrations and protest by its Shia majority?
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."
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Cold War rhetoric between Russia’s Lavrov and US Secretary of State Clinton
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."