I think Noam Scheiber’s analysis is very interesting. As he sees it, the only way that John Boehner can emerge from this fiasco with his speakership intact is if he intentionally causes a government shutdown, allows his party to be flayed alive for it, and then convinces them that their only option is to back down on making demands on the debt ceiling. For Mr. Scheiber, the post-shutdown public outcry is a prerequisite to any degree of reasonableness from Boehner’s caucus. And, in any case, since Boehner will have to pass his CR with primarily Democratic votes, he can only hope to be forgiven for it if his caucus comes to see, in a very vivid way, just how politically isolated they have become.
Maybe Mr. Scheiber has correctly sussed out Boehner’s thinking. But he hasn’t exhausted all of Boehner’s options, nor has he anticipated all the ways that the Democrats can make mischief.
Let’s walk through this. First, let’s assume that the Democrats are telling the truth and that they will never negotiate on the debt ceiling, nor will they make any concessions on ObamaCare in order to avoid a government shutdown.
Whether a shutdown happens next Tuesday or is pushed off for a week, Boehner will eventually have to pass a CR that relies mainly on Democratic votes. There is no reason that the Democrats have to accept the clean CR that the Senate is offering. If Boehner needs their votes, the Democrats can attach conditions. Steny Hoyer, who is hardly a liberal firebrand, has already said, “I am not going to vote to continue the sequester. I believe it is inimical to the interests of the United States of America — to our government, to our economy and to our national security.”
If the House Democrats refused to support the Senate bill, they would have to take partial responsibility for a government shutdown, but the government will have to open some day. And Boehner would have no other option than to meet the Democrats’ demands. Of course, meeting their demands would ensure that Boehner would face a challenge from his right, but the Democrats could offer to join with Boehner’s loyalists and vote for him in any fight for the speakership.
At that point, Boehner would face three alternatives. He could resign in frustration. He could be ousted as Speaker by his own caucus. Or he could retain his position as the head, not of the Republican Party, but of an ad hoc coalition of mainly Democrats.
The Democrats have every interest in pursuing this strategy because, first, they want to end the sequester and, second, they want to break the grip the Tea Party has on the House.
Getting back to Mr. Scheiber’s analysis, I think he overstates Boehner’s chances of leveraging outraged public opinion into getting his own caucus to back down and refrain from ousting him. It may be Boehner’s most obvious play, but that doesn’t make it very likely to succeed. The Crazy is very strong with his caucus, and they almost ousted him at the beginning of the year. They seem very insulated against public opinion, and they tend to operate in their own media bubble.
I continue to believe that the Dems can take de facto control of the House if they simply demand an end to sequestration in return for their support on a CR.
