The U.S. government long considered its collection of Americans’ call records to be a state secret. Now the Director of National Intelligence admits it would have been better if Washington had acknowledged the surveillance in the first place.
Even the head of the U.S. intelligence community now believes that its collection and storage of millions of call records was kept too secret for too long.
By any ordinary standard, James Clapper committed perjury before Congress when he was asked about this. But, we’ve been here before. I’ve discussed it many times. The Intelligence Community used to open all mail sent between the United States and the Soviet Union or Eastern Bloc. There is no record that they had any presidential authority to do this, and the CIA considered it to work precisely because the privacy of the U.S. mail was considered so sacrosanct that even the Communists believed it was real.
When Senator Walter Mondale questioned CIA Counterintelligence chief James Angleton about what authority he had to open mail, he responded that the authority came from the Deputy Director of Plans, which would have been Frank Wisner at the outset of the program. Look at how he rationalized breaking the law:
Here is some more testimony from James Angelton.
The first segment has Curtis R. Smothers, Church Committee Counsel to the Minority (Republicans), questioning Angleton about why the CIA would open the people’s mail and who would authorize such an operation.
Mr. SMOTHERS. All right. With respect to the question then of mail opening, is it your experience that this kind of operation by the CIA
would have been discussed in interagency working group meetings among persons who would otherwise have been uninformed of such operations?Mr. ANGLETON. No, we would not raise such an operation.
Mr. SMOTHERS. In the normal course of things, would there have been an approval channel other than such interagency groups for securing
Presidential advice and consent to such operations?Mr. ANGLETON. I am not aware of any other channel.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Would such channels as the Special Group or the Intelligence Board have been a proper place for such matters to be raised?
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not believe that an operation of this sensitivity would have been raised in any body. It would have been-if there was going to be submission for Presidential approval, it would have been raised either by the Director of the FBI or the Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. SMOTHERS. But in any event, it would not have been raised with this working group involved with the Huston plan?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct. That is correct.
Here is the Chairman, Senator Frank Church asking Angleton why the CIA would open people’s mail without any Presidential authority to do so. It should be kept in mind that the CIA might have actually had Presidential approval at one time (originating with Eisenhower) but their official story was that they did not. The CIA might have felt that if they ratted out prior Presidents no future Presidents would trust them. Or they might have been, as Senator Frank Church called them, acting like rogue elephants. In any case, here’s Angleton’s response.
The CHAIRMAN. But the CIA was the agency principally involved in the mail openings.
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct for all foreign mail, not for domestic.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and we will explore the whole breadth of that program in due course. Did not the CIA have an affirmative duty to inform the President about such a program?
Mr. ANGLETON. I believe so, without any question.
The CHAIRMAN. But it apparently was not done. You did not inform the President. Director Helms did not inform the President?
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say, sir, not by way of any excuse, but those were very turbulent periods for the intelligence community and particularly for the FBI, and I think that all of us had enormous
respect for Mr. Hoover and understood the problems which he had in sustaining the reputation of the FBI.The CHAIRMAN. But the fact that the times were turbulent, the fact that illegal operations were being conducted by the very agencies we entrust to uphold and enforce the law makes it all the more incumbent that the President be informed of what is going on, does it not? It is really not an excuse.
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not think there was ever the forum in which these matters could be raised at that level. I think that has been one of the troubles in domestic counterintelligence and foreign counterintelligence that the issues never do get beyond the parochial circle of those engaged in that activity.
The CHAIRMAN. But you have said that there was an affirmative duty on the CIA to inform the President.
Mr. ANGLETON. I don’t dispute that.
The CHAIRMAN. And he was not informed, so that was a failure of duty to the Commander in Chief; is that correct?
Mr. ANOLETON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think anyone would have hesitated to inform the President if he had at any moment asked for a review of intelligence operations.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what he did do. That is the very thing he asked Huston to do. That is the very reason that these agencies got together to make recommendations to him, and when they made their
recommendations, they misrepresented the facts.Mr. AXGLETON. I was referring, sir, to a much more restricted forum.
The CHAIRMAN. I am referring to the mail, and what I have said is solidly based upon the evidence. The President wanted to be informed. He wanted recommendations. He wanted to decide what
should be done, and he was misinformed. Not only was he misinformed, but when he reconsidered authorizing the opening of the mail 5 days later and revoked it, the CIA did not pay the slightest bit of attention to him, the Commander in Chief, as you say. Is that so?Mr. ANGLETON. I have no satisfactory answer for that.
The CHAIRMAN. You have no satisfactory answer?
Mr. ANGLETON. No, I do not.
Back in the 1970’s, the public was outraged about this and Congress was emboldened to enact real reforms. Those reforms went mostly to the wayside after the 9/11 attacks.
At first, the Intelligence Community had the blessing of the Bush-Cheney administration. Then it fell to the Obama administration to decide how much could be rolled back without angering the Intelligence Community or risking national security.
But the culture had been reestablished. The Intelligence Community thinks it can lie to Congress and the American people, and may even believe they can lie to the president. If they can collect intelligence, they feel like they are justified in doing so, regardless of the law. In some cases, they want us to believe we have privacy because our expectation of privacy is the very thing that makes collection of our communications worthwhile.
