In the November/December 2014 issue of the Washington Monthly, Ed Kilgore has a review of Rick Perlstein’s latest book: The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan.
The book is the third in a trilogy. Perlstein began his treatment of the Conservative Movement with his breakout 2001 book, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus. He followed that up, in 2008, with the well-researched and comprehensive Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America.
Despite approaching The Invisible Bridge with some trepidation, concerned that the main time period involved, the 1970s, would not be treated with the seriousness that it deserves as the progenitor of the world we live in today, Kilgore seems to have been relieved on that score. His review is broadly positive.
With all the effort that has gone into building up Ronald Reagan’s image as a heroic and transformative president, perhaps the most intriguing thing about his life during the 1970’s is to discover who he was and what he acted like prior to all the burnishings and embellishments of the Mighty Right-Wing Wurlitzer. One notable feature of Reagan in the 1970’s was his Lynyrd Skynyrd-like attitude to the Watergate scandal.
Again and again, Perlstein describes pundits and even friends and admirers shaking their heads in dismay at Reagan’s steady refusal to take Watergate—either the formal scandal or the broader set of Nixonian deceptions and schemes the term came to encompass—seriously. He had, they all thought, doomed himself as a national political figure.
There could be more than one reason to not particularly care about Nixon’s sins, apathy being one of the most obvious causes, overriding admiration for the man being another. For Kilgore, though, the explanation is more sinister.
One might admire the progressive (if highly opportunistic) impulses of the Nixon presidency, such as wage and price controls, the Clean Air and Water Acts, the opening to China, and détente with the Soviet Union, even while deploring his dark side. But Reagan seemed to embrace that dark side, which coincided with Nixon’s emotional connections with the conservative movement—the hippie and welfare baiting, the excoriation of liberal elites, and, most of all, the inflation of a jingoistic POW/MIA cult to whitewash the disastrous and tawdry end of the Vietnam War into “peace with honor.”
Perlstein sees a commonality between the humble upbringings of Nixon and Reagan that helps explain their adult personalities. What in Nixon expressed itself as ressentiment became something still dark but more optimistic in Reagan.
The Invisible Bridge argues that Reagan’s chaotic childhood, full of frustrations and fears, helped make him what Perlstein calls an “athlete of the imagination.” He could effortlessly invent stories of a perfect America because he had first reinvented his own life to fit the heroic models he found in sports and popular literature.
This ability to see America through rose-colored glasses was the key element that allowed Reagan to pick up Nixon’s banner and get the power to run with it.
Despite his disappointment that Perlstein did not speculate about how history would be different if the Republicans had nominated Reagan in 1976, Kilgore’s review will make you want to read the book.
In general, The Invisible Bridge is even more compulsively readable than the previous two volumes in the series; his account of the 1976 Republican National Convention—the last convention in which there was serious doubt about the outcome—is as good as his recounting in Nixonland of the more famous and lurid 1968 Democratic convention. Better yet, he accurately compares Reagan’s speech at the very end of the GOP convention to Martin Luther King Sr.’s powerful benediction at the Democratic event. King was symbolically healing the ancient wounds of southern Democrats, while Reagan was prophesying the future conquest of the GOP by the conservative movement. Both moments were riveting to anyone observing them at the time. Or perhaps you just had to be Rick Perlstein, obsessively reading and watching every moment of that year’s reporting and analysis, and rethinking what it all meant.
The history of the rise of the Conservative Movement is compelling in its own right, but it should be studied by progressives for more than just reading pleasure. We’re stuck with these people now, so we better make sure that we understand them.
While we’re at it, we might just pick up a few lessons on how to change a political party from within.
Perlstein is a national treasure – at least to those people who aren’t sociopaths and psychopaths.
Our Reich-Wingers laud national jokes like Amity Shlaes and David Barton as notable historians.
Notable ‘hysterians’ and blatant liars, I’ll give them.
Don’t forget about felonious election-law violator Dinesh D’Souza.
Anytime a fascist-enabler starts talking about how each and every DemocratTM votes a few thousands times per election, I always bring that fucking douchebag up.
Agree with this:
However, in real time, where Gary Hart stood was clear and why clear-sighted liberals had no use for him. (But apparently there remains some Hart nostalgia among some Democrats today.) WRT Brown it was more complicated and less clear. After two terms of Reagan, a majority of California voters pined for Pat Brown. The good, solid, competent, and decent governor they’d tossed out in favor of a sexier proposal. The problem was that Jerry wasn’t his Dad; although he did absorb some of his Dad’s administrative skills which IMHO is the primary thing that has kept his political career alive. (Second would be that he’s not a crook and didn’t use his political career to make himself extremely wealthy.) Generally, back the only words to describe him were quixotic and weird. Today I’d describe him as a religious libertarian.
Disagree with this:
McGovern and HHH were New Deal Democrats. It’s just that their time on the national stage was overwhelmed by the Vietnam War and the GOP political calculation to revive regressive racism. (And Nixon/Kissinger’s thwarting of the Paris Peace talks in 1968 and Nixon’s election dirty tricks in 1972, one part of which was the DNC burglary.)
The illusion is that the New Deal Democrats were anything more beyond FDR supporters and ignore that it was FDR’s masterful use of executive authority to move quickly and his ability to wrangle deals out of Congress during the 1930s and use the war effort as a club during the 1940s. Lyndon Johnson’s people used this mythology to influence his agenda, but has persisted as a romantic nostalgia that has papered over real continuing divisions in the Demcratic Party. The problem with Perlstein’s argument is that Democrats never really gained the ground for the New Deal that most current analysts think. Passing Medicare, for example, was a very heavy lift. And it wasn’t just the Dixiecrats and emerging conservative Republicans who were difficult. The Democratic failures of the 1970s are rooted in the political war in Chicago in 1968; part of that was ideological, but a whole lot of it was also personal in a time when personal cleavages in the party could be as important as ideological ones.
McGovern has the advantage of never having achieved executive office and had to put his ideas into practice. Clinton’s mentor was William Fulbright, a very interesting and contradictory politician when it came to ideology. And the cauldron that formed Clinton was the Arkansas governorship itself; few politicians make that sudden a jump. He was attorney general at 31 and governor at 33. Almost as meteoric as Dennis Kucinich, with the subsequent burnout and recovery as a very different sort of politician.
McGovern’s situation was more like that of Ronald Reagan’s in being the putative heir apparent after the collapse of the party through a disaster. In 1966, Richard Nixon was running but not considered a serious contender against LBJ. Nixon failed at winning the California governor’s race in 1962 and promised the world that it would never have him to kick around again. Reagan’s counter-hippie tenure in California allowed Nixon the space to run, so long as he tacked in Reagan’s (and Wallace’s) direction.
The New Politics was the old machine politics forced back on the party after the McGovern failure. Of course, the machine pols caused the failure by sitting on their hands, turning out just enough to elect their people at the bottom of the ticket. Clinton learned his lesson in 1988 and cozied up to the machines and the lobbyist kingmakers that were just then emerging out their Reagan era growth.
The shift that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s was from the old poltical machine relationships that continued over decades–the earliest one of these was likely Jefferson-Madison-Monroe-Gallatin and friends — to the lobbyist kingmakers best illustrated in the Democratic Party by the Podestas and by Boggs and lots of others and facilitated by consultants and lawyers in a capital instead of being based locally. The next shift is obviously the direct participation of the wealthy themselves.
McGovern failed because the system in 1972 in the Democratic Party still tilted toward the urban machines and state machines, which organized both finances and turnout. South Dakota did not have a large enough or consistent enough political machine in the 1970s to act as a base. Atlanta was a sufficient enough base by 1976 to move Carter forward in a crowded field. In 1974, when I was in Atlanta, the Peanut Brigade that ran the governor’s office was pretty impressive in how it could work a cantankerous legislature after six years in office. By then, Carter was working the Georgia machine.
During the Carter administration, Republicans were putting together a movemental politics that got the Republican machines to support them after the primaries. Key winning the primaries was the organization of rank-and-file veterans offended by Carter’s amnesty, local congregations of connectional churches in the anti-abortion and segregationist networks, and networks of small businessmen and professionals. Among professionals, specialist physicians feeling their ability to print money being hampered by Medicare and Medicaid were early supporters; so were tax lawyers and accountants. And law enforcement, which made in-roads into traditionally Democratic areas in urban areas. Conservatism was the public story used to hide a coalition of a variety of grievances.
Democrats, assured that conservatism and Reaganism were still jokes, never saw it coming. And for all the luxury of having a fractious left wing in the Democratic Party, there was also a conservative fractious wing to Carter’s right that sought to suck up some of the vulnerabilities that were attracking the voters to Reagan–moderation on civil rights, tough on crime, strong defense, balance the budget, la da da.
The failures of the Democratic Party in the 1970s were not all ideological although ideology was often used to frame the battles. Often it was institutional or personal loyalties or financial base.
No — they were all New Deal Democrats — but there were splits as to how much power the federal government would have over the states and wrt many southern New Deal Democrats, they wanted the “goodies” reserved for white folks.
The civil rights acts, Medicare/Medicaid, and war on poverty under LBJ were extensions of the spirit and intent to the New Deal. I’m not interested in parsing that into the different coalitions and regions that were involved in that. The primary opponents were the same as existed during FDR’s time — north, east, and to a lesser extent west Republicans. It was racism in the south, the destruction of blue collar unions and thugs like Daley, and the split over Vietnam that tilted the balance of power to the GOP in 1968. After the DINOs helped to destroy “Brand D” and then discovered that they didn’t have and weren’t going to get power in the GOP, they weaseled their way back into the Democratic Party — and being liberal wimps, we didn’t tell them to fuck off.
Being in (legislative) power too long atrophied Democratic responsiveness to the electorate. Then Reagan and Friends stepped in and knee-capped the Democratic party. It’s still hobbling today.
Gov Cuomo donning his magic GOP cape and practicing medicine again without a license:
HuffPoDear New York City’s Uninsured: Screw You, Love Governor Cuomo
As if “Brand D” needed to be tarnished further.
He’s never going to become President. He’s just lashing out now at this enemies. I wonder what his old man has to say now?
do you think he realizes that, or is he like his SO Chris Christie, steamrollering on in his bubble?
Cuomo is in his bubble. Obviously, I’m not a Hillary fan at all but if there is one reason I hope she doesn’t run because Cuomo would then run. And he’d get crushed. I doubt he makes it past Iowa if he were to run.
OMG. That goes beyond betrayal. How exactly does the governor have the power to do that in New York?
Make the jerk change parties. Or we might as well fold up the donkey and walk away.
If the law meant anything at all any more, that would be criminal.
wow!
Reagan was an abysmal governor 1967-1975 he was an even worse president. No one should have been surprised.
Ronald Reagan the Worst American – where the badge of honor proudly Ronnie.
What emerges from Perlstein’s book, as well as others such as Geoffrey Kabaservice’s “Rule and Ruin”, is a picture of ruthless, patient, sophisticated political organizers with a talent for the long game (50 years: 1964-2014) and the ability to stick to a plan long enough to turn short-term defeats to long-term advantage. Not a one of these are traits much in evidence among liberals, yet you guys laugh at and disdain your enemies while they’re eating your lunch. Why is that? It’s about damn time you start to think about understanding them. You’ve got a lot of work to do to catch up.
Here’s a lesson to start with: 3 things matter — organization, organization, and organization. And you have not the slightest scintilla of an organization. Not at the state level, not even at the county level. You control nothing, you have no leverage. Worse yet, your movement has no common vision to speak of. Nor does it have a common strategy. Nor any way of coming together around one (electing, even nominating Elizabeth Warren is not a strategy). Organizing liberals is like herding cats, it’s a continual chase after the next shiny object.
Want to change the Democrats from within? Fine: look closely at what the conservatives had to do. Starting in 1964 they realized that in the wake of the passage of the Civil Rights Act (the turning point for them was not the defeat of Goldwater) they had to go to war. And go to war they did. Are you ready to go to war? I don’t think so but if you are you have to plan to be down for a 50-year battle against other nominal Democrats because although the people you’re fighting are certainly incompetent and useless when it comes to fighting on behalf of our interests they will likely prove to be much better when it comes to fighting for their own.
The last 50 years is gone, it’s all pissed away. We won’t have another 50 years to throw at a plan like “take over the Democrats from within”. Seriously: how’s that going to work?
Sorry, but that’s one of the stupidest, most ignorant comments about economics (and economic incompetence) I think I’ve ever read.
#1: Price controls while your FED chair prints money is a complete con, which worked very well for Nixon. Arthur Burns was the worst FED chair in history. Even without Watergate, Nixon deserves to be reviled for this extremely unprogressive policy
#2: Nixon’s comment, ‘We are all Keynesians’ is probably the single most damaging comment that led to the whole supply side movement tarring Nixon’s economic mismanagement on a liberal economist. Quite a neat trick and stupidly for the next 45+ years the supply siders have run with that successfully.
It’s not hard to see how the Republicans have been able to beat down liberals/progressives on the 1970’s ‘Keynesian’ debacle when liberals/progressives still don’t understand what actually happened.
Forgot to mention that Carter reaped the whirlwind of Nixon’s economic mismanagement, that extended beyond price controls to also the use of ‘petrodollars’ to lessen the quadrupled oil prices impact on the economy.
For ANYONE, much less a liberal/progressive, to claim Nixon had a progressive economic policy borders on criminal.