(One in a series of posts on Mark & Paul Engler’s 2016 book, This Is An Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt Is Shaping The Twenty-First Century.)

When it comes to the practices necessary for effective organizing for change—and in particular, transformative change—the Englers save the toughest for last.

Sure, it can be hard to use tactics so polarizing that even most of your supporters disagree with your actions. (“In May 1961, a Gallup poll asked Americans, ‘Do you think that ‘sit-ins’ at lunch counters, ‘freedom buses,’ and other demonstrations by Negroes will hurt or help the Negro’s chances of being integrated in the South?’ The respondents were overwhelmingly negative: 57% believed that the nonviolent actions were counterproductive, with just 27% expressing confidence in the tactics’ effectiveness.” p. 209-10)

Launching a campaign that requires activists to risk physical pain and abuse, loss of jobs and friendships, even their (and your) lives is a daunting and stomach-wrenching challenge.

Yet many long-time organizers and activists agree that creating and enforcing a disciplined internal culture of nonviolence powerful enough to sustain itself in the face of saboteurs, provocateurs, governmental repression and opposition violence is perhaps the most difficult challenge facing organizations and movements working for change.

As the Englers note, scholars and practitioners of civil resistance tend to avoid theoretical debates about the definition and morality of violence.

“For activists using strategic nonviolence…the relevant question is: What tactics work best in growing a movement and winning popular support?

Here, the philosophical definition of what constitutes violence is largely irrelevant. What matters is the response of the public at large to a tactic—whether the wider society in which a social movement exists judges an action to be violent, and how it reacts as a result. From a strategic perspective, which tactics are classified as ‘violent’ or ‘nonviolent’ is determined by this public perception, not by the outcome of any abstract debate.

Once a movement accepts that gaining broad popular backing is essential to its success, a strong argument can be made for the effectiveness of maintaining strict nonviolent discipline.” (p. 236)

Here are three pragmatic arguments for drawing a bright line of exclusion against the use of violent (as perceived by the general public) tactics:

       

  1. “…(S)ome tactics just do not mix. Or, rather, they are actually poisonous when mixed together.” (p. 246) For example, throwing pipe bombs when others have chained themselves to a building’s doors.
  2.    

  3. “…(S)ome methods, rather than lending themselves to public outreach, promote insularity.” (p. 247) Violent tactics tend to require secrecy, breed distrust, and separate activists from the people and places they’re trying to aid.
  4.    

  5. Drawing on Gene Sharp, “…(V)iolence is especially likely to restore loyalty and obedience among any of the opponent’s troops or police becoming disaffected. In nonviolent struggles in which success and failure hinge on whether the opponent’s troops can be induced to mutiny, violence against them may spell defeat.” (p. 247)

The Englers offer two key suggestions for movements seeking to build a disciplined culture of strategic nonviolence:

       

  • “(F)rontload adherence to nonviolent tactics as one of their movement’s norms.” That means developing and using an explicit vocabulary and set of habits long before you expect to encounter violence from your opponents.
  •    

  • “(C)reate a culture of training to foster a greater unity of strategic vision.” Armies have “basic training”. So should movements seeking to win campaigns of radical change. (p. 250)

And when, despite your frontloading and powerful training culture, people in a strategy session, or a public forum, or at a demonstration, still speak out in favor of resorting to violence, treat them like opponents, not allies. Chances are they’re undercover government agents or opposition saboteurs. And if not, then they’re probably misguided young activists or old fools. Whoever they are, if they can’t agree to maintain a discipline of strategic nonviolence, then they’re of as little use to your movement as a raw army recruit who can’t/won’t learn to shoot a rifle.

In that moment, the more important audience is the silent majority—both within your movement, and in the wider society. They are the ones who want and need to know by your words and actions that this is a disciplined movement for change that can keep its eyes on the prize, and is therefore worth trusting and joining.

“The key common link, among all the activities in a momentum-driven movement is that they must be designed, in the long run, to build mass support. It is with this common goal in mind, and with the importance of nonviolence established, that activists can adopt a diversity of roles and approaches.” (p. 250)

Crossposted at: https:/masscommons.wordpress.com

0 0 votes
Article Rating