The Biden administration is prepping America for the imminent victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and it’s a painful narrative. The Taliban’s advance has been quicker than expected, although it was always kind of assumed that the federal government in Kabul could only hang on so long without U.S. assistance.

The Taliban shouldn’t be wished on anyone, and this is a tragedy for human rights and freedom. But I think it’s important that we see this in a balanced perspective. The weakness that the Taliban is now exposing is precisely why we needed to give up on Afghanistan after 20 years of trying to set up a durable government there. While there were certain military advantages to having bases in the country, the main goal was always to create stability so that extremism would not flourish. That meant building something that could endure without the use of our soldiers and weapons.

We just didn’t succeed in that task. Some blame belongs to us, because we have trouble seeing things for how they are rather than how we might wish them to be. We’re also not exactly geniuses at governing our own country, and we’re far from experts in nation building. Our enemies also deserve credit, whether we’re talking about those who fought us directly on the battlefields or we’re talking about regional governments in Iran, Russia, China and Pakistan that had an interest in seeing us fail. And, yes, the Afghans have to take a lot of blame too. There was too much corruption and not enough commitment to overcoming religious and ethnic differences to meet the common threat of religious fanaticism.

We made a huge investment in Afghanistan and it looks like they won’t hold on for six months without us. They ought to have built stronger institutions and defenses than this. But we’re talking about a country that hasn’t enjoyed peace since 1979 and which has seen far too much foreign occupation.

Less important that finding the proper apportionment of blame is the simple sad fact that Afghanistan is still not governable. We were not likely to do better in the next 20 years than we had done in the first twenty, so we had to pick some point in time to call it quits. If the government in Kabul had held on valiantly for a couple of years before succumbing, we might have had reason to question whether we needed to pull our support, but its total inability to hold ground without us shows that they were completely hollow and nowhere near where they needed to be to operate independently.

Ironically, the speed of their collapse confirms the wisdom of our decision.