I’ve written on many occasions about Frank Luntz and his consulting business. My favorite piece, from 2014, was called Frank Luntz Has Earned his Hell. In 2011, I had described him as “an evil genius who conducts tests on ordinary citizens to see how they can be best deceived into supporting policies that truly screw them over,” but by 2014 my take was that he “appears to be having some kind of midlife crisis brought on by the reelection of Barack Obama.” I’ve never stopped seeing him as a uniquely malevolent force, and I hold him deeply responsible for what has become of the Republican Party. Still, he has kind of faded away over the past decade. So, when I saw that he’d written an editorial in the New York Times on “how to make Donald Trump go away,” I was hoping that I might gain some useful insight.
As I anticipated, Luntz has been doing a lot of his famous focus groups, this time involving supporters of Trump. He wants to learn what makes them tick so he can devise the best way to pry them away from the disgraced ex-president and lead the GOP back to its former glory. I don’t doubt that his intentions are sincere. And based on past successes, I don’t discount his ability to find effective messaging.
Why does Donald Trump still generate such loyalty and devotion? And unlike 2016, can a different Republican win the nomination in 2024 who largely shares Mr. Trump’s agenda but not his personality?
To answer these questions, I have hosted more than two dozen focus groups with Trump voters across the country, the most recent for Straight Arrow News on Wednesday night to understand their mind-sets in the aftermath of his historic indictment in Manhattan. Many felt ignored and forgotten by the professional political class before Mr. Trump, and victimized and ridiculed for liking him now. Like Republican primary voters nationwide, the focus group participants still respect him, most still believe in him, a majority think the 2020 election was stolen, and half still want him to run again in 2024.
Luntz starts out by telling people what not to do: “pummeling [Trump] and attempting to decimate his base will not work…If they think a candidate’s mission is to defeat their hero, the candidate will fail.”
How can a Republican presidential contender credibly argue that their goal is not to defeat Trump? It’s a ridiculous ambition, seemingly absurd on its face. Luntz recommends, first of all, sticking with Trump’s policies: “It’s not about beating Mr. Trump with a competing ideology” because “Republicans want just about everything Mr. Trump did.” “Compliment Mr. Trump’s presidency while you criticize the person.”
Next, you need endorsers, but if these recommendations come from people who didn’t support Trump in 2016 and 2020, they’re worthless.
They just need to be authentic — and be able to say that they have voted for Mr. Trump in 2016 and 2020 — so the Never Trump label won’t stick.
So far, the winning formula is to push Trump policies and presidency, and say you supported him from the beginning to the end. As you might expect, this leaves little other than the “more in sadness than in anger” angle for criticizing Trump.
Luntz does have avenues of attack, however. First, focus on Trump’s preoccupation with the past. He seems more interested in re-litigating and settling scores than he does on what he can do for his supporters with another four years in the White House: “In 2016, the campaign was about what he could do for you. Today, it’s about what is being done to him.”
Second, attack him for hypocrisy, focusing heavily on how he criticized President Barack Obama for golfing but then spent half his presidency on the links. Third, promise to deliver the same basic results without all the drama. Say you’ll you’ll set a better example for people’s kids.
If this seems like weak tea, that’s because it is. But Luntz has another idea.
Millions of Trump voters are old — really old. They love their grandchildren, so speak specifically about the grandkids and their grandparents will listen as well.
Here’s where Luntz’s aversion to ideological challenge gives way. The way to appeal to Republicans’ grandchildren is to talk about debt and deficits.
The looming debt ceiling vote is the perfect hook. The increase in the annual deficit under Trump ranks as the third-largest increase, relative to the size of the economy, of any U.S. presidential administration. Long before Covid, Republicans in Congress were told by the Trump White House to spend more — and that spending contributed to the current debt crisis. Mr. Trump will say he was fiscally responsible, but the actual numbers don’t lie. “We can’t afford these deficits. We can’t afford this debt. We can’t afford Donald Trump.”
This is really where Luntz crashes on the shoals. Trump’s position that the Republicans should not touch Social Security or Medicare in their effort to shore up the country’s fiscal situation is his main ideological difference from traditional conservatives like former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan. This ideological heresy not only gave him get crossover appeal in 2016, it transformed the makeup of the GOP and created a Trump-specific constituency. If you want to keep Trump’s voters inside the tent, you can’t start preaching about “we can’t afford Trump” and have any coherency. I mean, you can say it, but you can’t translate it into anything that might actually pertain to the debt ceiling crisis. There’s simply no way to make meaningful changes in the country’s fiscal condition that don’t involve Social Security and Medicare, so if you want to run on traditional austerity without challenging Trump’s ideology, you’re going to be in a real bind. You’re going to be making wholly unrealistic levels of cuts to (mostly popular) discretionary spending. And if you decide to challenge Trump on entitlements, then you’re making an ideological change that Trump’s voters will intensely dislike.
Luntz’s final piece of advice is probably his best. It focuses on electability.
If Mr. Trump is the nominee in 2024, are Republicans fully confident he will win independents this time? The ex-president surely loses if Republicans come to believe that a vote for Mr. Trump in the primaries means the election of Mr. Biden in the general.
Simply put, if Republican primary voters lose faith that Trump can beat President Biden, he has a good chance of losing the nomination.
It seems to me, that reinforcing anything that calls into question Trump’s electability is to most obvious way peel away his support. Nothing will dent his perception of electability more than losing in court. Trump seeks to rally people to his defense by questioning the legitimacy of his legal problems, and it’s certainly working at the moment. But he’s getting an assist from his competitors who are so far taking his side. They need to start focusing on the pattern of Trump’s life. His charity was banned. His university was shut down. His company was convicted. He got caught in a lie about Stormy Daniels. All his associates are getting arrested. His January 6 supporters went to prison. The man is a fraud, and following or serving him is dangerous. He’s in legal peril because he deserves to be in legal peril, and if you don’t see it, enough other people see it that there’s no chance he can beat Biden.
Luntz doesn’t make this recommendation because his focus groups demonstrate too much loyalty to Trump, but he should be anticipating a year full of escalating legal problems. Instead of resigning himself to the fact that Trump is too popular to criticize for anything much more than style, spending and golf, Luntz should be coming up with a way to ride the coming wave in a way that can change how Trump is perceived by his supporters. He knows electability is a possibly fruitful avenue attack, but he doesn’t see how his competitors might actively enhance this weakness.
At the beginning of Luntz’s piece he says:
It begins by reflecting more closely on Mr. Trump’s rule-breaking, paradigm-shattering campaign in 2016 and all of his unforced errors since then. It accurately reflects the significant attitudinal and economic changes in America over the past eight years.
This is his way of saying the Republican candidates must respect the appeal of Trump’s combative style and more populist economic message. The problem with that is that no one will break more rules or paradigms or better embody the attitudinal thirst among conservatives for combat. If the battle is waged along those lines, Trump will win. To defeat Trump, the focus needs to change. It isn’t about being Trump without the unforced errors (a la Ron DeSantis), but about beating Biden.
It’s really a two-step strategy. Work to undermine Trump’s electability and then attack him for being unelectable.
The challenge, obviously, is that if you’re perceived as harming Trump’s electability you aren’t going to be the beneficiary. This is where surrogates can help. But it’s also about being politically adroit. First, don’t run interference for Trump. Never do anything to lessen his problems. Don’t attack his tormenters and don’t make excuses for him. Pile dirt on him whenever you can, damn with faint praise, and always amplify the difficulty he’ll have winning the general election.
Have faith that the legal woes will build and change perceptions, but also be an active participant in the process.
But, above all, don’t follow the Luntz roadmap. It’s garbage.