After the 9/11 attacks, when I considered how America should respond, I instantly recognized that it was important to remove American soldiers from Saudi Arabia. It’s one reason why I actually did see Iraq as part of the problem, because enforcement of our sanctions and no-fly zone against Baghdad were a big part of the reason we needed such a strong presence in the Persian Gulf. With the international consensus on Iraq sanctions falling apart, it really was a priority to find a way out. The situation presented a conundrum because of the strong desire not to reward the 9/11 attackers in any way.
In short, we needed to recognize that our own policies and actions had inspired a huge backlash and that the status quo was unacceptable and also unsustainable. But for political reasons and as a matter of principle, our response couldn’t be to accede to al-Qaeda’s demands. Using trumped up charges about weapons of mass destruction to topple Saddam Hussein was the Bush administration’s solution to this problem. It allowed us to end the unpopular sanctions regime and relocate our troops out of the Saudi kingdom without looking like we were making those concessions. But it predictably made matters worse.
Israel is in a similar position in that the October 7 attacks proved that the status quo with Gaza and the Palestinians was a massive failure that created an unacceptable national security risk, but there’s an overwhelming desire not to take any actions that would be perceived as a reward for Hamas. There’s a massive consensus about this with the Israeli public, and it’s one reason why support for a two-state solution is at the lowest level.
It’s important to understand Israeli public opinion on this because it’s tempting to think the problem lies solely with Benjamin Netanyahu. Writing for the New York Times, Roger Cohen suggests that it is only Netanyahu who stands in the way of America’s solution involving normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia in exchange for a solid roadmap to an independent Palestinian state:
Mr. Netanyahu’s life’s work has been largely built around the avoidance of a two-state agreement, even to the point of past support for Hamas intended to obstruct such an outcome. That seems unlikely to change, unless the United States can somehow triangulate Saudi normalization of relations with Israel, a vague Israeli verbal commitment to a process ending in two states and the end of the war in Gaza.
“To any prime minister but Netanyahu, the U.S. offer is very attractive,” said Itamar Rabinovich, a former Israeli ambassador to the United States, who noted that an end to the Gaza war would inevitably bring an official inquiry into responsibility for the Oct. 7 disaster and confront Mr. Netanyahu with the fraud and corruption charges against him. “But for his own personal reasons, he balks at any postwar significant Palestinian role in governing Gaza.”
It’s simply not true that there are alternative prime ministers who would leap at the chance to initiate a two-state solution. And, even if there were, their parties would never come close to forming a majority coalition in the Knesset. Much of Israel is presently uninhabitable because of security threats, including both the areas that were attacked on October 7 and the northern border areas with Lebanon that have been evacuated. The population is deeply traumatized and incredibly angry, and it’s simply impossible to think that now is that time to ask them to believe a future Palestinian state won’t present an even worse defensive situation. It also feels like it would vindicate Hamas’s decision to attack and thereby dishonor those they killed, kidnapped and tortured.
Destroying nearly every building and institution in Gaza is making matters worse, just as invading and occupying Iraq made matters worse. And Israel has to recognize that there’s no going back to the status quo ante. What they’ve done in flattening Gaza is create an even worse conundrum. Who will rebuild the place? Who will govern it? They can’t do it on their own even if they wanted to, and they can’t get any help unless they accede to a two-state solution. But no leader can form a majority on that premise.
Insofar as there’s a growing internal threat to Netanyahu’s leadership, it’s coming from those who recognize that there needs to be a plan for Gaza. Primary among these critics are members of the military and the intelligence community who know they can’t occupy an utterly destroyed Gaza in perpetuity. Yet even these critics engage in fantasies about Arab nations taking responsibility for Gaza without concessions on a two-state solution. That simply will not happen.
To even begin to get Israeli public opinion to consider a two-state solution, there needs to be at least a perception that Hamas has been utterly destroyed, and that’s why there’s so much consensus about going into Rafah despite intense international pressure, including from the Biden administration, not to do so. You can consider it a fig leaf to paper over the need to make concessions to the Palestinians.
So much focus is on Israel’s actions in Gaza, which has led the International Criminal Court to seek the arrest of Netanyahu and his defense minister. What’s not getting enough attention is that all this violence has not created a sense of safety or normalcy in Israel. Asking the public there or their leaders to make concessions that seem even riskier and also feel like rewards to their tormentors is not likely to succeed.
The idea seems to be that normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia could change this, but Hamas and Hezbollah don’t answer to the Saudis. They can’t stop rockets from falling on Israeli towns nor assure there won’t be future cross-border invasions from Gaza.
A final point that needs to be made is that Arab nations also feel like Israel shouldn’t be rewarded for its destruction of Gaza because it would in some way justify what they’ve done and dishonor the innocents they’ve killed.
Under the circumstances, any solution has to have a way for both sides to save face even if there are strong arguments that they don’t deserve it. One sacrifice Israel can make, and I don’t consider it much of a sacrifice, is that Netanyahu loses power and faces justice in the Israeli judicial system rather than international courts. That way, Arabs can negotiate with someone who isn’t the architect of the Gaza War.
But to get Israel to make concessions on a Palestinian state and the future governance of Gaza, they need tangible improvements in their day-to-day security situation, and that very much includes the threat in the north from Hezbollah. Since that problem can only be immediately addressed by Iran, I cannot see a way forward.
This week, Spain, Norway and Ireland unilaterally recognized an independent Palestinian state which caused Israel to withdrawal their ambassadors. It’s a further sign that the status quo, as bad as it is, will not hold for Israel. But symbolic moves like this which alarm the Israeli public can be counterproductive. People seem not to understand that Israel just learned they’re not safe from even an embargoed Gaza. How much less safe would they be from a Gaza that can freely import whatever it wants? They cannot secure their border with Lebanon and people have been forced to abandon their towns. That’s every day life in Israel, and while it’s a picnic compared to life in the West Bank and especially Gaza, it’s does not inspire trust in the enemy.
The one thing everyone should be able to agree on is that Netanyahu will not and cannot be part of the solution here. Until his government falls, there is no possibility that anything will get on track for a path to peace.
An excellent analysis. There is mounting pressure to topple Bibi which would help, but one wonders whether the Knesset would approve much of an improvement. A new prime minister might have his only improvement that he’d not have a criminal indictment to avoid.
And no direct and immediate culpability for international war crimes. That would help immensely.