The Rand Corporation, an independent think tank that says of itself, “Objective Analysis, Effective Solutions,” issued its latest 104-page study yesterday titled “US Policy Options for Iraq: a Reassessment.” Objective the report may be, but Rand seems able to deliver what amounts to bad news to the US Air Force who commissioned the study. In it, a single strong statement of radical shift in US policy in Iraq is recommended and a single pessimistic summation of the military commitment is offered. In short, the new goal of armed forces in Iraq should shift from making war to building a nation.
Or, to getting the hell out.
The United States should focus its political, security and economic efforts in Iraq toward the single goal of reducing sectarian strife and other violence, but should also start planning now for the possibility that these efforts will not succeed. . .Rand Press Release
Note: The report was completed prior to the present “surge.”
The mission Rand recommends is a change from a military presence to a police presence. Sectarian aggression, rather than insurgent or criminal fighting, is the main source of violence in the country. As long as Iraqis remain radicalized along religious fault lines, peace, stability, and infrastructure reconstruction are impossible.
“You cannot proceed with recovery and building a stable society when people fear for their lives,” said Olga Oliker, lead author of the report and a senior policy analyst at RAND. . .
The implications of continued violence in Iraq extend beyond its borders.
Continued failure to make Iraq stable and secure threatens to disrupt the Middle East not by catalyzing the spread of democracy but by exporting instability and conflict.
Iraq, which had not been an immediate threat to the US prior to invasion has been successfully turned into a very real threat since, thanks to the Bush Administration’s cowboy foreign policy. America before the Iraq War had an enviable reputation and status among countries of the world. No more. And the possibility of further diminished credibility and power, especially to the effectiveness of America’s defense capability, exists.
The problem is, reducing sectarian violence requires strategies different from defeating an enemy. Basically there are 5 options to solving that problem.
1. Use overwhelming force to pacify the country and further fighting.
2. Pick and support one or more “winners” of the civil war and help them gain control of Iraq, thus ending the conflict.
3. Help to partition Iraq into three separate states.
4. Leave Iraq and wait for one or more victors to emerge.
5. Maintain current efforts by seeking to broker a deal to reduce violence while Coalition troops focus on combating insurgency and supporting the central government. Rand Monograph
Let’s examine the options to determine each one’s relative merit.
Option 1 would require a military presence in the 350,000 – 500,000 range.
Option 2 would almost certainly backfire.
Option 3 would not end sectarian violence.
Option 4 would ditto.
Option 5 would require a functioning Iraqi government.
Unfortunately, the Rand recommendations hinge on these next 4 key factors.
The United States can help prevent current levels of violence from rising by supporting a functioning national unity government, preventing a Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk, forestalling the formation of new autonomous regions, and ensuring that the central government continues to control oil revenue.
Of those four, we know the following:
1. There is no functioning national unity government in Iraq;
2. We have no idea how to prevent the Kurds from taking over Kirkuk other than physically occupying the city, which would necessarily mean partially evacuating “peace keeping” troops from Baghdad and probably initiating Surge II;
3. We have no political influence or sway among tribal or sectarian entities to dissuade the formation of new autonomous regions other than to hope more tribal and religious leaders undertake to ally themselves with US troops against al Qaeda, which, of course, in no way precludes continued sectarian violence;
4. This one we probably can do, providing that “central government” is a puppet government of the USA.
The Rand report goes on to suggest solutions in several areas:
Political diplomacy (How novel an idea, and rather an impertinent one to suggest to the Air Force, no?) must be employed by engaging Iraq’s neighbors and whoever remains a US ally in discussions of Iraq’s future, as opposed to our present unilateral warmongering.
Security forces must become less sectarian and more effective, which will be impossible until the Ministry of Interior is purged and corruption within it ceases. As well, only joint US/Iraq patrols must be undertaken, and the US must increase financial support of the Iraqi courts.
Economic solutions depend on ending the smuggling and resale of gasoline and diesel, which are the primary sources of funds for insurgents and militias. This will require a complete overhaul of the Oil Ministry.
Assuming all of the above does happen then one of two outcomes ensue and America must make the hard choice based on which one does.
If — and Only If — Violence Declines The US must continue to protect Iraq’s sovereignty; initiate demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programs, which will probably require extensive amnesty; restructure and consolidate Iraq’s intelligence services; but cease financial investment in infrastructure projects, including utilities.
If Violence Fails To Decline The US forces should, to the extent possible, withdraw without haste while issuing assurances to allies in the region and around the world that
withdrawal does not mean that the United States plans to evacuate other bases or reduce its commitments to friends in the region.
Most tellingly,
(t)he United States should not seek to keep troops in any part of Iraq either to maintain control over oil fields, pipelines, and export terminals or to intervene in Iraq’s future affairs
whether or not we like or approve of whatever government rules in Iraq.
Departing from the Rand report (Click if you would like to download the full .pdf document.) and venturing my independent analysis, I offer the following: Given the likelihood of 3 of the four key points’ failure to reduce sectarian violence, the best interests of the US are to install a puppet government in Iraq, participate in the corrupt functions of that government, and enforce our choice from an increased military presence outside the borders of Iraq and increased pressure on Iraq’s neighboring states to keep out. Sound familiar? You may recognize the plan as identical to historical relationships America fostered among Banana Republics in South America during the second half of the last century.
At this stage, no reality-based observer can conclude that decreasing sectarian violence in Iraq to the point where citizens no longer fear for their lives, daily bombings of mass slaughter cease, and an independent Iraqi government can function, allowing economic recovery and normalcy in that country stands an ice cube’s chance in the desert of succeeding.
Continued magical thinking will not alter the circumstances in Iraq. That is why it is vitally important for Americans to select a president who recognizes this truth. And that is why I feel it is vital that a meaningful debate devoted to the single topic of “What I will do regarding Iraq, if elected president,” needs to happen.
The floor is open to discussion and opinions. Iraq remains the most critical crisis facing our next president. Have no fear, Bush and his cronies have no intention nor any ability to solve it between now and November, 2008.
