Against A World Arrayed for War

Back when all this began, when the Bush administration decided that the Shiite power they had unleashed by invading Iraq was a bigger threat to American interests in the Middle East than the Sunni-led insurgency they were facing in Mesopotamia, a cast of characters arose to question the administration. When Sen. Joe Biden of Delaware got word that we were sending commandos into Iran to pursue insurgents, he asked Condoleeza Rice for assurances.

At Rice’s Senate appearance in January [2007], Democratic Senator Joseph Biden, of Delaware, pointedly asked her whether the U.S. planned to cross the Iranian or the Syrian border in the course of a pursuit. “Obviously, the President isn’t going to rule anything out to protect our troops, but the plan is to take down these networks in Iraq,” Rice said, adding, “I do think that everyone will understand that—the American people and I assume the Congress expect the President to do what is necessary to protect our forces.”

That answer displeased Republican Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska.

“Some of us remember 1970, Madam Secretary. And that was Cambodia. And when our government lied to the American people and said, “We didn’t cross the border going into Cambodia,” in fact we did.

“I happen to know something about that, as do some on this committee. So, Madam Secretary, when you set in motion the kind of policy that the President is talking about here, it’s very, very dangerous.

When the administration began making noises about Iran developing nuclear technology, Sen. Hillary Clinton of New York had a cautionary word.

Many in Congress have greeted the claims about Iran with wariness; in the Senate on February 14th, Hillary Clinton said, “We have all learned lessons from the conflict in Iraq, and we have to apply those lessons to any allegations that are being raised about Iran. Because, Mr. President, what we are hearing has too familiar a ring and we must be on guard that we never again make decisions on the basis of intelligence that turns out to be faulty.”

According to Seymour Hersh’s reporting at the time (which, in retrospect, seems to have been more than a little alarmist), the Saudis, Israelis, and the Bush administration agreed to a four-point plan to counteract Iran’s influence. The fourth element of the plan is the most pertinent here.

Fourth, the Saudi government, with Washington’s approval, would provide funds and logistical aid to weaken the government of President Bashir Assad, of Syria. The Israelis believe that putting such pressure on the Assad government will make it more conciliatory and open to negotiations. Syria is a major conduit of arms to Hezbollah.

In 2011, after the WikiLeaks disclosures, the U.S. was forced to admit that it had been funding anti-Assad regime efforts, too, going back to 2006.

When Barack Obama became president, he inherited this neo-conservative policy which was based in very sectarian thinking: Sunnis good, Shiites bad. The people who had been speaking against and raising questions about the policy would become high-ranking members of his cabinet. But Obama proved repeatedly that he wasn’t going to accept the dissenters’ advice either. He doesn’t seem to have accepted any part of the paradigm.

Bradley Klapper may think that the administration’s Syria policy is in disarray, but his own timeline of events proves otherwise. While Obama did not pull up every anti-regime effort in the pipeline root and branch, he made clear upon taking office that he wanted to pursue improved relations with Syria and coax them out of their alliance with Iran and Hizbollah with a variety of diplomatic and economic incentives. He assigned an ambassador to Damascus for the first time in years. At this point, any ongoing mischief was either going on at the direction of Prince Bandar in Saudi Arabia or was intended to gently prod Assad toward the West.

The effort was not successful, and it was undercut by the Arab Spring. When Assad responded to protests with brutality, the administration tried to pursue sanctions at the United Nations but was rebuffed by the Chinese and the Russians. Eventually, Obama said that Assad needed to leave power, but his next step was to have Secretary of State Clinton work with the Russians on finding a way to end the civil war. The Russians wouldn’t agree that Assad had to go, but it was implied by the fact that the Assad regime was given a veto over any possible future government. In other words, they wouldn’t agree to go unless they felt that they and the Alawites would be protected. Obama went along with this, but it didn’t lead anywhere.

As the civil war grew worse, Obama refused to send weapons. But, in August 2012, he grew worried enough about the potential use of chemical weapons that he issued his now-famous “red line” warning against their use. By February 2013, we were sending medical kits and MRE’s, but still no weapons, and Obama refused to create a no-fly zone despite considerable pressure to do so.

Then, in June, our intelligence community concluded that the regime had probably used some chemical weapons in a few scattered attacks. Again, he was pressured to create a no-fly zone, but he settled on the lesser alternative of finally acceding to sending lethal aid to the rebels. But none of it was sent.

The lesson on the eve of the 8/21 attacks was clear. Despite inheriting a policy that saw the Middle East as a battle between Sunnis and Shiites, the president was using every stalling tactic he could think of to avoid joining the fight on the Sunni’s side. First, he tried diplomacy. Then he tried sanctions. Then he issued a warning. Then he allowed non-lethal aid. Then he offered lethal aid. At every point, he did less than what he was being asked to by the neo-cons, the Israelis, and the Sunni powers. In many cases, he was doing less than his own cabinet advised.

Then, when the 8/21 attacks occurred, he threatened to use a limited amount of force and sandbagged even that effort by giving up his right to act unilaterally and throwing the rotting mess to Congress. Finally, he struck an agreement with Russia that will take the pressure off to use military strikes so long as Syria is complying with the terms of disarmament.

His policy has been to reject the view that American interests are tied up in a regional sectarian war in which we want to see the Sunnis prevail. His policy has been to resist constant and powerful forces that keep insisting that we accept the paradigm the neo-cons set in motion back in 2006-7. His policy has been to keep us out of Syria, no matter the political cost to himself, his reelection efforts, or his posterity.

At the same time, his policy has been consistently that there is no military solution to Syria. The Sunnis cannot prevail there and we wouldn’t want them to anyway considering what they would do to the religious minorities. He tried to coax Syria out of the Shiite paradigm. Then he tried to get Russia to help him kill the sectarian paradigm. And now he has Russia on board to see this through to an end that isn’t settled by one sect prevailing against the other.

He has never seen Syria as a proxy war against Iran or Russia or as a war that we need settled in the Sunni’s favor.

His policy is not in disarray. It’s actually on its first solid footing since his presidency began.

Author: BooMan

Martin Longman a contributing editor at the Washington Monthly. He is also the founder of Booman Tribune and Progress Pond. He has a degree in philosophy from Western Michigan University.