Author: AlphaGeek

Our Squandered Victory and the Prospects for Democracy in Iraq

Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University

ABSTRACT:

In the fall of 2003, Larry Diamond received a call from Condoleezza Rice, asking if he would spend several months in Baghdad as an adviser to the American occupation authorities.  Diamond had not been a supporter of the war in Iraq, but he felt that the task of building a viable democracy was a worthy goal now that Saddam Hussein’s regime had been overthrown.  He also thought he could do some good by putting his academic expertise to work in the real world.  So in January 2004 he went to Iraq, and the next three months proved to be more of an education than he bargained for.

In this talk, Diamond will show how the American effort to establish democracy in Iraq was hampered not only by insurgents and terrorists but also by a long chain of miscalculations, missed opportunities, and acts of ideological blindness.  He will bridge the past, present, and future.

[Larry Diamond is introduced by PARC Forum coordinator to resounding applause from an audience of scientific researchers, grad students, and private citizens such as your author.]

Thank you, thank you.

I don’t get to speak to too many technical audiences.  [laughter]  

Don’t expect Powerpoint slides of insurgent position points.  [laughter]

Today, I will discuss Iraq.  I will discuss the questions of how we got into the situation we’re in — but NOT, in my opinion, a hopeless one.

I cover this topic at length in my new book, Squandered Victory : The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (Barnes & Noble alternate link).

[Obligatory book pimpage follows.]

It is not my view that we have failed in Iraq, finally and utterly. Rather, we now have a serious and compelling national interest in remaining in Iraq and not allowing it to slip into civil war … and to become a failed state.

Iraq was not, in March 2003 when we invaded, a threat to the US.

I still believe that invading Iraq was the wrong choice.  Credibility, respect for US suffer, standing suffers, and our “soft power” has suffered.  Nevertheless, I recognize that some (indeed, great) good will come from helping Iraqis to build a democratic/stable/decent society.  … Unless you have visited Iraq and talked with Iraqis of diverse backgrounds, it is difficult to understand what an oppressive dictator Saddam was.

[The record should reflect that Prof. Diamond spoke quite movingly of his interactions with Iraqis who represent the millions who are NOT combatants, of their general decency and desire to live their lives in peace.  I believe that we at dKos sometimes lose sight of the millions of ordinary folk in our abstract discussions of Iraq.]

First, there was a massive failure to plan effectively for the postwar era… including [failure to listen] to people with experience in dealing with postwar situations.  We knew what would be necessary to secure cities/facilities/borders/etc.  We were warned regarding the likelihood of looting and violence.  And it happened.

[Audience member asks a question: “WHO put out the warnings?”  Implicit in his question was whether the warnings came from credible sources.]

We were warned by the RAND Corporation.  [extensive explanation of RAND’s warnings follows.]

There was a report by the Army War College Strategic Study Center which directly addressed the issues expected in post-war Iraq.

And there were [extensive] estimates & warnings by CIA regarding the Future Of Iraq Project.

These warnings were willfully ignored by an arrogant and detached Pentagon leadership, which decided on their own what a high-tech modern war would look like … and that we wouldn’t need a lot of troops.  This turned out to be true during the war, but failed during the postwar period.

Second, we were crippled early on by 3 fundamental strategic mistakes made in the first month of the war by L. Paul Bremer:

1. [Our first mistake was] having an occupation in the first place.  The history of Iraq clearly indicated that an occupation by a Western Christian power, even more so by US & Britain, was a huge mistake.  [Vesting] total governing authority w/ US administrator (Bremer) was a strategic mistake.

2. [Our second mistake was to] dissolve in its entirety the Iraqi Army — 400,000 soldiers — leaving a power vacuum and releasing unpaid, armed soldiers into the population.

3. [Our third mistake was to] institute a sweeping de-Baathification of top 4 levels of Iraqi society, down to the district level.  The view of many, in retrospect, was that 4 levels was too far.  For example, Mosul was left without schoolteachers because they belonged to Baath party, and Mosul is now a radical hotspot.

Net result of 2 and 3: 450,000 fresh enemies in one month.  Multiply this by family and extended family members, [and you can see the results].

We also took the wrong approach to operating in Iraq, as it hit me in Jan 2004.  We had an imperial, haughty, ill-informed approach to operating in Iraq.  Summed up in 4 words:

• Arrogance
• Ignorance
• Isolation
• Incompetence

At the same time, I was struck during his time there during travels around the country that there remains a strikingly strong desire, among large elements of Iraqi society, for an open and fair democratic society.

Because of our mistakes in occupying Iraq, which enabled the insurgency to take hold and grow … it will take much longer, and cost much more in lives and treasure, to stabilize a democratic Iraq.

The CPA was constantly torn between ideals (democratic, rights-oriented society) and impulses (total control).  [Extensive commentary on internal politics and conflicting goals within CPA was not recorded because your humble author was fascinated by what Prof. Diamond had to say.  Sorry.]

Bremer failed to consult often enough, widely enough, with his own staff or with the Iraqi leadership.  As a result, adjustments came late and were crippled by desire to maintain control.

The entire CPA oscillated between awareness of need to generate Iraqi consent, and a mandate to steer the course of Iraqi future.  Every Iraqi minister had a US advisor who was actually in control as long as the CPA existed.  This did not sit well with the Iraqis, a very proud and nationalistic people.

Throughout first several weeks in Iraq, I remained hopeful and cautiously optimistic.  (Still hopeful!)  Some rebuilding is occurring — schools, hospitals.  Society is reforming — politics, law, professional associations, etc.

The problem was, that while we had lofty ideals, we didn’t have enough resources to deliver on them if we were fully sincere (and we weren’t) in our desire to deliver on our promises.

Military officers feel, almost to a man, that we do not have enough troops on the ground there.  When a military officer understands that you are not to request add’l troops, and that the consequences for doing so can be career ending, you do NOT ask for more troops.

December visit to Kuwait where Rumsfeld was asked about armor was the catalyst for dealing with issues.  Problem with armor drove right to the heart of the problems in Iraq (see 4 problems above).

Lack of secure transport wasn’t the only problem — we didn’t have enough protective staff, translators, or road security.

[Diamond’s translator was refused any protection by US outside Green Zone, was not allowed to carry weapon — and was assassinated in January 2005 as Diamond finished his book.  This was another moving anecdote, and the audience could clearly sense Diamond’s bitterness and regret over this.]

CPA office ran on a revolving door of diplomats and young neophytes.  Diplomats didn’t commit and stay around. Neophytes didn’t treat culture with respect, and did not have the work experience to do the work at hand.

One Iraqi official became so exasperated with a young American political appointee that he said “You must have thoroughly studied the history of the British occupation — because you seem determined to repeat every one of their mistakes.”

We failed to move with dispatch to transfer power to a true Iraqi government, and failed to engage the UN to facilitate the transition.

As a result, an organized, violent resistance emerged … frustrating and underminig our post-war construction efforts at every turn.

Is it just too late to repair this situation?

Is it time to simply withdraw?

Yes, Iraq CAN become a democracy.  I am not prepared, I don’t think any American should be prepared to give up on Iraq.  We have assumed a moral and political obligation to the Iraqi people.  If we fail, it will become what it was not before: a haven for Al Quaeda, and radical Islamists will gain considerably.

We are currently mired in a stalemate, and need a sharp adjustment in

strategy:

First: we need to do some hard analysis, and understand that the insurgency is NOT just al Qaeda and foreign jihadists who come in to [blow stuff up].  Many are fighting for 2 specific gains: to secure a base of power in the new order; and a nationalist feeling that their country is under occupation and that they are fighting a foreign power.

The President [in his speech Tuesday] should have declared that we do not have long-term imperialist plans for Iraq — and he didn’t say that because we DO have long-term plans for permanent bases in Iraq.

We tried to preload the Iraqi constitution to make it easier to approve a treaty in Iraq — so we could ramrod through approval of permanent military bases in Iraq.  It’s been an illusion all along that we could transfer our military platform from Saudi Arabia to Iraq, even in a post-Saddam Iraq.

I agrees with the President that we should not set a fixed, arbitrary deadline for withdrawal.  However, we should clearly indicate that Iraqis will, in the near future, get their country back.  This should be backed up with clear actions that bolster this message.

(This could convert members of the resistance to work towards that goal, instead of trying to expel US.)

Second, we should reach out to Sunni minority to encourage participation [in the governance process].

Third, no US effort to oppose the insurgency can succeed on its own. With the success of UN negotiators with Sadr in political transition,

the UN must be involved in non-military support.

We will not get control of the insurgency without the support of the Sunnis.

We need to change our attitude: we need to proceed with humility, with empathy, with respect for culture and history.  We cannot simply dictate the outcomes.

Don’t know if we would have succeeded if we’d done all of these things — but it’s clear that if we keep doing what we have been, without a major course change, we are not going to succeed.