There are two immediate advantages in post-Assad Syria that were not enjoyed in post-Saddam Iraq. The first is that the people trying to maintain order in Syria are actually Syrians rather than Americans and Brits, and they understand their society. The second is that they have the example of all the mistakes the Americans and Brits made in Iraq. We can already see the difference in how Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces are working to maintain government services rather than engaging in wholesale de-Baathification.
As The Soufan Center notes, there’s a notable public relations effort to project a moderate image. The HTS has talked about respecting religious minorities, including Assad’s Alawite sect providing that they separate themselves from the regime. The leader of HTS, has dropped his nom de guerre of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani in favor of his birth name, Ahmed al-Shara. He has also changed his wardrobe “to a combination of more well-coiffed Western attire and military uniforms.”
The change in name is significant for another reason. The Arabic word for the Golan Heights is Jawlān, and he chose the fighting name “Mohammed al-Jolani” to signify his family’s historic roots in the Golan. Al-Shara was born in Saudi Arabia and raised in Damascus, but most likely considers himself as a displaced person from Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. Significantly, as soon as al-Shara arrived in Damascus, the Israelis moved into and past the demilitarized zone in the Golan. They justified this as a purely defensive measure, but it was accompanied by a very heavy bombing campaign throughout the country which destroyed Syria’s navy and hit many military installations, including but not limited to suspected chemical weapons sites. This is an example of opportunism, as Israel exploits a moment of chaos to diminish Syria’s military capabilities in a way that would have been hugely risky during Assad’s time in power. But it’s doing nothing to create conditions for some kind of reset with the nascent government forming in Damascus.
Outside of Moscow and Tehran, almost no one is lamenting the fall of Assad, but a takeover by Sunni Islamists with ties to ISIS and al-Qaeda isn’t reassuring. And the sectarian change in power is the most significant thing here. Just as Iraq flipped in an instant from a Sunni-dominated country to a Shi’a dominated one when Saddam was toppled, the overthrow of Assad has broken Iran’s dominance in Syria. It also has huge consequences for Russia which is reliant on their Syrian naval base and large air base.
Another hugely significant development is the death of Baathism eliminates a secular Sunni alternative to Sunni fundamentalism. Baathism’s intellectual father, Michel Aflaq, was a Christian. The Assad family’s Alawite sect is considered non-Muslim by many, including especially by Sunni fundamentalists. For this reason, Baathism has always had a bit if a legitimacy problem. By aligning with the hardline Shi’a fundamentalists that control Iran, the Assad regime partially resolved this weakness, especially as Iran took a more active and combative anti-Israel role than the Sunni Arab regimes.
What these changes mean is that Syria has an opportunity to take the mantle of resistance to Israel from Iran, but to do it from a Sunni Arab point of view. This is more natural for a host of reasons, including that Syria is mostly Sunni, as are the Palestinians.
This is not what the leaders in Egypt and Jordan want to see, as they value their peace treaties with Israel. It’s also not what Saudi Arabia wants to see, as they’ve clearly been more interested in recent years in normalizing relations with Israel and attracting western investment, the World Cup, etc.
The war in Gaza has made accommodation and peace with Israel problematic for every Arab country, and this is something Syria can exploit to gain street credibility and allegiance. But it isn’t their only choice. After more than a decade of devastating war, Syria isn’t in a position to offer much resistance, and could benefit from international good will to rebuild and repatriate some of the millions who have fled the country.
It might be too optimistic to even posit that the civil war in Syria will end. Outside actors may be too invested in chaos to permit it. Turkey, which sponsored the overthrow of Assad by HTS, wants to crush Kurdish controlled areas. Saudis may want to shift anti-israel jihadi activity to Syria to give cover to their overall strategy of normalization with Israel, and to pressure for some concessions from the Israelis to the Palestinians. Iran may use what’s left of Hezbollah to cause problems. And, of course, Israel may promote divisions to sustain weakness.
But there is at least some chance that Syria can be stabilized if the new government can get a moment to breath and is serious about creating an ecumenical society that resembles what Syria, at its best, offered before the civil war began. I don’t think it will be secular in outlook, though. I believe it will be very religiously conservative and ultimately Sunni-sectarian.
Lebanon is another complete wildcard in this. It has always been dominated by Syria, but never by a Sunni government with this type of orientation. It has to be disorienting.
All these developments are both fascinating and frightening. Most Syrians are really happy about the fall of Assad. I hope they have reason to feel that way for more than a brief period. And I hope that’s true for the rest of us, too.