Needed today, June 2: Two volunteers to collate — before 4PM PDT — the e-mail addresses in the FOIA diary. E-mail me – susanhu at earthlink . net.
Please embed your links so the page doesn’t go too wide. If you need help, e-mail me. (I”ll fix the links below later but i’ll have to repost your comment under my username.)
NEWS for June 1, 2005:
1) Plover (Scott) has set up a page for us at DKosopedia.
2) Plover will set up a “format for describing each dossier” at DKosopedia.
3) Plover has transferred Subtropolis’s great new list of acronyms and abbreviations to DKosopedia. (Same list: BooTrib diary.)
4) If you don’t see an open spot in the FOIA diary with the TABLE OF VOLUNTEER ASSIGNMENTS for document research, go here to the ACLU list of FOIA documents, select a document – keeping in mind that some of those links take you to as many as 19 sections — and e-mail me immediately so I can add you to the list below. Check back at the FOIA diary to make sure no one else has taken that document in the interim.
_________________________
Register here in order to post. It’s easy, fast, and you can both post and write a diary immediately.
Use this diary to share your experiences, to ask questions, to express frustration, and to post any exciting discoveries. The “working diary” is here. … more below …
At this point — while I’m still assigning new volunteers with tasks — please don’t send me your findings. Sadly, I don’t have time to read them.
Instead, for now, post your findings here — this is the discussion diary for all volunteers.
Another tip: If you’re working on one section of a large document, consider contacting those [in the TABLE] who are working on sections immediately BEFORE or AFTER yours. You may have much to share with each other — before you post your findings.
ALSO: Another team is working up a clear format for you to use to submit your findings. So, you can keep your notes for now, and continue studying your document. Consider searching the ‘net for any corroborating evidence and/or news stories.
And use the experts who’ve volunteered to help with any terminology or acronyms.
Well I guess I have some questions about this project since I seemed to completely misunderstood yesterday.
First of all what are we looking for? Could you clarify that for us or for me, please.
Second, I am not clear what we should do with any or all info, that we find?
I looked at the name I was assigned and there was nothing there and also since I thought I was to look at all of the names (of detainees) I got through the first 6 names on the list and there was nothing there of interest. I looked at the last 5 names on the list, which were ‘freed’ apparently and found torture and references to torture in all of them.
I will be happy to take on a new assignment Susan, if you would send me what you wish me to look at.
Thanks Susan, for all the work you are putting into this and I can’t imagine how you are doing all of this plus writing all your articles and making comments as well.
I sure hope you are not ‘over loading’ yourself with all of this.
My thoughts after reading 11 of these documents is that the whole procedure(tribunals) is a joke of the greatest magnitude and an grievous insult to this country and our system of government!
Note: All looks in order. There’s credible-sounding evidence against the detainee and no sign of mistreatment. The only question mark might be Ghereby’s absence from the hearing, but I don’t think that’s a big item.
Summary: On September 27, 2004, Salem Abdu Salem Ghereby of Libya was found to be “properly designated as an enemy combatant” following a hearing by the Combatant Status Review Tribunal at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The tribunal cited credible evidence that Ghereby was an Al Qaida member and had been an Al Qaida operative in Kabul until his capture by Pakistani forces in November 2001. Ghereby was not present at the hearing, having refused to cooperate in a 10 minute pre-tribunal interview the previous day, during which he recited verses from the Koran, acknowledged neither his Personal Representative nor his Translator, and answered no questions.
The PR interpreted Ghereby’s negative response as a deliberate choice not to participate in the CSRT. Proceeding without him, the tribunal called no witnesses, requested no additional evidence be produced, and reached a unanimous decision. The case is final and Ghereby will now be scheduled for an Administrative Review Board.
The tribunal report was then forwarded up the chain for review and action, as per this table of documents.
6 Oct 04….Declaration of Legal Advisor to CSRT………………………………………..(Crisfield, USN)
3 Oct 04….Concurrence of Director, CSRT……………………………………………….(McGarrah, USN)
2 Oct 04….Legal Sufficiency Review………………………………………………………(Crisfield, USN)
30 Sep 04..Letter forwarding CSRT Decision Report from OARDEC to CSRT Director..(Taylor, USAF)
CSRT Decision Report Cover sheet…………………………………………..(CSRT President)
Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision……………………….(CSRT President)
Recorder Exhibit List
R1…Unclassified Summary 23-SEP-04
R2…FBI Request for Redaction 14-SEP-04
R3…(Redacted) FBI 302 dtd 09-MAY-02
R4…(Redacted) IIR 6 034 0242 03
R5…(Redacted) CTC MFR 16-JUN-03
R6…(Redacted)
R7…(Redacted) CITF Form 40 11-NOV-03
R8…(Redacted)
R9…(Redacted)
R10..(Redacted) MFR 17-DEC-02
R11..(Redacted) JTF-GTMO Recommendation Memo 27-AUG-04
R12..(Redacted) EC Checklist
R13..(Redacted) JTF GTMO Baseball Card
R14..(Redacted) CITF Assessment Memo 23-MAR-04
R15..(Redacted) Analyst Support Package
R16..(Redacted) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group alias page
R17..(Redacted) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group summary page
R18..(Redacted) FBI 302 dtd 08-JAN-03
R19..(Redacted) Quarterly Counterterrorism Tiers
R20..(Redacted) FBI 302 dtd 01-JUN-03
29-Sep-04..PR Review of Proceedings…………………………………………………….(PR)
26 Sep 04..Detainee Election Form………………………………………………………..(PR)
13 Sep 04..Appointment of CSRT #6………………………………………………………(McGarrah, USN)
My report:
Fouad Mahoud Hasan al Rabia is a 45 year old Kuwaiti husband and father with a master’s degree in management, who testified to a Guantanamo Bay Combatant Status Review Tribunal in fluent English. Hasan says he’s been employed for many years by Kuwaiti Airlines as an engineer and emphasizes having given a $100 million contract to an American company and claims to be known in Kuwait as pro-American. He is an educated, well-to-do person of high social status. He has what seems like an authentic history of involvement in charitable causes such as help for orphans and disaster relief, and he describes having traveled to a variety of countries for this work, and at one point having his efforts featured on Kuwaiti TV.
Hasan testified to his Combatant Status Review Tribunal that he went to Afghanistan in June 2001 to see Afghani relief needs for himself. Unbeknownst to him, or so he says, the arranger of his trip, Abu Suliyman, was an Qaida associate, and another traveling companion a Muslim student scholar who wanted to meet Usama Bin Laden. “To us in Kuwait before this, Bin Laden was an eccentric millionaire who became a revolutionary. This was way before September happened, and way before we realized what Bin Laden was capable of doing,” said Hasan–and so meeting the man did not inspire dread, though Hasan was disturbed when Bin Laden seemed to approve “killing innocent people,” and stated in response to a question by Hasan that he wanted the Americans out of the Arabian Peninsula even if it meant Saddam Hussein would again seize Kuwait. Over three days, he was in Bin Laden’s presence four times.
The tribunal paraphrases him in its summary of his testimony, “meeting Usama Bin Laden was not the purpose of the trip and the only reason interrogators know about the meetings is because he volunteered the information.” The tribunal considered his story that he traveled in the company of an Al Qaida operative to meet Usama Bin Laden and later fled into the Tora Bora mountains in the company of militants as a complete innocent, not to be believable. However, the documents do not imply to me what USA Today journalist Toni Loci inferred on 11/4/04: “‘There was more to the story than the detainee would have the tribunal believe,’ it said in its report, referring to secret evidence.” In context, in my opinion, that assessment that there was “more to the story” seems based on the tribunal’s skepticism of Hasan’s own testimony and the circumstantial evidence. During questioning Hasan asserts that the tribunal has no evidence that, for instance, he delivered money to Usama Bin Laden (something he denies)–and they do not seem to disagree with him. I do not notice them ever alluding to classified evidence, which is not to say there necessarily isn’t any.
Hasan testifies that he returned home after his first trip to Afghanistan and made a pitch to the Kuwaiti Joint Relief Committee, which he says was interested but sent him back to Afghanistan to obtain more concrete evidence of the needs, particularly photographs. Cageprisoners.com says that “In 2001 he applied for a job at the International Charitable Islamic Organization (according to that organization’s website, it is a leading member of the Kuwait Joint Relief Council http://www.iico.org/home-page-eng/joint-reliefcomm-eng.htm ). However, it seems that the application process was quite lengthy, and he decided to deliver aid on his own. He delivered more than 30 trucks of aid from Meshad, Iran, he told his family,” and he wrote similarly in a Red Cross letter, “As you know, I traveled to deliver rescue materials to the Afghani refugees on the Iranian Afghani borders and some hospitals in Kandahar.” He does not mention this freelance giving in his tribunal testimony, and it not totally clear how this fits with the story he told there.
The September 11th attacks happened in this interval, and Hasan was aware Bin Laden was implicated. War broke out not long after Hasan re-entered Afghanistan (he claims he was not aware of the American deadline which had passed, for the start of bombings). He was trapped in the country which was devolving into a state of lawless chaos. He turned to the well connected Abu Suliyman who was able to arrange places to stay and eventually, apparently harrowingly, they headed for Pakistan over the Tora Bora Mountains in the company of an Al Qaida honcho named Abdul Ghoudous. Because of his obesity and knee, neck and back pain, this journey was very difficult for Hasan, and sometimes he was provided a mule.
Headed in the same direction were many refugees, and also a lot of fighters. Trapped and hiding high in the mountains, he says Ghoudous ordered him to oversee the distribution of provisions (blankets, rice, “no weapons”). Later “for another week, I was overseeing six or seven mules” used to carry water. When Goudous finally permitted Hasan to leave with a group of injured people, he was captured by villagers and turned over to the Northern Alliance, and then to the Americans.
The United States’ case for Hasan’s enemy combatant status includes a number of assertions which they did not present specific evidence of, for instance that he gave money to Usama Bin Laden. Perhaps the best evidence supporting Hasan’s detainee status is his own frank admission that while he attempted to flee into Pakistan, he provided assistance to militants like Abdul Ghoudous in the form of basic work he did while stranded in the mountains. Whether he did more, I don’t know.
Hasan had a “personal representative” at his tribunal hearing, who assisted with the process but clearly was not acting as an attorney. No witnesses were called, and if there was supporting evidence for Hasan’s charitable and other activities (an included letter from his wife notes she was gathering such evidence), it wasn’t discussed.
A point of concern which Hasan raises is his fear that the particular detention unit he was assigned to at the time of the tribunal, the new, state of the art permanent facility “Camp 5,” was associated with detainees of the highest interest, and could be a factor prejudicing the tribunal against him. He gives a seemingly anxious explantion of why the tribunal should not be prejudiced by this, including his impression that “military police needed training on how to run this facility when it is fully operational. As you can see now, it is half full.” This was actually the thing that made me pity Hasan the most for the unfair circumstances, even though I think it is unlikely it had anything to do with the tribunal’s decision. He had been in Gitmo three years at that point and been interrogated more than 100 times, and seemingly been a fairly compliant prisoner, but none of this entitled him to have real charges brought against him in a real court of law with legal assurances of fairness and impartiality.
Cageprisoners.com ( http://www.cageprisoners.com/prisoners.php?id=27# ) says, “Recent reports cite that Fouad has been given a particularly bad time at Guantanamo. Initially, after passing a polygraph test he was put in the best section of the Camp, but recently has been moved back again. After General Miller came to the camp, he was treated more harshly and was moved cell very two hours and was short shackled. Because he was educated, wealthy, and they were determined that he had to be part of a cell.” Among the negative effects of Gitmo imprisonment, Cageprisoners notes Hasan “losing weight in a substantial way;” this may be so, but he describes himself in his testimony as having been obese (240 pounds) to begin with. Cageprisoners says, “Shafiq Rasul recollects when he was next to him in isolation that he was suffering from serious stomach pains and that medication was denied. He was told that he couldn’t receive medication unless he cooperated.” He is also described as depressed and worried.
I probably should have included this, which could be inserted as the second paragraph:
The US military’s contentions supporting Hasan’s enemy combatant status are: “The detainee provided material support to the Taliban and al Qaida; the detainee traveled to Afghanistan in October 2001; the detainee met Usama Bin Laden on four occasions during July 2001; the detainee delivered money to Usama Bin Laden; the detainee’s name and telephone number were found in an address book recovered from the residence where senior Al Qaida operative Khalid Shaykh (sic) Muhammed was captured; the detainee provided coordination and logistical support to Taliban fighters in Tora Bora [Afghanistan]; the detainee was present at an Al Qaida meeting in the Tora Bora Mountains [Afghanistan] where the distribution of SAM-7s and other anti-aircraft weapons was discussed; and the detainee was an operator for the Al WAFA non-governmental organization (NGO), and likely transferred large sums of money through a front company.”
I have a couple more guys to do, is this the kind of things I should be looking for? I stayed up till 5 AM engrossed in working on this, it took me a total of about 8 hours to distill the report above (I’m hoping this info going on a website somewhere as a resource to others). Which is perhaps a ridiculous time investment, but I feel for these guys who have no rights in there and I have a desire to tell their story.
Perhaps I’m looking “too hard” – or, more likely, I’m reading into what I see. In both of my cases (Adil Zamil Abdull Mohssin Al Zamil and Sa’ad Madhi Sa’ad Ha Wash Al-Azmi) the summary documents say the Tribunal’s decision rests on two things – classified information that is (obviously) not included in the documents we have available and the detainee statements.
In their statements, both detainees are very clear in their denial of the charges in full and additional denial of specific charges during the sworn statements.
Both Tribunal decisions are very clear in their condemnation which is based on the assumption that these men are lying.
Neither detainee called witnesses, Al-Zamil specifically said that he would have called witnesses but he couldn’t as no one who could support his statement knew where he was and he had as yet been unable to contact his family.
Furthermore, both detainees admitted their work with WAFA and said they understood WAFA to be a humanitarian/charity type organization. I understand that the al-WAFA listed on our “bad guys” list could be a front for al-Qaeda, and perhaps I’m being naieve, but isn’t there a way to look at the money trails of these organizations to see exactly where the money went? I mean, of course the good old US of A wouldn’t make an “on purpose mistake” to get more people at Gitmo, right?
Certainly there isn’t a confusion in translation or on the part of investigators between this WAFA, and this al WAFA?
Here is a wire item from 13 August 2004 which, I believe, specifically mentions Adil Zamil Abdull Mohssin Al Zamil. The first few paragraphs closely quote some remarks from Al Zamil’s testimony.
While both files show (in my opinion) a clear disregard for due process, that’s not surprising – we all know that military tribunals of “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo bear no resemblance to American jurisprudence. From comments I’ve seen here and over on DailyKos, I understood this hunt to be for accounts of abuse, FBI/DOD confusion, or things of that nature. Am I correct in that understanding?
If what is needed here is a more detailed description (ie: comments by Elizabeth D, below) I will be more than happy to provide.
Please advise!
Thanks~
Did you get to look at this? Text is from the FOIA Diary:
CAFL’s detainee table will be very helpful to you. CAFL combines the FOIA doc links + the CagePrisoners.com info.
Whatever Cage Prisoners has on your detainees may be very helpful to you. Or not.
———
The doc coordination team is still working on the report method, and i hope to hear from them soon.
Oh, and apologies for the personal email this AM. Didn’t quite know where to ask…
🙂
NO problem! It’s just that I’m almost dizzy from handling so much at once. Thank god George and Steve are helping with the DKospedia documentation aspect … I hope to hear more from them soon so we all know what TO DO wtih our “stuff.”
This is hard work, isn’t it. These documents are difficult to read.
found this interesting, too… (none / 1)
Adil Zamil Abdull Mohssin Al Zamil
He worked in the Kuwaiti Public Authority for Housing Care. The reason for his arrest is not known.
link
~k
“Get all the fools on your side and you can be elected to anything.” ~Frank Dane
by kwhowell on Tue May 31st, 2005 at 12:55:50 PM PDT
Gov’t Continues to Deny Gitmo Detainees Outside Legal Counsel
Almost a year after the Supreme Court ruled that detainees held by the US government at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba have the…
(I very much like NewStandardNews.net’s daily newsletter — they’re indy, and on the ‘net only.)
Section 10 consists of medical records for unnamed Iraqi males, two of which are described as “civilians,” 11 of which are described as “POTUS” or “EPW.”
While I’m by no means a medical expert, nothing in these reports suggests poor treatment, let alone abuse or torture. Not knowing who these patients were, the circumstances of their injuries and/or infections, or even why the DOD made these records available, I can’t see how these contribute to our investigation, but perhaps they will help elucidate other documents in these files.
Report on Section 10 (from DOD 5269 – 6711, Medical Records: MEDCOM 1617-1716)
Pages 1 through 18
1 August 21 to 23, 2003 Unnamed 18-year-old male Iraqi civilian treated in an intensive care unit for shrapnel wounds in the head (left occipital) and chest (right) along with other, apparently less serious injuries to the arms and legs. Reporting physician notes that shrapnel is still present in the brain.
Charts document treatment, which seems appropriate. Condition noted as improving over the course of the three days documented.
Released to EPW at 19:40 on August 23, 2003.
Pages 19 through 39
2 August 21 to 27, 2003 Unnamed 24-year-old (or 23-year-old–both ages are noted, in different handwriting) male Iraqi civilian treated for gunshot wounds to the back and abdomen. Required a laparotomy and a colostomy. Seems to have made a good recovery, with no sepsis present in the colon as of August 27, 2003.
Pages 40 to 99
3- 13 Eleven (11) “Critical Care Flow Charts” for patients described only as “POTUS” or “EPW.” Most of them seem to have been treated for infections and/or high fever. Unexpert opinion: care seems to have been adequate and humane.
Has anyone come across a group called the CACI- noted as a civilian contracted company that provides interrogation support?
Is this usual to use civilian support for interrogations, or am I reading this incorrectly?
You are not reading it incorrectly.
Where did come across this?
This will be an important aspect of this investigation.
This is in section 4 of the Army documents. I am reading more about it right now. This part says “Loaded onto the CACI by an unidentified individual (Exhibits P and Q.) Deleted in March 04 by CACI personnel, likely ___ as directed by the 1 MARDIV HUMINT Exploitation Team Commander at the DIF, _____. (Exhibits R – T.)
They appear to be talking about a photograph that was disseminated through the 82nd Airborne Division in which soldiers stood with prisoners. They said that the photograph was taken as a joke, and that no prisoners were physically harmed at the time nor put into the positions for the purpose of taking the photograph. They were put into the stress position for failure to follow instructions and not being honest about the collection of materials that could be used to create IEDs. 4 soldiers involved in taking the photographs of the prisoners who were hooded. The soldiers simulated sodomy of a prisoner with a broomstick in the photograph. There is no evidence in the photo that the detainee was injured or harmed. There is no evidence in the photo that the broomstick is making contact with the detainee, but said it is impossible to verify that the detainee was not struck before or after the photograph.
This is what I have so far.
has been a software (simulation), data- information/ profiling company for some time. They are based out of Arlington, VA. There is a profile of them here with some info on some employees at Abu Ghraib, links, ect.
I have heard that several of the private interrogators there, had not initially signed on for jobs like that, they were more trained in software, data, ect.
There seems to be some trends of really poor managerial decisions, that is to say sending inexperienced people into interrogation situations.
The Center for Public Integrity assembled a bunch of their work orders here. I recommend checking them out.
Employees from CACI were deeply involved in the abuses at Abu Grahib.
She claimed that she never touched the prisoner with the broom. She said that there were 6 people in the photograph: herself, 3 detainees, and two other soldiers from a National Guard unit. (Do you want names and numbers of units here??) It was found that she caused no harm to the detainees.
Another aspect of this is that a Marine found the photograph on a civilian computer at the DIF (Division Interrogation Facility) in Iraq. The Marine said it looked like a joke but hinted at mistreatment of prisoners. Witness called the Battalion Rear Detachment and addressed the issue to ___ as well as contacted ____ in Kuwait. The witness expressed shock that such a thing could have happened at teh DIF.
More later.
sent to someone higher up than the investigator.
States the the soldiers violated the acts of “public curiousity” amd wanted to know if this violates the UCMJ. Hesitant to consult with the SJA(?) but offers to call ___ who knows him because he has sat on 3 court martials. Punishment he recommends, if punishable: for the soldier who did not report the photos found (this is what I am assuming from the info given) a written local reprimand for not notifying the chain of command. Recommends a Field Grade Article 15 for ____ (assuming this is the female soldier with the broom) with a light punishment such as reduced rank and pay, but suspended.
is that the entire page of recommendations is redacted. Why would that be, unless the punishment did not fit the crime. Both Sharon and I have been working on this, and we both get the impression that while the investigator thought the actions of the female in Iraq were against the Geneva Conventions, that was not the focus of his investigation. I got the impression he was relieved that this type of behavior was not widespread and that is what he was looking for. Just am impression.
Section 4 consists of a report by an army investigator into a report that a female interrogator , affiliated in some way with CACI (not sure if she is enlisted or civilian employed by CACI)I), took a photo of Iraqi civilian detainees who had been hooded an put in a stress position (arms above heads) . There are two issues here: 1) taking photos of detainees was not allowed and 2) in the photo in question, someone is holding a broomstick so as to simulate sodomy. I will be writing a full report on this section after I go through it again in an attempt to connect more dots. One thing to come from it is that the photo was clearly in violation of the Geneva Conventions on the basis of public humiliation..
Yes, Sharon, I just saw that too. I am going further now and looking at an order to investigate a detainee’s claims that he was subjected to sleep management and diet manipulation while at the DIF. I can email you to run anything by you that I find, and see what you think it is.
The other thing that caught my eye was that this incident has been investigated several times since it happened in December 2003. The first investigation was ordered by LGT Sanchez, which is pretty high up. Can’t remember when Sanchez publicly claimed to have knowledge of abuse in Iraq – did he deny knowing about it when the he Grahib photos came out because it is clear he knew that there were problems with this photo as early as January 2004. I can ‘t help but wonder what they were looking for. The investigator in Section 4 seems more concerned with ruling out the incident as a systemic problem than dealing with the fact that it was a violation of the Geneva Conventions. It also indicates that very lax attitudes about treating detainees with humanity and respect were commonplace and widespread.
Don’t worry about sending additional stuff to me in particular. I have only read Sections 4 and 14 and am diving into helping out with acronyms if help is still needed. If not, I will be taking on another section.
Similar to what Matt covered above, these 100 pages are hospital records for an unamed, 22 year-old, 60kg, O-positive blood type, Iraqi detainee admitted on July 26, 2003 and released Aug 29, 2003. His location appears to be ICU#1
The pages in this report are MEDCOM 1417-1516.
The first five pages tell you:
*This detainee was brought in July 27, 2003 at 21:00
*Patient was x-rayed
*Patient refused pain relief
*Patient is able to wiggle fingers and toes
*Patient rests comfortably
*Patient is in alot of pain
July 28, 2003
*Patient is in alot of pain
*Patient is treated with Tylox @ 18:00
July 29, 2003
*wounds are cleaned, dressed
issue of eating is addressed, patient does not want to eat
*for some reason the pain scale on page 4 is redacted
This detainee/ patient has injuries:
*R shoulder
*L calf/foot
*R forearm-hand
*R calf-foot
Invasive lines inserted:
*?26Jul’03?
28Jul’03
Patient’s eye, verbal, and motor responses all scored high on July 28th. Respirations was not labored.
Patient’s heartrate between 127/64 to 112/59
Patient eventual eats after interperter tells him of eatings importance with recovery 18:00 Jul28. (pg. 8)
page 10 is a daily check sheet. “Pain free” boxes are checked yet beneath it patient gives pain level as 10. (I don’t know what this means, if anything
The record continues like this. The patient is treated for pain with morphine and Tylox. The patient is bathed. The patient often refuses to eat.
The patient continues to score a 15 on the Glascow Coma Scale throughout the record.
The nurse at 09:00 30Jul’03 is probably left-handed.
We learn the patient is a smoker (though not in the hospital)
The patient’s temperature ranges from 98.7 to 100.3
The patient had four operations, one on July 28 ending 11:45, on Aug 9 ending 16:30, Aug 12 at 14;45, Aug 18 time not recorded.
The detainee is taken to the operating room via “litter” which are safety straps. On page 78, the patient’s position during transport is “froglegged, safety straps over thighs.” I do not know what froglegged means in this usage.
There is mention (pg. 60-62) of the patient experiencing anxiety due to the surgery and to family seperation.
There is also a potential for respiratory dysfunction b/c of sedation during operation.
I don’t understand this: On page 66, the record states the patient arrived on June 26th at 19:55. This is the only mention of June in this report. This could be a mistake, and they meant July, or it could be referencing when the detainee was picked up earlier. I don’t know what it means. I tend to think it is a mistake because on page 62 it mentions the patient arriving in July 26, at 18:45
Pg. 95 lists the patients injuries. This guy came in hurt. Alot of shrapnel in his body.
The release/ discharge paper on page 59 states he was released Aug 29 at 10:12 in the care of MPs.
He was dispositioned to EPW camp… maybe FPW camp.
Any points on technique welcomed. Don’t know if this helps.
detainee was first reviewed July 27th at 21:00. He had been brought in July 26th.
re pain at 10: When I have gone into hospital I have been asked to rate my pain from 1 to 10. At 10, I have been given morphine.
as best as I can ddetermine, the pain rating is what we have here in America. However, when it becomes 5 and above, here, we give pain med. When it is at 8-10 there is need for narcotic analgesia.
The temps he was having seems normal for injury with foreign body in human body. and what with surgeries this can be normal as well. However, thsi should be treated with TYLENOL or a form of antipyrutic. I would think that some sort of antibitocis would have been given due to the nastiness of said wounds. A gut wound is very nasty, indeed! [especially if pt. had eaten like 1-2 hours prior to sustaining wound. The natural flora for a gut wound would lead to E-Coli and that is fery damning for recovery if not treated well and with antibiotics and allowed to drain properly. To have an occipital wound with shrapanal is not a good thing either..if left in it could wiggle or move every so slightly causing blindness or hemmorage {fatal}.
Hope I was somewhat helpful here in understanding the nature of the wounds.
The September Sanchez memo, is General Sanchez’s model for Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. Sanchez was the commanding officer of Combined Joint Task Force Seven, who’s mission was to conduct offensive operations aimed at defeating “noncompliant” forces.
This is the memo the ACLU has requested the AG that Sanchez be open to a perjury investigation.
Sanchez states at the beginning of the memo that this policy has been “modeled on the one implemented for interrogations conducted at Guantánamo Bay, but modified for applicability to a theater of war in which the Geneva Conventions apply. Unless otherwise directed, my intent is to implement this policy immediately.”
The second page introduces his intent: that this memo establishes the policy, he has approved of the following techniques, for some they require a written request and his approval.
Those techniques which require personal approval are:
He doesn’t specifically forbid Koran desecration.
For some reason this seems contradictory. How can the technique be inconsistent with Geneva if he instructs this to not occur beyond the limits applied to EPWs?
Accompanying this is a list of safeguards. I hesitate to list them all here, about a page and half’s worth, will post an addendum if requested, but a replicate at Cageprisoners is linked at the beginning of the post.
Two things I notice right off
1) Techniques that skim the intent of the Geneva Conventions need his approval, and he doesn’t ever state, instruct, order that the Convention be adhered to, only considered.
2)The general safeguards seem to have been ignored on at least several occasions.
What does Geneva say about stress positions, atmosphere disruption, military working dogs?
The Geneva Conventions are included in Section 4. If it is easier, I will take a look at my printout and get back to you about stress positons, etc. I don’t belive that there are specific references to any of the things you list, but will look again.
One more thing. Section 4 covers an investigation of an abuse of Section II and shows a violation of the Geneva Conventions in the area of public humiliation. It is an investigation into the taking of a photo by a female interrogator (not sure if military or civilian employed by CACi) I) of a group of detainees who have been hooded and put into stress position (hands over heads) due to their unwillingness to answer questions under interrogation. In the photo a broom stick is used to simulate sodomy. The photo was taken on December 21, 2003 and Sanchez ordered an investigation into it in mid-January. The investigator in Section 4 requested copies of the findings from Sanchez’ investigation but was told they would not be available until June/July 2004. I wonder what Sanchez was concerned about and what he found that he refused to release the results of the investigation.
seems to further diffuse the policy. See my comments in the post below if they help at all.
There is never any explicit order or instructions to adhere to the Geneva Conventions, only to recognize that they exist and that other countries feel certain ways about certain techniques.
It seems like a fairly vague policy open to interpertation, especially with combinations of techniques being cited in the Oct memo.
Dogs are removed from the list of techniques, yet added to Safeguards. I would read this as elevating their use instead of regulating it.
We know the muzzles were often off, from pictures we’ve seen.
Many of Sanchez’s guidelines and appeals (not instructions) to humanity in the policy were ignored.
How were these systematically ignored? Is the policy purposefully vague..?
I think the point is in not instructing humane behaviour, instead only appealing to a recognition of it… basically saying, “Keep it in mind”.
If that’s the feel of the policy, than I can see how interrogations could lead to abuse.
As others have noted, these 100 page sections deal with medical documents of detainees in Iraq.
Not having any background in medicine, I cannot comment on the treatment these patients received. It appeared reasonable and consistent with what little I do know.
The first 13 pages of Section 15 do not correspond well to the rest of the pages, so they may well be a continuation from Section 14. They appear to be mostly doctor’s notes and are practically illegible.
Pages 14 through 100 detail the treatment of a 23 yo Iraqi male who apparently suffered two gun shot wounds to the abdomen and chest and some wound to his left thigh.
He was admitted on Oct. 2, 2003 at 2:20 a.m. He was sent to immediate surgery at 3:05 a.m.
At 7:30, he was discharged __ recovery. an MP guard was bedside. at 10:30, Major ____ to see patient. at 1:50, Dr. _____ to see patient. It is interesting to note that the Major saw the patient before the Dr.
By 14:30, the patient is coherent and responsive.
On October 3, 2003, it appears the patient had some sort of distress around 1800 hr. He was sedated and paralyzed (though not of the permanent paralyzed sort). His temp was up and was listed as completely unresponsive. I believe he was also put on a respirator at this point.
It appears he was kept sedated and paralyzed until October 7, 2003. Now that I think about it, this does seem like an abnormally long time to keep someone sedated. His vitals were ok and all during this. He didn’t appear to have an infection. After coming out of sedation, the patient was agitated and pulled at his restraints and the nurse could not calm him down verbally. This went on for a couple of hours, and then he was sedated again.
October 9, 2003. Patient comes out of sedation around 16:30. Can move and open eyes, but does not obey commands. By 18:30, he can shake head “yes” or “no” appropriately to questions asked by an interpreter.
10.11.03 to 10.13.03. Patient is recovering well, however he refuses to eat. Says he wants “Iraqi” food. He continues to increase mobility.
Brief note on 10.14.03. Next entry is for 10.16.03 on pg. 100. No nursing notes fr these last three days.
All in all, it looks like the worst that was done to this person is he was kept heavily sedated for several days on end. He also hated the food and refused to eat on multiple occasions.
I doubt this is much help, but if I can do anything else, don’t hesitate to ask.
The last 21 pages of Section 14 are for a patient who was admitted 02 Oct 2003 and discharged 16 Oct 2003. Does that correspond with your first 13 pages? Seems like somebody who was in for two weeks should have more than that.
Wait, I didn’t read your post very thoroughly the first time. Looks like my last 21 pages probably go with your last 87 pages.
Hmmm….I will have to look at section 14 to determine this. But, I suspect you are right. Without any detainee info or even number, it is difficult to determine if al the docs are related. The wounds described in the first 13 pages are consistent with the gun shot wounds in 23 year old, but I imagine that gun shot wounds were pretty much par for the course there. Page 14 looked like an intake sheet, so that is why I assumed that it began there.
General thoughts on structure. (You are just getting my opinion. I bet there are plenty of ways to improve what I am suggesting.)
Start by identifying the document you are working from, including the web link.
Mention first the most interesting points, then the body, then the index.
If you refer to something, e.g., ‘prisoner had heard that Guantanamo was very bad’, please try to remember to include page numbers so the rest of us can find it.
As a suggestion, don’t kill yourself writing extremely long narratives at this point. Mind you, the long narratives in the above are much appreciated, were an incredible lot of very well-done work, and are very helpful for having a sample of what this body of documents is. But if you can only do a few paragraphs, that is still great!
It would be very helpful to have a table of contents by page number of the documents you read. Listing bunched of documents, e.g., (pp. 18-24 FBI review documents, heavily redacted, swearing the secret evidence does not prove innocence.) The Contents list can be fairly compressed.
(I moved this from the FOIA Diary to this discussion/review diary — Susanhu)
Richard Belmar (none / 1)
http://wid.ap.org/documents/detainees/richardbelmar.pdf
These documents record a tribunal process determining that a person is found to be an “enemy combatant”. So far as I can tell, the determination was affirmative, and from the documents Belmar would currently be being held in Guantanamo.
However, Susan Hu points out he has been released, which he certainly should not have been as a bureaucratic consequence of the documents seen here.
[I am not complaining he was released, but the documents here oppose release.]
References that he was not found to be a combatant are not supported by my reading of these documents. The prisoner was afraid of mistreatment, was in fear of mistreatment, but does not mention being mistreated. He appears to say he had heard unfavorable reports on Guantanamo that turned out not to be true.
Richard Belmar is an English Islamite. He traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan, apparently to get away from the law, and become involved with a Muslim military training camp that turned out to be a
training camp run by bin Laden. He actually heard bin Laden talk.
The first document is a US government filing to the US District Court for DC, relating to a case Belmar vs. the United States.
p.3, 11/2004 The Director, Combat Status Review Tribunals, concurs with the Tribunal finding that the accused is an enemy combatant.
p.4. 11/2004 Review confirming process issues related to the defendant’s CSRT.
p.5. 10/2004 Order creating a specific CSRT. The panel is numbered 15.
PP6-9 The summary of the evidence against the accused. He went to Afghanistan, was trained, met Bin laden, had a chance to fight the Northern alliance, and swore an oath to bin Laden. The defendant’s story differs.
He says he got training, never did guard duty, was part of a large group that listened to bin Laden, and never swore an oath. He says he was pressured by interrogators and made false statements to them.
p. 10. The defendant says that he received basic weapons, war tactics, and navigation training.
p. 11. -Defendant said that the interrogators told him to admit that he had sworn a loyalty oath “or we will send you to Cuba and if I lied everything I said would be a waste. They told me they would do this and that to me and I wouldn’t get any sleep and they would punish me. At the time, I thought Cuba was a very bad place and I would be tortured and raped.”
p.12. Discussing interrogation methods “….They move you around and give you a lot of trouble. They put you in cold rooms and make you sit for twenty hours. They do stuff like that here [apparently Guantanamo], too…and the prisoner therefore made statements to the interrogators he now claims are false.
p. 16 “The conditions at Bagram Air Force Base weren’t very good. I saw a lot of things that they did to people that they thought weren’t telling the truth or were withholding information. That scared me.”
The ‘they’ are identified by the prisoner as Americans.
Prisoner testimony ends on p. 18.
There are then pages from redacted names swearing that the redacted information “does not support a determination that the detainee is not an enemy combatant.”
CSRT=Combat Status Review Tribunal
IA=Intelligence Analyst
George Phillies
http://www.libertyforamerica.com http://3mpub.com/phillies
by phillies (phillies@4liberty.net) on Mon May 30th, 2005
I’m assembling a team of good writers/editors who will go over each of your reports, and give them consistency.
You may hear from these writers/editors if they have questions about your findings. Be sure your E-MAIL ADDRESS is listed in the doc reviews you post here.
THANKS!
Here are my first two summaries…I’d like some feedback to see if my approach and/or formatting is what you are looking for.
SAEED AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLAH SAREM JARABH
Documentation:
Cover Sheet: Prepared by James R. Crisfield, Jr.
Status Review: Concurs and is final
Sufficiency Review: Concurs and is final
Convening Authority Appointment: Yes
CSRT Record of Proceedings: Yes
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report: Yes
Summary of Tribunal Decision: Yes
Unsworn Detainee Statement: Yes
Detainee Election Form: Yes
Detainee Session Notes: Yes
Recorder Exhibit List: Yes
Summary of Evidence: Yes
Request for Redaction: Yes
Affidavit: Yes (brother)
PR Review: Yes (no comments)
Summary of case against him:
The detainee is a member of al Quaida who traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan to train at the Abu Abaida training camp. He admits to having contact with other al Quaida members and he was present with fighters in the Tora Bora region.
The detainee requested his father as a witness and evidence in the form of his plane ticket from Yemen and the record of his issued visa. All denied as “not relevant.”
Summary of Jarabh’s testimony:
Mr. Jarabh said that he had traveled from his home in Yemen to Afghanistan to teach the Koran and that his father had financed his trip for him. He said that due to circumstances there, finding a place to teach was difficult so he taught on the go as he traveled from place to place. When asked why he didn’t return home after 9/11 he stated that,
“I couldn’t leave. The borders were closed and the situation was chaotic.”
He denied that he ever received military training and that he only shot with friends for proficiency, with rocks for targets, that he was neither a member of nor knew of any al Quaida members and that there was no way for anyone to know who was or wasn’t al Quaida.
During the course of his testimony, he was made aware of an affidavit by his brother which said that he had traveled to Pakistan to buy honey for the family business, and that to his knowledge his brother had never gone to Afghanstan. He then said he was pressured not to change his original statement and that,
“so…I waited for an opportunity where it would be open, people would ‘
see, people would hear, there would be lawyers…I was waiting for an opportunity
like that to tell my story.
I asked the interrogators before, are these Tribunals going to be open to the
public, are there going to be lawyers, are we going to be able to contact our
families…
When I saw that everything was closed or silenced, so I was just saying the same
story over and over again. But the real story is like I told the Personal
Representative.
He said that after having no success in Afghanistan, he traveled with friends to Pakistan
With the intent to return to Yemen. H was taken by the Pakistanis at the “fifth point” [checkpoint?] He believes that the friends lied to him and turned him over to the Americans.
My comments:
He never specified any personal abuse, although he did indicate that there was “pressure” not to change his original story (that he went to teach the Koran versus a business trip). He expressed fear of being sent to “Romeo Block” without any explanation for that fear.
My .02? I believe him.
*******
BASHIR NAS~ AL-MARWALAH
Documentation:
Coversheet: Prepared by James R. Crisfield, Jr.
Status Review: Concurs and is final
Sufficiency Review: Concurs and is final
Convening Authority Appointment: Yes
CSRT Record of Proceedings: Yes
Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report: Yes
Summary of Tribunal Decision: Yes
Sworn Detainee Statement: Yes
Detainee Election Form: Yes (participates/translator needed)
Recorder Exhibit List: Yes
Summary of Evidence: Yes
Request for Redaction: Yes
PR Review: Yes (no comments)
Summary of case against him:
The detainee voluntarily traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan to receive training at the Al Farouq training and Malek Military Center. After briefly visiting Yemen, he returned to Afghanistan in August, 2001, for additional training. He then went to the frontlines at Bagram before fleeing to Pakistan where he was arrested at a safe house in September, 2002.
There were no witnesses or writings requested.
Summary of Al-Marwalah’s testimony:
Mr. Al-Marwahlah only disputed one portion of the evidence as presented against him. He requested to be sworn in and stated that,
“The statement I moved to the front line and participated in the fight against the Northam
Alliance is not correct”
In his sworn testimony Mr. Al-Marwahlah said that he had traveled to Afghanistan, using his own money, to train for fighting against the Chechnyans and that he was an “Arab fighter.” He described his training as,
“Yes. I attended, but I don’t know if it is considered specialized training. They just
taught me how to walk and sit with a weapon.”
Mr. Al-Marwahlah stated that he didn’t know what al Quaida was and that he never met bin Landen.
“I can swear to you, I am not quite sure what to say. I was not.
fighting, nor did I want to fight Americans. The Americans were very far from where I
was fighting and I am from Yemen. The Americans did not do anything to give me a
reason to fight them.”
My comments:
Mr. Al-Marwahlah admits to traveling to Afghanistan twice, specifically to train to fight. His only dispute with the tribunals conclusions is that he claims he only wanted to fight in Chechnya. Within the available documents there are no claims of abuse or coercion.
Just saw Susan’s post…
My e-mail address is: hfl2001@msn.com
And I am rushing here…I must remember that spellcheck is my friend. 😉
I can’t find my guy (Mamdouh Habib) on the CAFL list or on the cageprisoners.com list although, when I search for him by name on cageprisoners, I find lots of news articles on him. He has been released, but I see other released prisoners on both the lists. Any idea why he isn’t showing up?
I did find the AP FOIA documents for him but, several pages seem to be missing. The summary of the unclassified portion of the tribunal said Documents R1-R5 were presented but only documents R1-R3 are included in the pdf. Should I contact the AP directly or does someone else have a contact there?
Never mind the first question–I was able to find his cageprisoner page by using the advance search feature. I do still need to know what to do about the missing documents from his tribunal.
Didn’t I write you that I’ve written several diaries on him at Daily Kos? You’ll find many, many links there. And good info on his attorney in Chicago, etc.
And a search of him at Google News and/or Yahoo News wiill net you more stories than you’ll ever be able to read.
Yep, I’ve found your diaries plus oodles of news stories about him. I was hoping to see all the documents used during the tribunal (at least the unclassified ones) to see if there was any variation in what they said and what Habib has said. It doesn’t appear that the two missing documents were material to the determination of his status as an enemy combatant but, the fact that they are missing, makes me suspiscious–I’d like to see them for myself.
How interesting. I e-mailed his Chicago attorney once … not on this computer though. I you look him up — I think his name is Joe Margulies — you can find his e-mail address. You might write him and ask him about those missing pages.
I think Margulies does his volunteer work through CCR-NY.org, where you could call or e-mail too. They’ve responded to my e-mails in the past.
to help you with any medical sections, terminology, etc.
katmlee@cox.net
— Kathy Lee is an RN and poli sci lecturer; her husband, who will help too, is a physician
The purpose of this memo is similar to the one from September. The difference is the October memo deals with “security internees“.
A security detainee is a civilian detained pursuant to Article 5 and 78 of the Geneva Conventions.
This memo provides for the use of segregation of detainees, and states that the interrogator “should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the interrogation, including lighting, heating, configuration of the room, food, heating, clothing and shelter.
Sanchez states the policy set forth in this memo supercedes the Sept 14th memo and its policies.
Has Sanchez changed the wording from “enemy prisoners of war” to “security internees”
The Oct. memo has a dozen fewer interrogation approaches than the previous one. It appears Sanchez has removed some of the more questionable tactics, such as the use of dogs and the use of stress positions.
The questions which first leap to my mind are:
1) Were these changes enforced?
2) What led Sanchez to change the allowed procedures?
The term “security internee” should be used throughout the above post, not “security detainee”.
Another difference between this memo and the earlier one, is Sanchez does not indicate any particular technique, save one, requiring a written request and subsequently subject to his approval before use.
The only exception is in the use of segregation consisting of more than 30 days total.
Some of the techniques are vague:
This could be interperted in a variety of ways.
He does mention dogs in the end of the General Safeguard. He instructs that, in the event of their use, they must be muzzled and under the supervision of the handler. In the Sept. memo, dogs were on the list of techniques, not safeguards.
One other thing I find interesting is this last General Safeguard:
emphasis mine
Who’s approval? General Sanchez has already approved everything listed except extended segregation.
Also, three techniques which previously required pre-approval, Incentive Removal, Pride Ego Down, and Mutt and Jeff, are not singled-out in this memo.
While removing, the bottom twelve techniques listed in the Sept memo, Sanchez also removed pre-approval on those three techniques left on the list.
The records in DOD Section 18 consist of 125 pages of handwritten medical records for two (?) patients.
It starts with notes from the 19th of October, 2003 recommending exploratory laparoscopy surgery for an unidentified patient. These records are difficult to interpret as a great deal of the handwriting is almost illegible, as well as the fact that the names (and often position e.g. nurse or surgeon)of the people signing have been covered over . The vast majority is records of things like vital signs and medications given. I’ve added (?) question marks wherever either I was uncertain of what was written, or the informaion is an assumption instead of a solid fact.
Covering Patient #1
Pg 2: Oct. 19/03 Post-op Diagnosis: Shrapnel wounds to abdomen, with sm. bowel and colonic injury. Surgery was done to repair the bowel, as well as an appendectomy.
Pg 4: As part of a nutrition consult, suggestion of possible malnutrition.
Pg 18: Oct. 27/03 Patient released to MP’s (military police?).
Pg 20: Oct 19/03 `Emergency Care and Treatment’ form. It describes him as an “adult male local national of unknown age transferred from FSB at TALIFAR(?) with sustaining injuries in grenade attack. Subject is alleged perpetrator of attack. Arrived in custody of US personnel, will not speak or answer questions.” Patient Identification is shown as “POTUS# (detainee)”.
Pg 74: Oct 19/03 `Preanesthetic Summary’ estimates patients age as 20, weight at 135.
Covering Patient#2
Pg 102: Nov. (?)/05 Next patient records start here (?), on an `Inpatient Treatment Record Cover Sheet’. `Cause of injury’: Gunshot wound. Under `Diagnoses/Operation and Special Procedures’ is listed: Grade III liver lacerations right lobe Total discuption(?) right kidney, T2 Paraplegia (spinal injury?), Left thigh GSW(gun shot wound), Ex legs with nephrectomy(?), Repair Liver lac, Median sternotomy(?)
Pg 105: Oct. 31/03 Refers to surgery. Unreadable.
Pg 106: Oct 23/03 `Chronological Record of Medical Care’ form. “Surgical note: 20’s year old male who attacked fortified patrol(?) sustaining GSW(gun shot wound) to chest and abdomen, L thigh.”
Pg 107: “Condition – critical, survival ?”
Pg 108: 23 Oct/03 “0730: Arrived via ground to [covered up] Mosul, Iraq.”
Pg 109: 23 Oct/03 “3/327 HHC Scouts SPC Hopkins(?), Amari Enemy drove off Interstate. Occupants exited car and begin to fire at Sniper teams located in OP. Snipers returned fire Killing 2, Injuring 1, and 1 enemy escaped.”
Pg 117: 23 Oct/03 `Emergency Care and Treatment’ form for this patient. Very hard to read. `Patient’s Identification’ is listed as `Iraqi Detainee’
Summary: These records cover the medical care in Iraq(?) of two prisoners.
The first, an Iraqi(?) male, age 20(?) was admitted on October 19th, 2003 with non-life threatening injuries sustained in a grenade attack. He was alleged to be the perpetrator of the attack, and was released into military police custody on October 27th, 2003.
The second, an Iraqi(?) male, age 20(?), was admitted, near Mosul (?) on October 23rd, 2003 with critical gunshot wound injuries. The wounds were received in a shoot out with an OP (observation post). It is unclear from this portion of documents if the patient recovered.
Thanks, Maggie. Do you want help from any of the medical experts?
For the moment, I don’t think there is necessarily any urgent need to have someone with medical expertise review them. This would obviously change if these records are able to be linked to a known detainee where there are questions about the injuries they received or how they were treated.
I will get in contact with the person who has the section that follows mine, to try to find out if that portion of the records show the second patient/detainee recovered, or if they died from their injuries. If they died in custody, you might want to have someone with a medical background review that portion.
Unfortunately, I won’t likely be able to do much more until later in the week.
Maggie
Patient 1‘s files. It indicates he was born 01/01/1964; was admitted on 2/19/04; and was transferred — doesn’t say where he was transferred from.
Yes. Same guy in sec. 19 Maggie. He was on Vasopressin. (Vasopressin may have a place in the management of patients with life-threatening intra-abdominal haemorrhage but its use should be confined to those patients in whom conventional therapy has failed.)
Interesting bit Page 22 (10-26-’03) PT(patient) had many questions re: surgery & explained that he was trying to get “revenge b/c an American soldier ruined his eye”.
On page 30 (10-27-’03) it’s noted that patient speaks English well. (he) asked when he may be able to eat or drink H2o. Explained DLT (D/T ?) surgery may have to wait 1 to 2 days more
Page 36 (10-28-’03) Patient questioned about use of his legs again.
Asked if it was forever that he won’t be able to use them.
(The patient seemed to be paralyzed from the umbilicus (waist?) down.)
Page 73 (11-03-03) Patient clothes put on (redacted) signed out to M.P. discharge instructions given to M.P> about medications dressing ?, braces, paralysis.
Extra supplies given to patient and M.P.
Page 109 (bottom note) For DCCS. Called to let the DCCS know that the paperwork for the patient that got hit in the back and is paralysed will be ready tomorrow. He should also be EVAC out of here tomorrow (They are working on a C-130 )
(He seemed to have had good Medical care)
Summary of Combatant Status Review Tribunal.
http://www.cageprisoners.com/downloads/abdalazizalshammeri.pdf
Page 9. Unclassified Summary of Basis for Decision
#2a. Synopsis of Proceedings, Called no witnesses,or submitted any documents
Made oral, sworn and written statements.
b.Detainees Written statement.
He traveled to Afghanistan in 10/01 to teach (he holds a degree in Islamic law) and help the needy. He left after the collapse of the Taliban ,and the Northern Alliance entered his area, and was told they (N.A.) would kill any Arab, leaving behind all documents. (which anyone could have found and altered).
He was arrested by the Pakistan Army for not having any ID while crossing over to Pakistan.
Handed over to U.S.
P.10 5a.Discussion of Unclassified Evidence
5a3 Questions for his Family
P.13-14 Unsworn statement
P.14-19 Sworn statement
P19-26 Question by Tribunal President
P.28 3a. Why he was found to be member of al Qaeda
1 He Traveled to Afghanistan soon after9/11
2 Was arrested without identification documents.
3 One of the detainees known aliases(he had no id when arrested,how did they know what aliases he used) was on a list of captured hard drives associated with a senior al Qaeda member. (he was being held before these were found)
P.32-33 Questions to Family
P.36-62 Fax of Complaint to Us. Asst. Att.
has anyone come across any statements, in the FOIA docs,
that detainees were sold by members of pakistan military
or afghan warlords to u.s. special forces?
i have one that claims evidence against him was fabricated by pakistan soldiers.
So I’m not sure how big of a bombshell this is (I vaguely remember it being covered in the RWCM somewhere???), but my section (Section 1 of the DOD stuff) confirms that a detainee was in fact murdered in Iraq.
Here’s the bombshell: The soldier that committed the murder was not prosecuted/court martialed. Instead he was demoted to E-1 (the lowest enlisted rank) and discharged. Since when are we discharging people for MURDER?
In my post below there is a link to an ACLU article that mentions special forces soldiers getting away with murder. It seems to be a different case than the one you are working on. So, unfortunately, the case you mention doesn’t seem unique.
Check out this AP article Prisoner Deaths in U.S. Custody.
It is just a list, but it gives you a rough idea how many prisoners have died in US custody. It looks as if some 23 or so have been murdered, with an addition number the victims of “justifiable homicide”. One case I’m looking at is a justifiable homicide where the guy was shot during a fire fight in Falluja (the classification seems to fit in that case).
I realize that there have been other deaths, but there’s a difference between DEATHS from heat stroke/starvation/neglect/etc and being SHOT by a soldier.
I’m with you. The list mentions up to 23 MURDERS of prisoners, and many more other deaths. That is a lot of murders, and America should be up in arms about this.
about to debate the AI report vs. Bush’s comment that it’s “absurd.”
That’s on MSNBC, you disassemblers.
should take a break from all your hard work and head over for some mojo.
Thanks for the buzz-over!
Hee …
I am looking at a number of files that are part of Army CID, Navy CIS and Army Compensation Claims.
Below is a brief description of the first file.
Is there any way to find out what happened to this case once it ended up in SOTF’s hands?
It is clear that SOTF (Security Operations Training Facility) at Fort Bragg, and in particular a few specific Task Force (TF) groups there, are deeply implicated in torture, and probably its coverup. In the file above, an Army CID (Criminal Investigation Division) investigation of an incident of torture at the Baghdad International Airport in May of 2004 was passed off from CID to SOTF because the person under investigation was part of TF 6-26. It would appear, then, that Special Forces personnel suspected of torture ended up being investigated by Special Forces personnel.
In any event, the termination of the investigation fits a pattern of covering up abuses committed by several Task Forces, including TF 6-26. For example, see the ACLU story Newly Released Investigative Files Provide Further Evidence Soldiers Not Held Accountable for Abuse, January 24, 2005. Here is an excerpt:
I have a more detailed report on my computer, but decided to spare you all the trivial details. Short report = nothing too damning in here.
These are all Documents related to the Court Martial of The United States vs. Ambuhl, held in Mannheim, Germany
8/23/04 Proceedings (Pages 1 – 6): These mostly deal with technical matters
8/25/04 Proceedings (Pages 6 – 82): More technical wrangling regarding access to experts (the defense wants Dr. Craig Haney of the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment), access to documents, and whether these documents can be declassified. Some of these documents sound interesting (a logbook of prisoner movements and medical treatment, individual interrogation plans for various prisoners, a missing hard drive) but no details are mentioned.
Appellate Exhibits for above proceedings (Pages 82 – 150): The highlight of these is the 5/1/04 Article 32 Transcript (Pages 101 – 119), which I’m guessing exists somewhere else, too, but oh well. Contains three semi-interesting witness testimony transcripts:
* (Pages 101 – 107): One testifying sergeant discusses interrogation methods that were authorized at Abu Ghraib (playing loud music, altering diets and sleep patterns, driving prisoners around in the back of a truck, using dogs for intimidation, pouring water on them). He/she gives some second-hand testimony about some abuses (nudity, forcing prisoners to wear women’s panties, overly aggressive interrogation). Memorable quote: “It was confusing the way the place was run. It was an important mission run by Reservists who did not know what they were doing. They were just on their own. It was a shocking experience.” He/she also mentions civilian interrogators who were not under anyone’s authority.
* (Pages 107 – 112): An Interrogations Technician discusses approved and non-approved interrogation techniques. He/she seems to bolster the government assertion that the abuses were the work of a few bad apples: “That type of interrogation `plan’ would not have made it to General Sanchez for approval. It would not have made it past me.” “All of these acts would be criminal offenses. If I were ordered to do these acts, I would not carry them out. Embarrassment as a technique would be contradictory to achieving results.” Also interesting is the inexpert redaction, which leads to the disclosure of the names of the Government Counsel, or prosecutor (Captain McCabe), Investigating Officer, or judge (Major Ransome), and Defence Counsel (Mr. Volzer).
* (Pages 112 – 119): Testimony of a CID (which I’m thinking is Combat Intelligence Division) officer who received the photos documenting the abuses at Abu Ghraib. He/she describes the initial investigation as they tried to ferret out who was doing the abusing. It seems that it was primarily the night shift who would wait until the daytime commanding officer would leave before starting their shenanigans.
Another file that is part of Army CID, Navy CIS and Army Compensation Claims.
This appears to be a straightforward case. Mr. Sudhail was involved in an attack on US forces, was shot, and subsequently died. Sounds justified to me.
I have only one question: is it unusual that he died of “peritonitis as a consequence of a gunshot wound to the abdomen” 3-1/2 weeks after being shot?
in myhumble analysis of this, I would say depends on the type of medical care given. how it was given and how long it was given and what was done in said care and for why did they do/ do not give said care.
So, if you have ANY questions about your docs — beyond the acronyms and definitions, even to how the military proceedings work, and what should happen during military proceedings, etc., etc. — please contact Robert at rmeisterkos @ sbcglobal.net
Susan just put me in charge of doing a DKospedia Howto, basically because I was dumb enough to open my mouth.
I’ll try to have something together by the weekend.
consists of medical records.
The first 30 pages are the continuation of patient recordes from Section 16 (I’ve forwarded them to the relevant person).
The bulk of the pages record the medical treatment of what I’ll call Patient 1: an Afghani female with one gunshot wound to the head and two to the the right leg.
The records document what seems to be appropriate treatment of all wounds, including neurosurgery to remove metal and bone fragments. The femur was debrided and realignment.
The patient was brought in for treatment after release because of pain arising from the leg injury.
Date injuries received: 9 October 2003. First treated at Shkin (local hospital) from 10/10 – 10/12. From there, patient was transferred to the forward surgical team in Salerno, and then to BAF hospital in Khost, Kuwait (for neurosurgery)
Patient 2
25 year old Muslim male (nationality unknown). Dressing for gunshot wound changed. 12/18/03. Wound may have required further surgery, but it’s referred to as “outpatient” surgery.
Patient 3
40-year-old Muslim male (nationality unknown). Treated for infection of “stump wound.” 12/18/03. Treatment continued until 3/18/04 whereupon patient was released with instructions to follow-up with the orthopedic clinic.
For patients 2 and 3, it’s unclear where treatment took place.
Need to delete the sentence about Patient 1 being brought in for further treatment re: leg injury. (Misread the files originally due to the fact that both suffered from an injury to the femur).
If you need help with medical terms, we’ve got four medical experts to help you.
And, if it’s too daunting, they can take those documents + you can take other non-medical documents. (Several people have had me switch them off medical docs and on to other non-medical docs.)
and more the level of detail — how much do you want/need?
There’s a wealth of detail about patient 1 including doctor’s notes, nurse’s notes, EEGs, etc. Do you want the basics, or do you need more?
I’d share this with one of the medical experts, and let them help you decide what is important to include.
I have a way to go before finishing my section. I ran across something I thought was interesting so I will post it.
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/032505/981_1080.pdf
page 1014-1020 mp training guidance May 11-14, 2004 sections of (apparently) ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE [prepared by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba]
People Involved: unknown, Antonio M Taguba (excerpters from his report), Bruns, Julian H. MG -DCS G-3/5/7, General Helmly (quote from),
Synopsis: The training procedures are using recommendations from Gen. Antonio M. Taguba’s report. General Helmly is quoted “I believe that all members of this unit had the requisite training to ensure that they were aware of and competent in the task needed to secure enemy prisoners of war, and to ensure that they were aware of the requirement for humane treatment of prisoners Gen. Helmly said. The army also has said that all soldiers, regardless of job assignments, learn about the Geneva Conventions prohibiting mistreatment of prisoners of war and others.” This will be contradicted later. Unknown sends a message with several excerpts from Gen. Antionio M. Taguba’s report (see http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/iraqis_tortured/taguba_report.htm for full report) detailing numerous problems at the Abu Ghraib Prison, including lack of training in MP procedures and Geneva conventions, lack of enough military personnel to supervise the prison, poor conditions for both prisoners and guards… “I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had received no training in detention/internee operations. I also find that very little instruction or training was provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Fm 27-10, AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40. Moreover I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees.” The report goes on to state that “I found no evidence that the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever requested specific correction training from…” any US Military police facility. p 1015-1018 contain the excerpts.
List of publications referenced: 31E TSP List.ppt
(emphasis mine)
kandj at sentex dot net
There are two detainees in this report.
One with an injured wrist, further exacerbated by 14 days of blindfolded in a small confinement and flexi-cuffed. It appears this is the prisoner who had 13 seperate disciplinary reports filed agaisnt him. This is also the detainee who gave the interview on 05Aug04. Alleged abuses occurred at KCFB.
The second detainee appears to have been released on 07Jul04 in his home town of Khowst. He is believed to be a high ranking member in anti-coalition forces in the area and contact with has been considered dangerous. This detainee apparently suffered a laceration to his skull during an escape attempt, from the butt of a gun, which required 14 stitches.
The report states the identity of the accused is unknown: “the Other Coalition Forces, who captured him, could not be interviewed due to their indentification not being known based on their operational sensitivity.”
The report states an interview with the released detainee is not possible: ” was not able to be interviewed, because he was considered an anti-coalition forces, high level operative and was suspected to be currently living in a high threat area of Afghanistan.”
These two factors make it difficult to corroberate the allegations against the unknown member of the coalition forces.
The only statement is from an interview with the first detainee 05Aug04. The detainee only wants the US to fix his hand
On 29Jul04 the investigation was initiated upon receiving information from the Detainee Assessment Task Force who had received a report regarding an International Red Cross visit between 05-08Jul04.
This is a quick synopsis. I will post more to this post later if I find anything important.
The one question I have currently is why did they release the second detainee if he was a high-level anti-coalition operative?
He was released on the 7th of July in Khowst. The Red Cross was at Bagram between the 5th and the 8th. I don’t know if that means anything.
This is a report regarding an alleged incident at Abu Ghraib prison. It involves one detainee and one unknown subject. The date of the detainee’s capture is unknown. The charges are Assault and Cruelty and Maltreatment. Both the detainee and the subjects identities are exempted.
Several conflicting stories have been reported by the detainee regarding this incident. If there was an act of abuse, it looks like it was an employee of CACI
The investigation was initiated upon a Request for Assistance for the 78th Military Detachment regarding case # 0219-04-CID259-80253. The initial information from the Red Cross was the detainee had been cuffed from 15Mar to 25Mar 04 at some time for a period of 8 hours which harmed his wrist
The detainee denies this charge by the IRC, but alleges this other one of being shoved. The investigator in this email says due to communication/ translation problems this could be the same incident(pg 74)
From what I can tell, the circumstances were as follows:
The detainee claims no other incidents of abuse. On an unknown day in earlier May, a SGT had noticed a large lump on the detainee’s wrist and asked the detainee how that happened.
The detainee said he had been alone in the interrogation room and someone, a younger male by the tone of his voice, had come in and yelled at him and then shoved him hard, and the shove had jerked his wrist in the cuffs. The detainee was crying as he told the story. (pg 11)(pg 40)
The SGT claims the detainee was splinted and sent to the BCCF hospital.
The detainee corroborates that he was taken to a hospital. It may be reasonable to assume this interpreter did not notice his hand until after the hospital trip. It appears a different interpreter was in the room the day the detainee spoke of his injury.
There are no records of the hospital trip.
The SGT filed the original abuse report with the interrogation records of this detainee.
The detainee claims he had been interrogated between 40 and 50 times and this incident had occurred on roughly the 20th interrogation.
It appears those involved in the interrogation process were an SGT (maybe two), an SPC, an interpreter from Titan Corporation, and an analysist from CACI.
The interpreter says the detainee had given two stories, one that he had fallen on it, one that he had been shoved while shackled. She says she had never seen an interrogator use force.(pg 10)
The interpreter noticed his hand was bandaged. This is when she asked what had happened. Interpreter also says the interrogator always had the same analyst. (pg 14)
Now, for some reason a SGT reports an unrelated incident of leaving for a few minutes and coming back and seeing a guard leaving the interrogation room where the detainee was being held.
The guard tells the SGT he was checking on the detainee. The SGT goes into the room and the detainee is laying on the floor. Guard says he was sitting up just moments earlier. Detainee says he was trying to lay down, find a comfortable position. The detainee was not blindfolded on this incident, so… this is not the incident in question.
Subsequent pages are interviews by an SA. What stands out is he keeps asking if the analyst from CACI was ever alone in the room with the detainee. The answer was no. These interviews were in October 28-9th, 2004.
On page 31 is this from Aug 13th:
On page 41 is this in the Agent’s Investigation Report:
In a sworn statement, the interrogator names [redacted] as the CACI analyst, who at the time of the statement (05AUG04) was on leave. The interrogator did not see the analyst or anyone else back into the room. (pg 43-4)
Here are some more emails leading up to suspicion of the CACI employee:
July 17 (pg 78)
read this carefully. This is reference the email [redacted] just sent. 16th MP BDE already refuted on the allegations, so initial final it if the detainee is already released. If the detainee is the one we have in custody, have [redacted] interrogate him for lying.
From [redacted] July 29 (pg 70):
Aug 4th (pg 66)
What I can’t find out is why the SA believed, and others believed the CACI analyst was responsible, and then later, everyone interviewed claims they didn’t see anything.
This fellow is a Saudi. He was found in Tora Bora where he had been wounded and hiding in a bunker by Afghanis. They gave him to the Americans. There was a statement attributed to him as saying he went to Afghanistan to get military training and fled to Tora Bora when it became clear the Americans were going to retaliate. In the little bit of documentation they had they didn’t say where Abdul was when the statement was extracted. At the tribunal Abdul had a “personal representative” who did not seem to act as an attorney. The “personal representative” assured the court that the interpreter had the right dialect but that Abdul had refused to speak to the tribunal and thusly called no witnesses nor produced any docs. From the paucity of docs I concluded that they were very happy Abdul stayed silent and unlike a true court of law did not appoint someone to take over his defense. If possible it would be nice to do another FOIA and find out where and how his so-called statement was developed and why he wasn’t appointed an attorney to represent him.
Have you signed up for CagePrisoners.org ‘s newsletter? This is one of the article I got in the latest newsletter, and it’s chock full of FOIA legal doc references that we might find useful:
by Emily Bazelon, Phillip Carter, and Dahlia Lithwick
This series provides the facts and law to illuminate and add depth to the torture debate–not to persuade you to support or oppose it, but to help you formulate your own views on where the acceptable boundaries may lie. We’ve tried to separate facts from analysis, using principally the primary documents made available through government reports, leaks, or Freedom of Information Act requests. The aim is to inform the national conversation about the way America acts in the war against terror.
Note: I’ve quoted Bazelon’s Mother Jones article several times in my DKos diaries on torture … I don’t have the link handy, but you can find it easily enough by searching http://www.dailykos.com diaries.
This is my first post. Glad to be here, hope I can help.
(I’m afraid I haven’t worked out embedding links yet, but I wanted to get this info up.)
Defense Department Documents, 02/16/05
– CID Report of Investigation (into torture), Part 1, 10/15/04 http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/021605/5895_5923.pdf + Part 2, 10/15/04 http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/021605/5924_6021.pdf
– CID Report of Investigation (into torture), 10/15/04
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/021605/6022_6039.pdf
I’ve given these three documents a preliminary going-over; the capsule descriptions provided on the parent page are essentially accurate, as far as they go.
These PDFs contain scans of the contents of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division case files regarding two Iraqi detainees who were held at the Abu Ghraib prison complex.
The first two files concern a man from Tikrit who claimed he had been beaten, choked with a rope and subjected to a mock execution during interrogation by Americans in civilian clothes. The investigation seems to have been closed once, then reopened. The first file totals 29 scanned pages, the second 98. All names have been redacted. There are sections identified as foreign language documents that have been left out. These appear to be the subject’s statements; there are English translations that seem to correspond to the omissions. I will provide a more detailed inventory of the documents when I have more time; what’s here looks complete enough to construct a fairly robust narrative of the incident(s?), which occurred in September 2003, and the subsequent events. There are mentions of possible involvement by a “Task Force 20,” which may or may not be significant. The case was closed in September 2004 with the determination by a Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Hood, Texas, that the offenses of Aggravated Assault and Mistreatment of a Prisoner were “Unfounded.” There’s a story here, I think.
The third file concerns a detainee at Abu Ghraib who died in custody, apparently of a cardiac arrest. Witness statements indicate that he turned blue and fell over. His name was Raidh Mohammad Abd Al Razak, and the records indicate that he was being treated for cardiac disease. The autopsy report lists cause of death as “natural”. The file includes 18 scanned pages, and names other than the deceased have been redacted. Investigation of the scene of death was impractical due to several hundred extremely angry detainees. There didn’t seem to be any indication of the reason Abd Al Razak was being held, but no overt abuse led to his death. (You know, other than being locked up…)
I’ll try to get a bit deeper into the first two files over the weekend; this report is based on a couple of hours skimming and scanning last night.
All suggestions, comments, and directions are welcome.
Great work so far, Chas.
Feel free to contact our medical experts (see FOIA diary) re his heart condition.
Also feel free to contact our military expert, Robert:
rmeisterkos @ sbcglobal.net
Hi, Susan, I’ve completed my review of:
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/032505/index.html (section 4)
I’ve made these notes:
1)The 60 minutes broadcast of 5/4/04 gave rise to changes by FORSCOM to have specific training on the Law of War, Geneva and Hague conventions, and reporting violations of the Law of War.
2)An investigation into alleged incidents of detainment problems revealed that necessary forms to be provided at the time of detainment are showing up 24 to 48 hours later. Until these are received, there is no way of knowing why the individual was detained and no meaningful inquiry can begin. (coalition provisional authority form and 04137) Apparently the “jail” has filled out forms but obviously without firsthand knowledge.
3)Detainees may can spend unnecessary time being detained for this and because investigation of the detainee is not timely made. (maybe too many to deal with?) Detainees are not told why they are being detained and apparently a fair number are in the “wrong place at the wrong time.”
4)Loss of personal property of detainees was a problem and has apparently been addressed.
5)There has apparently been a problem with shooting individuals that have run from task force members (and for no other reason other than running.) Some reports deny this problem and at least two confirm the practice and a tacit understanding of it.
If more detail is needed, please let me know. Thanks.
Hi, Boran! I’ve got Section Five.
I’ve only had the time to read four of the hundred pages, but I’ve already noticed that the Army’s redactors did a (luckily for us) really shitty job!
On the first page of my section (page 1181 of
the release), the form mentions a prisoner whose jaw was broken, but the prisoner’s name is blacked out. But guess what? On the very next page, his name – Salah Salih Jassim – was left alone and unredacted!
Jassim’s case is already well documented in the world press. In 2003, Salah Salih Jassim was a twenty-year-old Iraqi man from Mosul who was not charged with any crime, but arrested along with his father, who was an officer in Saddam Hussein’s Fedayeen Army. News of Jassim’s maltreatment prompted a probe of conditions at the Mosul prison where he was held.
~ Cross-posted from Abbreviations thread ~
What an hell, lies and lawlessness!
IMO PT means Physical Threat
Used once on document 1179.
As an officer, this guy is ignorant of any interrogation techniques and the Geneva Conventions. The SJA who made recommendation, isn’t worth much, keeps status quo of rules used.
“If there would have been an interview, detainee would have been released.”
doc. 1177
BHA – Brigade Holding Areas from Nov. 9 thru Dec. 18, 2003 Sr. HUMINT Tech in charge of cage and senior interrogator, supervises all personnel.
Since 9-11 NOV, it became a ZY Ops facility as it is now [..] Sr. HUMINT Tech. [..] NCOIC [..]
They’ve moved to strike [illegible] Additionally 2 cat.2 linguists work there under my supervision.
Speaks of “Chief” any idea who it is he/she refers to?
What PT guidance did you tell the guards?
Tell me about SOP? 9-11 NOV Chief made a SOP all the guards signed.
Did the guards change? Yes all guards were briefed 2x by my ISG and I think all, including the ones for Reindeer Games signed off.
doc. 1180-1181
First interrogation I ever saw was around July 2003.
Rules changed Dec. 10, 2003 – eliminated PT – at the time MPs too over. I am not in charge of the cage any more.
Who suggested those changes? The PMO as far as I know.
Oui – Liberté – Egalité – Fraternité
It means “Physical Training”–exercises. This is as standard an army abbreviation as you can get.
Hwoever, elsewhere we discover that the detainees were forced to do PT until they suffered from muscle exhaustion, which is a form of torture.
That makes sense, Phillies. I’ve read in news accounts of this case that the broken jaw was blamed on excessive exercise — which to me sounds suspiciously like PT-as-torture.
this is my report on Emad Abdalla Hassan. do not know if I am at the right place for all of this or not.
Susan,
Sorry it took me so long to get back to you on my prisoner. I have read this profile twice and can not find one damaging piece of evidence that would keep him in Gitmo.
It is very interesting tho, he did not have legal representation and he spoke on his own behalf. He quite frankly in his interview with the tribunal had lost track of his imprisonment in length of time..ie years of how long he had been there.
He is Yemeni and was a student at a university in Pakistan and was arrested there, along with others, which he described as such as a dorm [house]for the students, sent to Afghanistan and from there to Gitmo. He had his passport taken away from him and he only knew that his stamped official verification was there.
To the best of my ability in reading what I have, it is not indicative to this man being there even for one day let alone 2 and 1/2 years or longer so the transcript said. It did not go into the interrogation methods but did say he was interrogated over many times and he gave the same answer to them [the interrogators]. I recall that the FBI was doing some of the interrogation. They were instrumental to his arrest and bringing he to Gitmo, if I understood the papers correctly. The evidence is just not there for him to be held, if what I have is all there is to get to read. Seems fishy to me…he is not guilty of anything, in what I have read. Actually when he was arrested in Pakistan, he said he was told that this would all be cleared up and he would be let go. Now some three years later, he is till in prison. He had a verified letter from his brother in Yemen testifying to his being who he said he was and why he was in Pakistan.
Oh yes, the tribunal asked him if he had any fighting credentials. He said that he wore sheathed knives, I think he implied and the only gun he knew how to shoot was a pistol and that this was nomenclature in his country. He was asked if he learned any thing from Al Quaida or fought with them and he denied any of this. He kept stipulating he was one day in his house in Pakistan as a student and arrested with others, and that he was innocent of any of the presented charges on him.
Some of this is very hard to get time line and authority on with the redactments of names etc.
So that is my synopsis of this young man. I hope I have done a fair enough job for you on this one.
Thanks and, if I can help further let me know.
Jarallah al Marri
In his summarized detainee statement the tribunal president asked if Jarallah had any questions about the process. He answered yes. He then said he would proceed to speak in arabic because his english was not good. He asked if the tribunal followed the laws of the US. He was told yes. He then said he did not understand of know about the laws and he would require an attorney, and would have nothing to say.
The personal representative offered that he had met with Jarallah for an interview, and took some notes. At that time, Jarallah was going to speak on his own behalf. Now, the representative asked the tribunal what Jarallah’s wishes were in regard to the notes. Should he read them? When asked Jarallah replied ‘no comment’, as he had replied to everything asked him after he requested a lawyer. Then, the representative says ‘I would be asking for some guidance on this. He said he does not want me to say them, but I am not sure what I should do, because I have them written here.’ Tribunal president replies ‘its up to you’. [Note: As noted in the transcript above, the detainee did not say ‘don’t present my statements’. He only said, “No comment”.
Jarallah is a Qatar citizen who traveled to Afghanistan through Pakistan to participate in the Jihad. He met people in Mecca who brought him to Afghanistan. He fled the camp owned by Usama bin Laden after 9/11 because the American’s were going to bomb the camp. When he was arrested at the Pakistan border by the Pakistani polices, he was alone. From Kandahar to Pakistan, he took a taxi, which he paid for. He had all his paperwork and passports.
The tribunal finds the classified evidence overwhelming that the detainee is an enemy combatant…
having read through this mans’ file I feel completely incompetent at providing any assistance, or maybe its depression?
The document I reviewed can be found here:
Link
The title of the document is
“Memorandum for Record–Report of Violations of the Geneva Conventions and the International Laws of Land Warfare”
Date: 10 June 2004
This report is from a Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Officer. I was not aware that DIA had an operational arm beyond the regular triservice intelligence commands.
The officer was employed as a civilian, i.e. he was not a currently serving military member. He relates that he saw a US Army interrogator and several non-interrogator personnel assault a prisoner. The interrogator was from 1st SF group, which makes him a member of Army Special Forces, colloquially known as the Green Berets.
He was then kicked out of the room by an NCO.
On another occasion he reports that a man arrested by the Task Force 6-26 told him he was slapped around during interrogation. However, the DIA officer did not witness the acts.
The final account was of a raid on a suspected terrorist in Tarmiya Iraq.
The same NCO that the agent identified in the first incident is also a player in the final incident. Agent refers to him as “XO3.” The report does not explicitly state whether the TF ever caught target, but it sounds like target was not present on the day of the raid. Agent objected to the TF detaining the wife of the target terrorist, because he screened her at the house and determined she could not help find target. 2 days late, the wife was released.
From the sound of the report, Agent was very concerned with what he had witnessed in Iraq. He felt that the mistreatment of detainees reflected poorly on the “DHS collector” and the DIA. I assume the DHS collector refers to Agent, but I don’t know, since I am not sure what “DHS” stands for.
I think it is important for us to remember that there are principled people working in the military and Department of Defense.
Detainee: Jamal Muhammad Alawi Mar’I, 34
Birth Place: Khochna Village, Yemen
Status:
– Captured on September 23, 2001
– Was detained in Pakistan, extradited to Jordan, and then sent to Guantanamo
– Meets criteria for designation as enemy combatant
– Decission was unanimously made by combatant status review tribunal
– Tribunal was composed of:
* 1 Colonel, US Army
* 1 Commander, US Navy
* 1 Lieutenant Colonel, US Marine
– Jamal has not been heard from by his family members since November, 2003
Case against Jamal:
– Detainee admitted to traveling to Kandahar, Afghanistan in May 2001 to work in the Al-Wafa organization as director of Karachi, Pakistan branch.
– Worked for Al Haramayn, Jamal states that his duties were strictly humanitarian
– Members of Al-Wafa are not allowed in US, On 5/21/04 Al-Wafa was added to Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) created under the Patriot Act.
– Information relating to weapons, tactics and explosives (IRWTE) was found at the time of his capture.
– The IRWTE was retracted from the released record by the FBI for reasons of national security.
Jamal’s statement at tribunal hearing:
– Denied working for Al-Wafa or being involved with Al Qaeda or the Taliban.
– Indicated he was responsible for finding medical supplies in Pakistan and arranging for their distribution through Al-Wafa Humanitarian Organization.
– Indicated that he has not been paid by Al-Wafa, but was paid by Al Haramayn.
– His duties were limited to buying medicine from Hospitals.
– Indicated that he was not the director of Al-Wafa branch, the director had made him a representative until the director’s return.
– Indicated Al Haramayn is a government agency, He asked “How can it be classified as an NGO if the person in charged is the Minister of the Muslim Association?”
– Indicated that his reason for traveling to Afghanistan was to find work, and to bring his family to Afghanistan.
– Stated that there is no office for Al-Wafa in Pakistan, and the people who were there before his visit were doing the same duties during his visit as they had been doing all along, so how could he be the director?
– Stated that he has never heard of Al-Wafa as being connected with Al-Qaeda.
– Indicated that he was captured in a raid on his home.
– States that he had $13,000 in his possession to bring his family to Pakistan, and that the IRTWE were manufactured by the Pakistanis so that they could gain control of his assets.
Documents Retracted From Record:
– Classified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision
– Copies of Documentary Evidence Presented (IRWTE included)
Jamal’s Brother’s Affidavit:
– Jamal has no idea why he is being detained.
– Jamal called once or twice per month from Guantanamo until November, 2003.
– Jamal was known and respected in his community.
– Jamal was trying to set up a medical distribution organization, so he traveled to Afghanistan to find out how Al-Wafa handles their distribution operation.
Findings:
– The record clearly states that individuals providing support to or associated with TELs may be found inadmissible to US or if already in the US, under certain circumstances may be deported.
– Being involved with LETs is not grounds for indefinite detainment, only deportation from US.
– It is stated in the record that “The FBI certified that the redacted information would not support a determination that the detainee is not an enemy combatant.” However, just because it doesn’t support a determination that the detainee is not an enemy combatant does not mean that the information supports the determination that he is an enemy combatant. This statement, couple with the document’s retraction, this document being the only hard piece of evidence against Jamal, raises a lot of questions regarding the legitimacy of his detention.
– Without having critical pieces of information present, it is hard to come to an informed conclusion regarding the guilt or innocence of Jamal.