“Diplomacy [is] the art of restraining power,” said Henry Kissinger. Think what you will of him, that’s not a bad quote.
His words seem to describe what terrorism expert Evan Kohlmann conveyed to Keith Olbermann on MSNBC last evening, about the tricky cost/risk assessments involving a capture of Osama bin Laden. Manno a manno:
Why the nice-nice on this?
Below, why the “nice-nice”:
We have a government that’s really the best of a bad lot. Pervez Musharraf has shown himself to be a member of the war on terror and a part of the war on terror, but not necessarily an extremely committed member of that alliance. He’s, you know, been responsible for the arrests of various operatives, including most recently Abu Faraj al-Libbi in Pakistan. Certainly Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s arrest ranks up there.
But fact that these man are choosing to operate inside of Pakistan alone should be an indication of something. If you look, the most significant al Qaeda arrests that we’ve had in the last three years have all been inside Pakistan. And in many cases, we’re not even talking about the Pakistani-Afghani border. We’re talking about cities in central Pakistan, like Lahore and Karachi.
Look, the problem is, is this. If we go after this too aggressively, if we send in U.S. special forces into Pakistan, we endanger causing an Islamic revolution there, in a country that already is known to have atomic weapons. And that could be even potentially a worse situation than we have now. Imagine a nuclear-armed Pakistan run by a government extremely sympathetic to that of Osama bin Laden. It’s a problem.
Then, Kohlman deftly denudes the theories of Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) and his new, inflammatory book (“Countdown to Terror: The Top-Secret Information that Could Prevent the Next Terrorist Attack on America . . . and How the CIA Has Ignored It”) that he’s hawking on any show that’ll have him:
Is there some worse dimension to it?
KOHLMANN: Well, there’s been a lot of suggestion lately about Iran. In fact, someone even wrote a book suggesting that Iran right now is currently harboring Osama bin Laden. I really think that’s mostly just speculation, and unfounded speculation.
Everything we have, including intercepts of al Qaeda operatives, including messengers, mules that we’ve picked up carrying messages from Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, all of these individuals are being picked up along the Pakistani-Afghani border region, in Waziristan and Baluchistan.
So unless these guys are taking first-class trips from their mules from Iran into Afghanistan, and that’s where they’re being captured, or the reality simply is that that’s where these guys are.
This is where the cerebrum of al Qaeda remains. And if we want to take real action against it, if we really want to destroy the network, it’s inside of Pakistan, where some of the most valuable answers that we can find still are.
OLBERMANN: And politically, we have to let them, essentially, do it for us.
KOHLMANN: Well, if we want to be careful.
If we want to be careful.
Makes sense to me. How about you?
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P.S. Kohlmann’s firm, Global Terror Alert came out today with a study of the national/geographic make-up of foreign insurgents in Iraq:
Which is that Musharraf has been aggressively undermining the SECULAR opposition parties in Pakistan and letting the Intelligence Service help build up the Islamic Parties.
Take this quote from an Asia Times article from 2003 discussing the elections in Pakistan:
The MMA is the alliance of Islamist parties that are as radical as Bin Laden. The PPPP (led by Benazir Bhutto) and PML-N are both strong secular parties. Prior to Musharraf’s little games with the electoral rules and his handling of the war on terror, the MMA crowd never got more than 5% of the vote. Now they’re a major block in Parliament.
The analysis by Kohlmann is correct, except for noting that Musharraf created the situation where the choice is between him and the Islamists. His tactics force the U.S. to choose between supporting his dictatorship (and it’s weak record against Al-Qaeda) or trying to back a secular opposition that can’t hope to win against the combined power of the ISI and the Islamists.
It is also important to note that the ISI helped create most of the Islamic militants during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, that the ISI was backing the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan, and that the ISI used Islamic militants to carry out a proxy war in Indian controlled Kashmir.
My own belief is that the current course in Pakistan is a slow slide towards a radical Islamic state that will be nuclear armed. The more the secular opposition is shut down by Musharraf, the better the Islamists will do. Eventually, they will demand power and enough people in the ISI will decide that they can work with the Islamists that they created.
I sent your reply to Kohlmann in the hope he may respond to you.
But, what choice is there in Pakistan except a dictatorship or an Islamic state?
Maybe by helping along the fundies, M. is hoping to keep them in check and not too restless?
(And I’ve been wondering if the rise of Muslim fundamentalism is actually helpful to the Neocon agenda .. all their token talk about democracy aside. A repressed, religiously bound people are more malleable, aren’t they, than free, thinking people?)
between the Islamists and the Pakistani Intelligence Services. It’s all tied up in the history of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The ISI and the Islamists made each other successful and they still need each other.
The U.S. sends in CIA operatives, some money, and lots of equipment. The U.S. also backs Pakistan’s dictator at the time, Zia Ul-Haq. The Pakistani ISI does most of the running of the operations, managing the Afghan camps on their side of the border, providing training, and helping direct the other money coming in. The Saudis, in particular, send tons of money to Pakistan to finance the fighters AND MORE IMPORTANTLY TO SET UP MADRASSAS. For the last 25 years, the Saudi and Pakistani pieces of this operation have been grinding along changing the nature of Pakistan.
Fareed Zakaria had a great article in Newsweek right after 9/11 where he talked about the change in Islam in South Asia:
Pakistan was at the center of this religious battle. General Zia, as Pakistan’s dictator, needed a new source of support that he wouldn’t get from secular elites. The Saudis meanwhile had a bunch of religious zealots who despised the decadent ways of the royal family. The House of Saud cut a deal – you leave us alone at home and we’ll help you spread your version Islam across the world. And so the money flowed and the madrassas spewing hate blossomed.
Musharraf and the ISI crowd think that they can control the monster they’ve helped to create. The problem comes when younger ISI officers decide to drink the Kool Aid that the Islamists are offering. When that happens, they can help them seize power – and they may ALREADY be providing cover for Al-Qaeda from the inside.
To the extent that there is a real choice, we need to help the moderates and secular people in the Islamic world take their countries back. Pressure Musharraf to cut a deal with the secular parties. Push Musharraf to fund more SECULAR schools and stop cutting deals with the MMA. Maybe it’s too late to reverse the damage of the last 25 years, but it’s no different than undoing the work of Richard Mellon Scaife and the other GOP whackjobs in the U.S.
This source (without references) says:
If true, it points to Saudi Arabia, again, being the source of a significant source of individuals willing to kill themselves to strike American or American related targets. And, if the Administration agrees with this assessment, why is it treating Saudi Arabia with kid gloves?
Same reasons as above. If you lose the House of Saud (or at least the part of the family that likes the House of Bush), then you get something even MORE radical in power in Saudi Arabia.