On Saturday, I posted “Iran – Stalling For Time“:
“Chief Iranian Nuclear Affairs Negotiator Hosein Musavian: The Negotiations with Europe Bought Us Time to Complete the Esfahan UCF Project and the Work on the Centrifuges in Natanz.” MEMRI
In this interview the chief Iranian Negotiator in the matter of their nuclear program explains that the protracted process of dealing with the IAEA and the European powers was worthwhile because it enabled Iran to procrastinate in dealing with the West long enough to complete major installation essential to the nuclear program.
Musavian makes it clear that the Iranian government’s negotiating strategy was motivated entirely by the tactical necessities required by the determination of the Iranian government to drive the program forward as rapidly as possible.
This interview should largely answer the uncertainty on the part of some people as to whether or not the Iranians could be lured into giving up their nuclear ambitions. – Pat Lang
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Next, from my friend, retired Marine Lt. Col. Dale Davis, who is director of international programs and teaches Arabic at Virginia Military Institute, his assessment — from a military standpoint — of the U.S. miliary’s options.
Dale — with whom I have appeared on PBS’s Newshour — posted “US Military Options to the Iranian Proliferation” at my blog, Sic Semper Tyrannis:
Despite the awesome power of the US armed forces, President Bush will find his military options for dealing with Iran tightly constrained by both political and military realities. What will be absolutely impossible to achieve is regime change Iraq – style via invasion and occupation. Even if the bulk of US ground forces were not already committed in Iraq and Afghanistan such an effort would be extremely challenging and without the support of popular forces certain to be violently rejected by the Iranian people.
CONTINUED BELOW:
A limited air campaign would be militarily simple to execute. Iranian air defenses would be easily destroyed. Targets would be designated and struck with precision and force but to what end? The Iranians have had decades to prepare for this most likely of scenarios and have no doubt dispersed, duplicated, and hardened their critical facilities. No air campaign in recent history has ever achieved anything near what the proponents of airpower have claimed. Unless the US is willing to carry out sustained strikes and re-strikes for months and maybe even years there is likely to be little serious damage done to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
And for the Jacobins in the audience forget the use of airpower as a tool for regime change. Iran is not Kosovo. Even a sustained air campaign would be unlikely to dislodge the Mullahs from power. Any speculation that a popular revolt can be triggered on the “Wings of Eagles” would be seriously mis-informed. The second bombs fall on Isphahan every Iranian will rally to the call of “Allahu Akbar Khomeni Rahbar.” Persian nationalism will trump the forces of democracy every time.
Sea-power might be the most effective of the limited tools available. A naval blockade of oil exports could be easily undertaken. Destoying the Iranian tanker fleet and liberating the three islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs along with their associated oil and gas fields would place tremendous economic pressure on the regime.
Regardless of which option is selected, Iran will retaliate by unleashing its tremendous influence amongst its Shi’a proxies in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan. Doesn’t any remember the Spring 04 Shi’a uprisings in Najaf and Kerbala? Imagine it on a much more intense and wide scale.
Dale R. Davis