The Elusive Iraqi Tipping Point

by Larry C. Johnson (bio below)

Had dinner last night with an old CIA buddy who has just returned from Iraq with some discouraging news. Although our troops and intelligence operatives are killing scores of insurgents (my friend estimated the kill rate at 160 enemy per each friendly) the insurgents keep coming. As Sy Hersh predicted in last month’s New Yorker, the military commanders decided to shift from ground confrontations to high altitude airstrikes. According to press reports on Wednesday, for example, the United States carried out 53 strikes inside Iraq. One of these, the mistaken bombing of a civilian home north of Baghdad, was condemend by Iraqi officials.

There should be no doubt our tactics have changed. The United States is relying more on aerial bombing, most of it high altitude or stand off, rather than close air support for troops on the ground engaged in a fight. Despite the promise of “precision” bombing, aerial strikes are anything but precise. They are very lethal and very powerful. On that front, a lot of insurgents, mostly Iraqis, are dying. But a bombing campaign, short of nuclear strikes that vaporize the whole country, cannot defeat an insurgency. We do not have enough planes or pilots, not to mention bombs. … continued below …
Most U.S. military officers on the ground sincerely believe that we have reached a tipping point where we are killing enough insurgents that their will to fight is being sapped. But the death toll from insurgent strikes during the last two days calls into question that confidence. It is worth recalling that in Vietnam we killed close to 1 million North Vietnamese while we suffered 57,000 fatalities. That was a kill ratio of roughly 200 20 to 1. Unfortunately, we do not know where this magical tipping point is.

The alternative argument is that imprecision of the U.S. strikes is likely to generate more insurgents than are killed. Within the ethos of the tribal culture in Iraq, seeking revenge on those who have wronged you or your family is a mission that can span centuries. The folks we are fighting have a much longer attention span than we do.

The coming months creates additional challenges and contraints for the United States military that are likely to work in favor of the insurgents. As the Shia led government assumes control in February the U.S. ability to conduct unilateral counterinsurgency missions will be curtailed because we will first have to seek permission to carry out such operations. At present U.S. forces can act without seeking Iraqi permission. That gives us an element of surprise. Once the Iraqi Government becomes the gate keeper our troops will face a greater risk of having the secrecy of any operation compromised.

This will likely lead to a reduction in U.S. counter insurgency operations over the coming months. As our operations decline the various Iraqi insurgent groups will have a chance to regroup, resupply, recruit, and become more lethal. Since we also are starting to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Iraq our actual ability to conduct operations will be further constrained.

The outlook for the next 10 months is not pretty. We will see a continued upsurge in violence, most of it sectarian in nature, with Iraqis dying at a far greater rate than Americans. U.S. military casualties will decline if the United States opts for a garrison strategy (keeping its forces on secure bases and devoted almost exclusively to training Iraqi forces). However, if the United States feels compelled to send its forces into cities to fight ithe nsurgents the U.S. death rate will go up.

What we can’t answer at this point is whether or not an Iraqi Government dominated by Shia religious extremists will allow the United States to play a constructive role in trying to build a secure, safe Iraq, or if U.S. forces will be used as proxies to kill Sunni opponents of the Government, or if the Shia will tell us to get out. My friend, recently back from Iraq, sees little chance that new Iraqi Government will opt for a non-sectarian solution to the security crisis. That leaves us two bad options–killing Sunnis or getting out. Either choice does not strengthen our policy in the Middle East.

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Larry C. Johnson is CEO and co-founder of BERG Associates, LLC, an international business-consulting firm that helps corporations and governments manage threats posed by terrorism and money laundering. Mr. Johnson, who worked previously with the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. State Department’s Office of Counter Terrorism (as a Deputy Director), is a recognized expert in the fields of terrorism, aviation security, crisis and risk management. Mr. Johnson has analyzed terrorist incidents for a variety of media including the Jim Lehrer News Hour, National Public Radio, ABC’s Nightline, NBC’s Today Show, the New York Times, CNN, Fox News, and the BBC. Mr. Johnson has authored several articles for publications, including Security Management Magazine, the New York Times, and The Los Angeles Times. He has lectured on terrorism and aviation security around the world. Further bio details.

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