In my previous posting, I referred to the fact that Judith Miller anticipated, by a month, all the key judgments of the intelligence agencies about Iraq’s nuclear program that went into the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. But, I left it to the reader to go to the sources and compare them. This led to some confusion. So, let me lay it out for you all again, and then put the two documents side by side.

On September 8, 2002, Judith Miller and Michael Gordon published an article entitled U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts
. In the first week of October, the intelligence community produced the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. It was a report that was requested from Congress and it was used to justify their vote for the authorization of force. As you will see, it used almost the same language, and drew the same conclusions, to describe the state of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities as Miller’s article had used. In other words, Judith Miller had seen all the facts that went into this highly classified report a month before Congress did.

Now, fast-forward to July of 2003. Baghdad is occupied, but no one can find anything to back up either Judith Miller’s reporting, or the reporting from the NIE (they are the same thing) on Iraq’s nuclear program. Once again, Scooter Libby goes to Judith Miller. He shows her (again) the key findings of the NIE (as if she hadn’t seen them back in September 2002). He also reveals Valerie Plames’s name and occupation (apparently getting her department wrong).

Now he claims, in court, that he went and got specific permission to leak these documents to Judith Miller in July. But, who leaked them to her in September of 2002?














National Intelligence Estimate- Key Judgments. Created in October 2002, declassified on July 18th, 2003.

From Judith Miller and Michael Gordon’s article U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts
. Published September 8, 2002.

How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.

* If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a year.

American intelligence officials believe that Iraq could assemble a nuclear device in a year or somewhat less if it obtained the nuclear material for a bomb on the black market. But they say there are no signs that Iraq has acquired such a supply.

* Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.

The Central Intelligence Agency still says it would take Iraq five to seven years to make a nuclear weapon if it must produce its own supply of highly enriched uranium for a bomb, an administration official said.

o Most agencies believe that Saddam’s personal interest in and Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors–as well as Iraq’s attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools–provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program.)

In addition to the special aluminum tubes, a senior administration official said Iraq had made efforts to purchase other equipment, epoxy and resins that could be used for centrifuges. A key issue is whether the items Iraq tried to buy are uniquely designed for centrifuge use or could have other applications.

Experts say the dimensions and precise specification of the aluminum tubes would provide a clear indication of its intended use.

o Iraq’s efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel as well as activities at several suspect nuclear sites further indicate that reconstitution is underway.

The attempted purchases are not the only signs of a renewed Iraqi interest in acquiring nuclear arms. President Hussein has met repeatedly in recent months with Iraq’s top nuclear scientists and, according to American intelligence, praised their efforts as part of his campaign against the West.