Effective Counter Attack-Part III; Mechanisms and Methods of Nonviolent Struggle

     The source for the following blue box text is;  — Robert L Helvey On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals.

     [All text in boxes with blue background are from the above source. Robert L Helvey is a protégé of Gene Sharp]

Chapter Four

Mechanisms and Methods of Nonviolent Struggle

      …all that I claim is that every experiment of mine has deepened my faith in non-violence as the greatest force at the disposal of mankind. -M.K.Gandhi  

     Moving a society from a dictatorship to a democracy is difficult no matter what path is preferred. […] consideration should be given to the different ways, or mechanisms, in which nonviolent struggle produces the desired changes in the power relationship between the ruler and the ruled.

     Dr. Sharp identifies four “mechanisms for changing power relationships.” These are conversion, accommodation, coercion and disintegration.

      They provide a cognitive framework for viewing information regarding the dynamics of change in power relationships. These classes of nonviolent action are useful also as methods to activate change or to assess the effects of prior nonviolent actions or campaigns.

     Included also in this chapter is an introduction to the broad categories of nonviolent actions: Protest and Persuasion, Noncooperation, and Intervention.

Mechanisms

     The ideas of strategic nonviolent struggle must move from theory to practice in order to bring political and social change. Important in the transition from ideas to action is the selection by the opposition of the preferred mechanism, or process, for influencing attitudes and behaviors of the rulers.

     This decision will, in turn, then influence the selection of methods for achieving the desired changes in the relationship between the people and their government.  

     For a more detailed discussion of the mechanisms and methods, see Gene Sharp’s The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Vols. II and III.

Conversion

     […] There may be situations where the regime can be convinced that its interests can be served by adopting a recommendation or demand by the struggle group.  

     Conversion has many advantages for the struggle group. The regime’s concession of the validity of the purpose for change could enhance the credibility and legitimacy of opposition leaders, reduce potential risks associated with direct confrontation with the state, and, very importantly, conserve resources for employment at later stages of the conflict. […]

     Recalling that strategic nonviolent struggle attacks the sources of power, conversion efforts against a regime’s pillars of support can be productive. […]Conversion is the primary mechanism for expanding and strengthening the pro-democracy forces.

     The skillful use of propaganda to contrast life under democratic and authoritarian regimes and news about current nonviolent actions occurring throughout the world are helpful in conversion efforts.

     News of demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and other forms of protests are examples that affect public attitudes.

     Most importantly, a “vision of tomorrow” with a concept of how that vision could be achieved should be presented to the public.

     Perhaps the strongest force for conversion efforts is the demonstration of courage of those who oppose an authoritarian regime.

     Public acts of courage against oppression dispel the stereotype that sees nonviolent protestors as cowards. Courage is universally respected whether that courage is displayed by soldiers on a battlefield or by nonviolent warriors confronting an oppressive regime. […]

     For example, those who signed the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 were displaying great courage in defying the King of England as were the 1950’s and 60’s civil rights activists who participated in the “sit-ins” to end segregation.

     Both of these acts of defiance caused the public to examine the fairness of the objectives of a struggle for which its proponents would accept grave risks.

 Accommodation

     Sometimes, a regime will accommodate a request or demand of the pro-democracy forces, not out of respect or courtesy, but because the regime may want to defuse social tension, influence attitudes of foreign governments, impress citizens of it’s concern for the welfare of people, or bring an issue to closure before opponents can exploit it for their own purposes.

     The regime has not been coerced but rather determines that its interests are not being directly threatened nor would it be weakened by conceding to the opposition on a particular issue.

     The reality is that the regime’s absolute hold on power has already been weakened and has become sensitive to issues that could arouse public hostility toward the government.  […]

     The cumulative effect of conversion and accommodation strengthens society and prepares it for even stronger action.

     Elections are commonly used by authoritarian regimes to accommodate opposition demands for political change.

     Unfortunately for the public, opposition leaders often naively assume that the elections will be free and fair, that the public can withstand government intimidation, or that international monitors can insure the integrity of the ballot counting process.

     The elections in Serbia in 2000 and in Zimbabwe in 2002 are examples of different election outcomes of rigged elections.

      In Serbia, the political opposition established an election monitoring system from the ballot boxes to Belgrade election central office. They had well-trained and organized Get Out The Vote (GOTV) campaign staff and a plan of action if the government should attempt to steal the election.

      The opposition groups’ early reporting of election results from the counting stations reflected a democratic victory, and the outcome was announced before the official results were tallied.

     When the government revealed that, according to its count, the opposition had not won, the people went to the streets and proclaimed their victory with mass demonstrations occurring throughout Serbia.

    The demonstrations culminated in a march on Parliament. Preparations were so complete that the police and military did not interfere when the new government was declared and installed. […]

     Zimbabwe’s election in March 2002 had a much different result. […] Little attention was given to a “Plan B” that would go into effect should the elections be stolen by the incumbent, […]

     With no detailed plan or any capacity to enforce the mandate of the people’s vote, the MDC [democracy movement] had no alternative but to limit its response to declaring the election neither fair nor free and to call for another election.

     There was no assurance whatsoever that a new election would result in any different outcome.

     The lesson here is that elections are too important to the regimes to lose since that defeat would mean the loss of legitimacy both at home and in the international community.

     For the same reasons, elections are also too important for the democratic opposition to lose. Preparations should be made to insure that the public is prepared to validate their votes at the ballot box with carefully planned measures to thwart the regime’s efforts to rig the results.

Coercion

     Conversion and accommodation permit the oppressor the option to accept or reject the requests or demands of the nonviolent opponents with little or no immediate consequences.

     Coercion, however, can compel submission to demands placed before the regime. At a point where coercion can be effective, a regime’s real power has already been significantly undermined.

     Opposition groups need to understand that attempts to coerce prematurely may undermine their own credibility with the public.

     If forces compliance with the demands cannot be assured, consideration must be given to a postponement or reconfiguration of demands.

     Political parties and student groups sometimes make “demands” that cannot be enforced. […] If, for example, there is a “demand” for a “free and fair election,” what sanctions will be imposed upon the regime for rejecting that demand?

    Coercion is successful when the demands of the opposition are achieved against the will of the regime. […]

     While there have been instances where threats of nonviolent coercion have result in victory for opposition groups, threats without a credible capacity to act do damage to any movement, as happened in Zimbabwe in 2002 when two calls for a general strike failed to materialize.

     It took many months of planning and coordination before another successful strike could be carried out.

     Attempts to coerce without the capacity to impose threatened sanctions can result in loss of the momentum of the democratic struggle; active support can dwindle; and international supporters may question the viability of the movement.

     It is imperative that capabilities assessments be reviewed during the planning and execution of major nonviolent campaigns to avoid such adverse consequences to a movement.

Disintegration

     […]Once the opposition recognizes that the balance of power has shifted in its favor, the regime should be attacked on a broad front by using the stronger methods of noncooperation and intervention.

     If these attacks are sustained, the regime will disintegrate, as the sources of power needed for maintaining its rule will no longer be available.

     If disintegration of a regime is considered necessary by the opposition, then there must be no reduction in the intensity and scope of nonviolent actions until the collapse of the regime is accomplished.

   A loss of momentum by the opposition, for whatever reason, can provide the regime with an opportunity to re-assert its power. […]  

Methods of Nonviolent Action

     […] The methods of nonviolent action that are available for use by the opposition against an opponent are both extensive and varied. In The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Sharp identifies almost two hundred […] and advises that this list is not exhaustive. In fact, creative thinking is encouraged to tailor methods for specific situations. […]

      Ideally, one should first examine the objectives and then review the menu of methods to select those that provide the most appropriate means to further the strategic and tactical objectives.

     For ease of consideration, methods can be divided into three broad categories. These are protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention.  

Protest and Persuasion

      Acts of protest and attempted persuasion provide a signal to the regime that the pro-democracy forces have serious disagreements and objections to certain actions and policies of the government. These protests are primarily symbolic in intent.

     Moreover, these acts also serve to put the public on notice that the nonviolent opposition movement is challenging the government for specified abuses.

     While acts of nonviolent protest and attempts at persuasion can be used to advantage at any stage of a strategic nonviolent movement, they are generally introduced early in a struggle, even at its public initiation.

     Whatever forms of protest and persuasion are selected, the acts should receive wide-spread media coverage. Demonstrations or protest letters have little or no effect if no one knows about them. […]

     These methods [protest and persuasion] do not constitute direct attacks on the opponent’s sources of power, discussed in Chapter 1, but rather they are indirect attacks intended to expose the actions of the regime to public scrutiny, express objections to them and attempt to persuade the regime and others that change is needed.

    Nonviolent struggle is more, much more, than demonstrations of discontent.      

Noncooperation

    Noncooperation is the most powerful category of nonviolent methods available to opposition movements. Wise selection and planning for this group of actions within a strategy enhances the likelihood of removing sources of power from the regime. […]

     No government can survive without the cooperation of the people. The message that noncooperation seeks to convey is that “we, the people, will no longer help the government oppress its citizens.”

     The greatest impact of noncooperation is achieved when the actions that have been selected support nonviolent strategy and are orchestrated rather than haphazard.

     Coupled with the internal noncooperation campaigns against a regime’s pillars of support should be a concentrated effort to develop international support for the imposition of sanctions that focus on a withdrawal of cooperation.

     Noncooperation on the international level as well as within the country’s borders can help supporters of political change.

Social Noncooperation

     Every person in the country can practice social noncooperation. Avoiding social interactions with targeted members of the regime can be devastating to officials and members of their families.

     Social elites can stop inviting regime officials to social functions and refuse to attend government sponsored and private social affairs when officials are expected to be in attendance. […]

     Shunning sends a message that the people cannot tolerate those who support the regime. It should, however, be used with care and precision. If it used incorrectly, it could interfere with ongoing efforts to move regime supporters into the ranks of the opposition.

     Social and sports events that give prestige to the regime can be boycotted. Even wearing clothing frowned upon by the regime is an act of noncooperation. Those who have become selected targets quickly realize the message that such non-cooperation imparts.

Economic Noncooperation

     Based upon the obvious fact that all governments require revenues to provide the public services expected of them, economic noncooperation as a method of strategic nonviolent action is intended to attack government support by destroying or decreasing the economic incentives available to its supporters. […]

     […]Economic instability leads not only to the weakening of the pillars of support for a government, it detracts from and limits the regime’s efforts to counter an opposition’s political noncooperation efforts–not an insignificant contribution to the overall strategic objectives of a nonviolent struggle. […]

Political Noncooperation

     While any and all acts of noncooperation against a regime, as part of a strategic nonviolent movement, are “political” in nature, Gene Sharp identified thirty-eight specific political acts of noncooperation among his “198 Methods of Nonviolent Action” […]

     These actions are aimed primarily at the rejection of authority, a key source of power for a government or an occupying power.

     A collateral benefit of political noncooperation is that is also tends to strengthen civil society. Organizations gain experience and confidence in their capacity to act against the regime, alone, or in concert with other like-minded groups.

     Political noncooperation is a direct assault upon the government. Declarations, manifestos, and other documents rejecting the presumed authority and therefore the legitimacy of a regime can be used to convince the public that the regime has no right to exercise authority.

     These acts of protest are then followed by boycotts of government institutions, work slowdowns by civil servants, and innumerable opportunities for civil disobedience by the general public, which, if widely and consistently carried out, can neutralize or even disintegrate the power of an authoritarian regime.

Intervention

     Nonviolent actions whose intent or effect disrupts established behavior patterns, policies, relationships or institutions are acts of intervention.

     They may also have the effect of creating new patterns of behavior, relationships or even creating new institutions.

     Since these methods are more direct in challenging the status quo, they provide more immediate visibility to the issue at hand, a more direct challenge to authority, and the possibility of a more rapid resolution.

    On the other hand, acts of intervention may result in more immediate and severe repression than acts that are intended as protest and noncooperation.

     Recent US history provides examples of how effective third party intervention can be in changing established behavior patterns and social relationships.

     Lunch counter sit-in during the US civil rights movement were highly visible and effective actions that directly attacked and quickly ended racial segregation at restaurants.

    Moreover, these campaigns also brought the necessary visibility and sense of urgency needed to enact legislation addressing the broader issue of racial segregation.

     As decades have passed since these actions took place, the violence that occurred during many of the sit-ins is sometimes overlooked. Sit-ins provoked countless beatings, the unleashing of police dogs, and other acts of violence.

   This violence, often inflicted by authorities, initiated political jiu-jitsu, in that the power to inflict violence against peaceful  protestors spurred the even more powerful forces of justice to act against segregation. [#10 ]

     [#10 ] Political jiu-jitsu is briefly defined as “A special process that may operate during a nonviolent struggle to change power relationships. In political jiu-jitsu negative reactions to the opponents’ violent repression against nonviolent resisters is turned to operate politically against the opponents, weakening their power position and strengthening that of the nonviolent resisters.” […]

     In a strategic nonviolent struggle against an authoritarian regime, that force for justice on behalf of the people may not be the national government, but may require reinforcement from the international community. […]

                                           Chapter Nine

Insights into Strategic Thinking

[…]

     Just as artillery changed the nature of war in Machiavelli’s time, technology has given us capabilities to change the way nonviolent conflicts are waged. Computers, internet access, mobile and satellite phones, encryption programs, television, and radio are major weapons of nonviolent struggle.

     In preparing to wage a strategic nonviolent struggle, understanding those links between politics and the social and economic forces is critically important. Today, we must see these forces, not just within a country, but also the ones that are external, for globalization has provided opportunities to expand the battlefield far beyond what Machiavelli could have imagined.