A commenter at Booman Tribune, no3reed, pointed me to this Washington Post report on Zarqawi’s death, and in particular to its penultimate paragraph:
Minutes after the Zarqawi’s death was announced the long-debated interior, defense and national security posts were filled in a giddy session of parliament. Abdul Qadir Muhammed Jassim, a Sunni Arab and former Iraqi army commander, was named defense minister, Jawad al-Bolani, a Shiite, was put in charge of the interior ministry, and Sherwan Alwaeli, a Kurd, was named the country’s top official for national security.
Very giddy, indeed (more on the flip).
A very odd paragraph to bury so far into this story. Why call the session giddy? And why would political opponents who had been fighting tooth and nail over these final three, critical posts for the ministries of defense, the interior and national security, suddenly break out in a gush of camaraderie and cut this deal, seemingly in a display of good will toward all, if the WaPo story is to be believed.
You must remember that the Iraqi Parliament has been at loggerheads for weeks over divvying up responsibility for these posts which collectively have over control the police and the Iraqi military forces. Suddenly, Zarqawi is pronounced dead and a deal is struck? And the Sunni representative gets control over the Iraqi Army?
This looks like a deal long in the making, the sort of deal Mafia dons reputably make. “Bring me the head of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi” I can imagine Prime Minister al-Maliki telling the Sunni parties, “and I’ll give you the Defense Ministry post.”
Now, I wish to make clear this is purely speculation on my part, but you must admit, something about the way the WaPO article portrays this sudden outbreak of cheery bonhomie among the politicians in Iraq’a Parliament doesn’t pass the smell test. Let’s look back at earlier portions of this article to see if we can glean any further insights:
U.S. forces had placed a $25 million bounty on Zarqawi, the organization’s leader and most public face. He was last seen publicly in a video that aired in early May, after widespread reports that U.S. and Iraqi forces had stepped up efforts to capture him.
“Zarqawi was the godfather of sectarian killing and terrorism in Iraq,” Khalilzad said. He sought a civil war within Islam and a global war of civilizations. “His organization has been responsible for the death of thousands of civilians in Iraq and abroad.”
After the news conference, Maliki told the al-Arabiya television network that the $25 million bounty would be honored. “We will meet our promise,” he said without elaborating.
Again, look at the internal inconsistency. The US puts a bounty of $25 million on Zarqawi’s head last year, yet today it is al-Maliki who is quoted as saying the bounty will be honored. But who’s getting the money? He won’t say, although earlier in the article it was strongly suggested by General Casey that the information about Zarqawi’s whereabouts came from Iraqi intelligence sources.
“Tips and intelligence from Iraqi senior leaders from his network led forces to al-Zarqawi and some of his associates who were conducting a meeting . . . when the air strike was launched,” Casey said.
And then look again at what US Ambassador Khalilzad said: “Zarqawi was the godfather of sectarian killing and terrorism in Iraq.” Not that emphasis on the phrase “sectarian killing.” Not the godfather of “terrorist activity” in Iraq, or the “Leader of Al Queda” in Iraq. Instead, Khalizad chose to emphasize the element of “sectarian violence”, in effect saying Zarqawi was responsible for all the Sunni v. Shia fighting that has erupted. As if Zarqawi is being made the scapegoat, so all sides can save face, and pin the blame in him.
Perhaps I’m way off base, but this strikes me as one of those deals that was done behind the scenes., where the Sunni factions in the Government ratted out Zarqawi, a foreigner, in exchange for political concessions and cold hard cash. Let’s just say that theory makes at least as much sense as a sudden welling up of good will, and the breakout of the spirit of compromise between the Sunnis and Shiite political factions immediately upon Zarqawi’s death.
