Already, I have examined the history of the National Missile Defense programs in our nation’s history. Then, we took a look at Bush’s recent statements that he believes the current system has a “reasonable chance” of shooting down a North Korean missile launched today. When pressed on the matter, Bush replied that that was, “what he had been told.”
Well, it appears that what he, and the rest of the Department of Defense, have been told is that the program that was already failing has been ruined by Bush’s mismanagement. How do you grab hold of something that never worked to begin with and take it that extra step toward a special kind of failure? Bush style, that’s how.
Follow me below the fold for a look at a GAO report from March of this year that showed just how ridiculously inept the Bush adminstration really is.
For a quick recap of how we got here today, we will examine the history of the program briefly. Missile defense arosee out of the ashes of the second World War, and had a relatively low profile until President Reagan took it upon himself to launch a resurgence in the 1980s. His strategic defense initiative, also known as Star Wars, was an attempt to provide the United States with a blanket of protection from a foreign ICBM threat. Unfortunately for the American taxpayer, it quickly became clear that not only was the technology inadequate for such a program, but the ramifications of national missile defense were more nuclear missiles being created, rather than less. To say this made the hawkish conservatives happy would be an understatement, and the stage was set for salivating neocons to take control of the system when George W. Bush was sworn in during 2002. Here are the major developments since that point, from Wikipedia (emphasis mine):
On 16 December 2002 President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 23 which outlined a plan to begin deployment of operational ballistic missile defense systems by 2004. The following day the U.S. formally requested from the UK and Denmark use of facilities in Fylingdales, England, and Thule, Greenland, respectively, as a part of the NMD program. The projected cost of the program for the years 2004 to 2009 will be 53 billion U.S. dollars, making it the largest single line in The Pentagon’s budget.
Since 2002, the US has been in talks with Poland and other European countries over the possibility of setting up a European base to intercept long-range missiles. A site similar to the US base in Alaska would help protect the US and Europe from missiles fired from the Middle East or North Africa. Poland’s prime minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz said in November, 2005 he wanted to open up the public debate on whether Poland should host such a base.
In 2003, NMD was changed to Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), to differentiate it from other missile defense programs, such as space-based, sea-based, and defense targeting the boost phase and the reentry phase (see flight phases).
On 22 July 2004, the first ground-based interceptor was deployed at Ft. Greely, Alaska (63.954° N 145.735° W). By the end of 2004, a total of six had been deployed at Ft. Greely and another two at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Two additional were installed at Ft. Greely in 2005. The system will provide “rudimentary” protection.
On 15 December 2004, an interceptor test in the Marshall Islands failed when the launch was aborted due to an “unknown anomaly” in the interceptor, 16 minutes after launch of the target from Kodiak Island, Alaska. “I don’t think that the goal was ever that we would declare it was operational. I think the goal was that there would be an operational capability by the end of 2004,” Pentagon representative Larry DiRita said on 2005-01-13 at a Pentagon press conference. “There has been some expectation that there will be some point at which it is operational and not something else, and I just don’t think people should expect that for the near term.” DiRita said the system might never actually be declared operational.
On 18 January 2005, the Commander, United States Strategic Command issued direction to establish the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense. JFCC IMD, once activated, will develop desired characteristics and capabilities for global missile defense operations and support for missile defense.
On 14 February 2005, another interceptor test failed due to a malfunction with the ground support equipment at the test range on Kwajalein Island, not with the interceptor missile itself.
On 24 February 2005, the Missile Defense Agency, testing the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, successfully intercepted a mock enemy missile. This was the first test of an operationally configured Standard missile 3 interceptor and the fifth successful test intercept using this system.
On 10 November 2005, the USS Lake Erie detected, tracked, and destroyed a mock two-stage ballistic missile within two minutes of the ballistic missile launch.
What we are going to be looking at today is that National Security Presidential Directive 23. In 2002, President Bush was making a nearly daily habit of expanding and accelerating defense programs. The aforementioned neoconservatives were chomping at the bit to bloat the defense budget beyond even their wildest imaginations. The centerpiece was to be a National Missile Defense program.
Already in the works, the program was on a ‘blocks’ system, by which research and testing would occur in two year blocks. At the end of each block, the system could either be moved on to further research, approved for expanded testing, or given operational status. It was a way for the program to evolve given the conditions of progress in each two year period. While I won’t admit that the system itself was a responsible use of defense dollars, it was at least an intelligent way to go about doing it. Luckily for us, President Bush was on the case.
Directive 23 took away the blocks system as it was, and essentially said that we were going to do everything at once, with the goal being a fully operationally ready system by 2004. Research would occur at the same time as testing at the same time as declaring things fully operational. It was a beautiful way for Bush to say that we were protected by missile defense, before the tests were even completed. This was lucky for him, because the tests were largely failures.
As part of this system, the United States Government Accountability Office was required to give reports on the status of the program and the blocks as they were completed. In March of this year, the report was released. The Baltimore Sun has the scoop:
The Bush administration has spent nearly $43 billion over the past five years on missile defense systems, but with North Korea brandishing its most advanced missile yet, U.S. government assessments and investigative reports indicate little confidence in the centerpiece portion of the program.
Eleven ground-based interceptors in Alaska and at Vandenberg Air Force Base in central California, the cornerstone of the administration’s new system, have not undergone a successful test in nearly four years and have been troubled by glitches that investigators blame, at least in part, on President Bush’s order in 2002 to make the program operational before it had been fully tested.
In all, the interceptors hit dummy missiles in five out of 10 tests, but these were under controlled conditions that critics said did not reflect the challenges of an actual missile launch.
A little-noticed study by the Government Accountability Office issued in March found that program officials were so concerned with potential flaws in the first nine interceptors now in operation that they considered taking them out of their silos and returning them to their manufacturer for “disassembly and remanufacture.”
“Quality control procedures may not have been rigorous enough to ensure that unreliable parts, or parts that were inappropriate for space applications, would be removed from the manufacturing process,” the report found.
Since taking office in 2001, Bush has made a ballistic missile defense system one of his highest military priorities, advancing an array of programs designed to down enemy missiles in various stages of flight.
Now how does a system go from a recommended “disassembly and remanufacture” to having a “reasonable chance” of working? Through the magic that is the Bush administration, that’s how. And how does the Bush system of governance award a failure? With the monetary equivalent of a Medal of Freedom:
The Pentagon has requested $10.4 billion for missile defense in next year’s budget, which would be its largest annual grant to date. And according to the GAO, the administration plans to spend $58 billion, or 14 percent of its entire research budget, on missile defense over the next six years.
The bulk of spending has gone to the ground-based interceptor system, designed to take out long-range missiles as they arc through space toward a target. Interceptors are rockets that have missile-seeking devices meant to destroy incoming weapons.
And in case there was any doubt about who the GAO places blame on, they make it very clear:
Until the President’s directive, the GMD program was focused on developing a test bed. If GMD had serially progressed through all eight events of the Integrated Management Plan, components would have been matured and demonstrated in the test bed. At the end of Block 2004, MDA could have (1) transferred GMD to a military service for production, operation, and sustainment; (2) developed GMD further in a subsequent block; or (3) terminated the program altogether. However, to field early, the GMD program condensed its Block 2004 acquisition cycle. The program attempted to simultaneously demonstrate technology, design an integrated GMD element, and produce and emplace assets for operational use–all within 2 years of the President’s directive.
The GMD program fielded an initial capability in 2004 and 2005, as it was directed to do. However, there were consequences of the accelerated schedule. The fielding schedule for some GMD components slipped, and the program could not complete an end-to-end test needed to verify GMD’s performance. Production and fielding of GMD interceptors was slowed by technical problems and the program’s need to address quality controlissues. To address these issues, the program restructured its test plan at a cost of about $115 million; but it funded the plan at the expense of making the Sea-Based X-Band and Fylingdales upgraded early warning radars operational. Block 2006 funds will now be used to complete these Block 2004 activities.
Now, that last part caught my eye, because in the conclusion of the report, the GAO says the following:
Missile defense is one of the largest weapon system investments DOD is making. To date, around $90 billion has been spent, and over the next 6 years, DOD expects that it will need about $58 billion more to enhance the BMDS. Beyond that, more funding will be required if DOD is to reach its ultimate goal of developing a system capable of countering ballistic missile launches from any range during all phases of flight. By driving to a fielding date during Block 2004, MDA placed assets in the field faster than originally planned. However, in doing so, MDA strayed from the knowledge-based approach that allows successful developers to deliver, within budget, a product whose performance has been demonstrated. Instead, MDA fielded assets before their capability was known. In addition, the full cost of this capability is not transparent to decision makers because MDA has deferred the cost of some Block 2004 activities into the next block.
What happened was this: The Bush adminstration ordered the hurry-up of research/testing/upgrading, and the Department of Defense just couldn’t keep up. In an effort to have end results on deadline, they cut out large swaths of the testing schedule in the name of having an ‘operational’ tag put on the system. The tests themselves have to be done, so they just pushed them off until after the deadline, allowing their expenditures to go with them. So what we are left with is an untested program that is grossly over-budget, and the DoD essentially says that large portions of the program were never completed to begin with, and their costs not included in the information given to the GAO. Make no doubt about this: They are hiding the true costs of this system from the American people.
So where does this leave us? Well, absolutely nowhere at the moment. No politicians are raising hell about the new calls for missile defense, for the same reasons they refused to question the <s>Patriot Act</s> <s>Iraq War</s>…well, you get the picture. The amount of money invested in this obviously failing program, a program that no one truly believes will work to begin with, is horrifying. Yet we have no one willing to step up to the plate and make the case for the American people. This is where I want to see a 2008 Presidential contender stake their claim. This is a matter of leadership and responsibility.
It will not be easy, but fighting for the truth never is. So my question to the Democratic Party is this: Who among you is willing to fight for what is right?
Go read the GAO Report yourself. Not for the faint of heart.
(Originally posted at Deny My Freedom and cross posted at Daily Kos and My Left Wing)
Tommorrow, I will be looking at the myth of missile defense testing, wherein we will see how even the successful tests of the missile defense system have been carefully orchestrated press releases.