I wrote about the problems with Condi Rice’s pre-9/11 performance in my February 2004 article, What Was Bush Thinking On 9/11? (.pdf). It’s important to revisit these issues in light of the recent revelations that George Tenet and Cofer Black visited Condi on July 10th, 2001 and issued a warning of imminent attacks. I pick up here midstream in an analysis of the May 2002 revelation that Bush had received an August 6th Presidential Daily Briefing entitled Bin-Laden Determined to Strike in the United States.
By the time word of this memo leaked, in May 2002, eight months had passed since the attacks, and the administration had insisted emphatically that we had no warning. No one could have predicted 9/11, they said, and nothing could have prevented it. It
came as a shock to hear that the President had been specifically briefed on the subject of al-Qaeda hijacking. Tom Brokaw led the NBC Nightly News by announcing: “at the White House tonight it is all hands on deck as the White House tries to deal with a storm of criticism”.17The pro-Bush New York Post’s headline blared, “BUSH KNEW”. The father of WTC casualty, Bill Doyle, said at the time, “I believe our
whole government let people down”. Ron Willet, whose son’s phone cut out when17 The Hotline, May 17, 2002, FIRST PUBLIC COMMENTS COME AFTER A DAY OF DAMAGE CONTROL
the North Tower was struck, agreed. Asked whether he thought the government shared some responsibility for the loss of his son, Willet replied, “I have to. We had the suspicions all along. We’d talked about the possibility of the government knowing.”18
On May 16th, a shaken Dr. Rice held a press conference to do damage control. She tried to downplay the significance of the leak and the memo, claiming it was merely a page and half long and was an, “analytic report, which did not have warning information in it of the kind that said, they are talking about an attack against so forth
or so on…(it) mentioned hijacking, but hijacking in the traditional sense… the overwhelming bulk of the evidence was that this was an attack that was likely to take place overseas.”When asked why the administration had not volunteered this information she responded, “this all came out as a result of our preparations to help the committees on the Hill that are getting ready to review the events. It wasn’t—frankly, it didn’t pop to the front of people’s minds, because it’s one report among very, very many that you
get.”Interestingly, the Bush administration refused to provide access to this memo to those “committees on the Hill” whose very existence they did their utmost to discourage.
18 Springfield News -Leader (Springfield, MO) May 26, 2002 Families differ on what they want to know, Eric Eckert.
What I want to now is to put the July 10th date into its proper perspective. The first thing I want to do is quote from Condi’s damage control press conference of May 16, 2002. Look carefully at her timeline and notice how she skips right over the July 10 period. I quote this at length so you can an idea of the level of detail she used. And remember, the 9/11 Commission was never told about the July 10th meeting with Tenet and Cofer.
In the June time frame, arrests for the Millennium plot, there was testimony by the participants in the Millennium plot that Abu Zabeda had said that there might be interest in attacking the United States. And this comes out of testimony that was there as a result of the Millennium plot. And then in June — on June 26th, there was a threat spike, and as a result, again focusing overseas, the State Department issued a worldwide caution. Again, that was June 26th, and you probably remember that caution.
Now, the FAA was also concerned of threats to U.S. citizens such as airline hijackings, and therefore, issued an information circular — and an information circular goes out the private carriers from law enforcement — saying that we have a concern. That was a June 22nd information circular.
At the end of June, there was a status of threat and action meeting that the — what we call the Counterterrorism Security Group — it is a group that is interagency that meets on the direction of an NSC Special Assistant, Dick Clarke at that time. There was a meeting of that, and Dick Clarke reported to me that steps were being taken by the CSG.
On July 2nd, as a result of some of that work, the FBI released a message saying that there are threats to be worried about overseas, but we cannot — while we cannot foresee attacks domestically, we cannot rule them out. This is an inlet, and again, an inlet goes out to law enforcement from the FBI.
On July 2nd, the FAA issued another IC, saying that Ressam — again associated with the Millennium plot — said that there was an intention of using explosives in an airport terminal. This was a very specific IC.
On July 5th, the threat reporting had become sufficiently robust, though not, again, very specific, but sufficiently robust, there was a lot of chatter in the system, that in his morning meeting the President asked me to go back and to see what was being done about all of the chatter that was there. Andy Card and I met that afternoon with Dick Clarke, and Dick Clarke informed us that he had already had a meeting of the CSG core group and that he was holding another meeting that afternoon that would be focused on threats, and that would bring the domestic agencies into the CSG.
On July 6th, the CSG core players met again because there was concern about — very high concern about potential attacks in Paris, Turkey, Rome, and they acted to go so far as to suspend non-essential travel of U.S. counterterrorism staff. So this is a period in which, again, attacks — potential attacks overseas were heightened enough that there was almost daily meeting now, sometimes twice a day, of either the CSG or its subgroups. Contingency planning was done on how to deal with multiple, simultaneous attacks around the world.
The period in mid-July was a point of another major threat spike, and it all related to the G-8 summit that was coming up. And in fact, there was specific threat information about the President. There was a lot of work done with liaison services abroad; in fact, the CIA went on what I think you would call a full-court press to try and deal with these potential attacks, and indeed, managed through these intelligence activities and liaison activities to disrupt attacks in Paris, Turkey and Rome.
On July 18th, the FAA issued another IC, saying that there were ongoing terrorist threats overseas, and that although there were no specific threats directed at civil aviation, they told the airlines, “we urge you to use the highest level of caution.”
On July 18th also, the FBI issued another inlet on the Millennium plot conviction, reiterating its July 2nd message saying we’re concerned about threats as a result of the Millennium plot conviction.
At the end of July, the FAA issued another IC, which said, there’s no specific target, no credible info of attack to U.S. civil aviation interests, but terror groups are known to be planning and training for hijackings, and we ask you, therefore, to urge — to use caution.
Throughout July and August, several times a week, there were meetings of the CSG, reviewing information at hand. There was no specific new information that came in in that period of time after the end of July and sort of in August, leading up to September. But the agencies were still at a heightened state of alert. Particularly overseas. I think the military actually had dropped its state of alert, but everybody was still on a heightened state of alert.
On August 1st, the FBI issued another inlet on the upcoming third East Africa bombing anniversary, and again reiterated the message that had been in the July 2nd inlet.
Let’s fill this timeline in a little more by citing the relevant portion of the 9/11 Commission report.
On July 2, the FBI Counterterrorism Division sent a message to federal agencies and state and local law enforcement agencies summarizing information regarding threats from Bin Ladin. It warned that there was an increased volume of threat reporting, indicating a potential for attacks against U.S. targets abroad from groups “aligned with or sympathetic to Usama Bin Ladin.” Despite the general warnings, the message further stated, “The FBI has no information indicating a credible threat of terrorist attack in the United States.” However, it went on to emphasize that the possibility of attack in the United States could not be discounted. It also noted that the July 4 holiday might heighten the threats. The report asked recipients to “exercise extreme vigilance” and “report suspicious activities” to the FBI. It did not suggest specific actions that they should take to prevent attacks.19
Disruption operations against al Qaeda-affiliated cells were launched involving 20 countries. Several terrorist operatives were detained by foreign governments, possibly disrupting operations in the Gulf and Italy and perhaps averting attacks against two or three U.S. embassies. Clarke and others told us of a particular concern about possible attacks on the Fourth of July. After it passed uneventfully, the CSG decided to maintain the alert.20
To enlist more international help, Vice President Cheney contacted Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5. Hadley apparently called European counterparts, while Clarke worked with senior officials in the Gulf. In late July, because of threats, Italy closed the airspace over Genoa and mounted antiaircraft batteries at the Genoa airport during the G-8 summit, which President Bush attended.21
At home, the CSG arranged for the CIA to brief intelligence and security officials from several domestic agencies. On July 5, representatives from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the FAA, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, Customs, the CIA, and the FBI met with Clarke to discuss the current threat. Attendees report that they were told not to disseminate the threat information they received at the meeting. They interpreted this direction to mean that although they could brief their superiors, they could not send out advisories to the field. An NSC official recalls a somewhat different emphasis, saying that attendees were asked to take the information back to their home agencies and “do what you can” with it, subject to classification and distribution restrictions. A representative from the INS asked for a summary of the information that she could share with field offices. She never received one.22
That same day, the CIA briefed Attorney General Ashcroft on the al Qaeda threat, warning that a significant terrorist attack was imminent. Ashcroft was told that preparations for multiple attacks were in late stages or already complete and that little additional warning could be expected. The briefing addressed only threats outside the United States.23
The next day, the CIA representative told the CSG that al Qaeda members believed the upcoming attack would be “spectacular,” qualitatively different from anything they had done to date.24
Apparently as a result of the July 5 meeting with Clarke, the interagency committee on federal building security was tasked to examine security measures. This committee met on July 9, when 37 officials from 27 agencies and organizations were briefed on the “current threat level” in the United States. They were told that not only the threat reports from abroad but also the recent convictions in the East Africa bombings trial, the conviction of Ahmed Ressam, and the just-returned Khobar Towers indictments reinforced the need to “exercise extreme vigilance.” Attendees were expected to determine whether their respective agencies needed enhanced security measures.25
Now, let’s add another piece of the puzzle to this time period. This is from a Kerry campaign press release of July 1, 2004.
Acting FBI Director Tom Pickard testified before the 9-11 Commission that when he tried to brief Ashcroft on July 12, 2001 about the terror threat inside the United States, Ashcroft told him he did not want to hear about it anymore. Despite Ashcroft’s testimony before the 9-11 Commission that he did not brush Pickard aside, two senior FBI officials, including the head of the FBI Criminal Division at that time, have confirmed that Ashcroft dismissed Pickard’s warnings about Al Qaeda. (NBC, “Nightly News,” 6/22/04; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States hearing, 4/13/04; NBC, “Nightly News,” 6/22/04)
The Attorney General expressed a desire to not be bothered with further briefings about al-Qaeda two days after Tenet and Black met with Rice. This is how Woodward describes the latter meeting.
Although passages of the book suggest that Mr. Tenet was a major source for Mr. Woodward, the former intelligence director has refused to comment on the book.
Nor has there been any comment from J. Cofer Black, Mr. Tenet’s counterterrorism chief, who is reported in the book to have attended the July 10 meeting and left it frustrated by Ms. Rice’s “brush-off” of the warnings.
He is quoted as saying, “The only thing we didn’t do was pull the trigger to the gun we were holding to her head.” Mr. Black did not return calls left at the security firm Blackwater, which he joined last year.
The book says that Mr. Tenet hurriedly organized the meeting — calling ahead from his car as it traveled to the White House — because he wanted to “shake Rice” into persuading the president to respond to dire intelligence warnings that summer about a terrorist strike. Mr. Woodward writes that Mr. Tenet left the meeting frustrated because “they were not getting through to Rice.”
There is a lot of fodder in here for the Let-it-happen-on-purpose (LIHOP) folks. Consider the case of Ashcroft. He received dire warnings on July 12th and responded in anger and dismissiveness. But, what are we to make of the July 26, 2001 report by CBS News that Ashcroft would no longer fly commercial airlines?
In response to inquiries from CBS News over why Ashcroft was traveling exclusively by leased jet aircraft instead of commercial airlines, the Justice Department cited what it called a “threat assessment” by the FBI, and said Ashcroft has been advised to travel only by private jet for the remainder of his term.
“There was a threat assessment and there are guidelines. He is acting under the guidelines,” an FBI spokesman said. Neither the FBI nor the Justice Department, however, would identify what the threat was, when it was detected or who made it.
It’s not surprising that Ashcroft was afraid to fly commerical. As noted above, “on July 5, 2001 the CIA briefed Attorney General Ashcroft on the al Qaeda threat, warning that a significant terrorist attack was imminent. Ashcroft was told that preparations for multiple attacks were in late stages or already complete and that little additional warning could be expected.” What’s not clear is why, on July 12th he told acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard not to bother him with further al-Qaeda reporting.
Why did Condi Rice ignore the warnings of the CIA Director and Counterterrorism chief? Why did Bush ignore the August 6th, memo.
But, most importantly, I will quote again from my February 2004 article:
The first plane crashed at 8:46 am, and was reported by CNN at 8:48. Millions of
people all over the world knew that a plane had crashed into the WTC for over ten minutes, the White House maintains, before anyone bothered to tell the President.Condi Rice didn’t feel the urgency to contact him immediately but was willing to wait for him to arrive at the school. Since he arrived at the school shortly before nine, and had already settled into the classroom by no later than 9:03, it is clear that Rice did not have a very long conversation with him. She does recollect him saying, “it sounds like a terrible accident. Keep me informed.”
Was Rice, the National Security Advisor, whose job it is to coordinate national security, really unaware that NORAD had at least two other suspected hijacks in the air? After all, approximately forty minutes earlier Flight 11 had inadvertently broadcast the message, “We have some
planes.”Even if she wasn’t aware of it, might she not have reminded Bush that the WTC was a terrorist target, of his August 6th briefing, and that an accident was unlikely?
Why didn’t Condi Rice, George Tenet, or Cofer Black ever tell Congress or the 9/11 Commission that they had had a meeting on July 10, 2001? I don’t think we want to know the answer.
